Ashna in response to Mujahid: The management of the prisoner exchange negotiations was with the Ministry of Intelligence/ 1.7 billion dollars was not the demand that was made in the negotiations for Rezaian's release.
The adviser to the head of the 11th and 12th governments, in response to Mehdi Mujahid's narrative about the exchange of Jason Rezaiyan and Iran's blocked money, wrote: The amount of 1.7 billion dollars was not a demand that was created in the negotiations for Rezaiyan's release, and its origin was the funds paid by Iran to buy military equipment from the United States before the revolution.
According to Ambassador Arjan, the story of the exchange of Jason Rezaian and the issue of Iran's blocked money has once again become a point of disagreement between the political figures of the previous governments. The dispute, which this time with the statements of Mehdi Mujahid, the deputy coordinator, special follow-ups and management services of the President's office in the 13th government, has been re-emerged on the radio. Mujahid gave a narrative of this story in a television interview; A narrative that was met with the reaction of Hossamuddin Ashna, the adviser to the head of the 11th and 12th governments; A person who was in the government during the mentioned period and was closely familiar with the atmosphere of that time.
In response to Mujahid's words, Ashna wrote by republishing a part of these statements on his user account on the X social network that this narrative has "only about 105 degrees of deviation from the north"; An irony that shows that he does not consider the proposed narrative to be compatible with the facts of that event.
But Ashna's reaction was not limited to this short sentence, and he went on to provide more detailed explanations about the exchange of Jason Rezaian and Iranian money, which you can read below:
rereading a file; From the exchange of prisoners to the collection of 1.7 billion dollars
In defense of the IRGC Intelligence Organization's performance, Braradi identifies Jason Rezaian's arrest as the reason for forcing America to pay 1.7 billion dollars. The appearance of this narrative is to defend the success of a security operation; But its legal result can be exactly the opposite of the speaker's intention.
If Rezaiyan was arrested on the charge of espionage, the legality of the arrest should be checked based on the reasons related to the same charge and the decision of the judicial authorities. But if it is said that we arrested him to force the American government to pay money, another purpose for the arrest has been suggested: to use a person's freedom to obtain financial privileges from his respective government.
In order to judge this claim, three cases must be separated from each other: the Rezaian case, the prisoner exchange agreement, and the financial reconciliation between Iran and the United States.
A request that had a history of thirty years
The amount of 1.7 billion dollars was not a demand that was created in the negotiations for Rezaian's release. Its origin goes back to the funds paid by Iran to buy military equipment from America before the revolution.
After the revolution and the suspension of the implementation of part of the contracts, the dispute regarding the return of funds and obligations of the parties was referred to the Court of Arbitration of Iran and America in The Hague. This case was the subject of investigation and negotiation since the early 1980s. In 1990, the United States returned 200 million dollars of the funds related to this account in the framework of a partial reconciliation. Finally, in January 2016, the parties agreed to pay $400 million in principal and about $1.3 billion in interest. Only 400 million dollars were delivered on the exchange day (December 27th) and 1.3 billion dollars were paid in two stages (2nd and 16th of February 2014). Therefore, the narrative that "all $1.7 billion was received against Rezaian's delivery" is inconsistent with the actual timeline of payments. Of course, this fact alone does not deny the existence of a negotiation relationship between the two agreements; But it shows that the release of the prisoners was not dependent on the full collection of 1.7 billion dollars.
In an official statement on January 17, 2016, John Kerry, the then US Secretary of State, announced the origin of the claimant and the settlement amounts, and explained that the continuation of the lawsuit could have created a greater financial obligation for the US. Therefore, the compromise had a legal and financial justification for the American side. This precedent clarifies the essence of the issue: Rezaian's arrest was neither the source of Iran's demand nor the basis for calculating its interest. If it is claimed that the detention forced the US to accept the compromise, the causal relationship between the two must be proven with the negotiation documents.
An exchange that was not only about Rezaian
The narrative of "Rezaian against 1.7 billion dollars" is not consistent with the actual composition of the exchange agreement. On January 26, 2014, Iran released four people within the framework of the agreement: Jason Rezaian, Amir Hekmati, Saeed Abedini and Nusratullah Khosravi Rudsari. On the other hand, the US pardoned or dismissed seven Iranians: Nader Madanlou, Bahram Mechanik, Khosro Oghahi, Toraj Faridi, Arash Kahraman, Nima Golestane and Ali Sabunuchi. In addition, the United States dropped charges and Interpol red notices related to 14 other Iranians. These 14 people were not released prisoners; Removing their prosecution was another part of the concessions of the agreement. Matthew Troitick was also released at the same time, but he was released outside of the original trade. Therefore, the main agreement included the release of four people from Iran and the judicial and legal actions of the United States regarding 21 Iranians; Not a specific deal about Rezaian.
In its official explanation in August 2016, the White House introduced the release of four Americans against the actions of seven Iranians and 14 others as the framework of the exchange and considered the compromise of $400 million as a separate agreement.
This fact raises a serious question: if the amount of 1.7 billion dollars was clearly the price for the release of Rezaian, what place did the release of three other people and the actions of the United States regarding 21 Iranians have in this agreement? Of course, the multiplicity of the exchange does not rule out the executive connection between the release of prisoners and the payment of money; But the narrative of a prisoner's exclusive transaction for that amount lacks a detailed description of the agreement.
The role of Dari Esfahani in collecting claims
One of the neglected facts in the security narrative of this case is the role of financial and legal experts in reaching a compromise. Abdul Rasool Dari Esfahani, a member of the financial and banking expert team of negotiations, played a key role in the process of collecting Iran's claims. The importance of this role was clearly stated by Mohammad Javad Zarif in the public session of the Majlis on 11 September 2017, when he answered the questions of Javad Karimi Qudousi. In that meeting, despite the disputes and the court case raised about Dari Esfahani, Zarif emphasized that he played an effective role in collecting the amount of 1.7 billion dollars. Zarif also explained that his testimony refers to the performance that he personally observed from him in his area of responsibility.
These statements are important in two ways. First, Iran's demand was not merely the result of a security decision; It required legal follow-up, calculation of principal and interest, negotiation of compromise and provision of financial payment arrangements. Second, evaluating a person's professional performance in a particular case should not be confused with judging other charges or his legal status. One can have an independent discussion about the court case of Dari Esfahani, but his expert role in collecting claims cannot be removed from the history of negotiations just because of that case. This is also true for other legal and financial experts. Attributing the entire outcome to the detaining entity ignores the contribution of those who were responsible for negotiating and settling the financial dispute.
Who linked the payment to the release of the prisoners?
The temporal and operational connection between the payment of money and the release of prisoners is real; But official US documents are also clear about how this relationship is. US State Department spokesman John Kirby confirmed in a press conference on August 18, 2016 that the US government delayed the delivery of $400 million, the first part of the settlement amount, until the release of its citizens. He explained that the financial negotiations and the prisoner negotiations had proceeded on two independent tracks, but in the final stage and as the time for the implementation of the agreements approached, Washington used to hold the money to ensure the release of the prisoners.
So the American document confirms the existence of executive communication; But what is clearly recorded in it is the US use of delayed payment as a lever to guarantee the release of prisoners. This document does not prove that Iran had arrested Rezaian with the intention of extortion, nor does it attribute responsibility for the financial negotiations to IRGC intelligence.
Which institution was responsible for the negotiations?
The IRGC Intelligence Organization arrested Rezaian in July 2014 and charged him with espionage. However, the evaluation of the counter-espionage deputy of the Ministry of Information, under the responsibility of Shahid Batani, was negative regarding the assignment of this accusation. The difference between the experts of the two institutions cannot be ignored; Just as the expert opinion of any body does not replace the reasoned judgment of the judiciary. But the dispute over the evaluation of the charge is a separate issue from the responsibility of the exchange negotiations.
On March 8, 2015, an informed official of the Ministry of Information, in a conversation with Ambassador Arjan, in response to Hossein Nejat's statements, announced that the management of negotiations for the exchange of prisoners and the return of 1 billion and 710 million dollars was entrusted to the Ministry of Information with the mandate of the Supreme National Security Council. Based on this announcement, negotiations were conducted under the responsibility of the representative of the Ministry of Information and Cooperation of the Central Bank and the Presidential Legal Services Office. This position was published at a time when there were still several years left until Hossein Taib's later narrative about the decisive role of IRGC intelligence in collecting money. In March 1401, Taib presented a narrative of the terms of the exchange, but he did not publish an independent document of the mission or agreement to prove the IRGC's responsibility in managing legal and financial negotiations.
Therefore, a difference should be made between the documented fact of Rezaian's arrest by IRGC intelligence and the claim of managing the negotiations by that organization. To prove the latter, documents related to the division of missions and negotiations are necessary.
Why Iran's other demands were not received?
He asks if the collection of 1.7 billion dollars was the result of legal negotiations, why other claims of Iran were not collected in the same way?
Each claim has its own contractual origin, evidence, counterclaims and its own processing status. Conciliation of a case does not mean automatic resolution of other claims. John Kerry also stated in the January 17, 2016 statement that after this compromise, other lawsuits, mainly from Iran against the United States, remained in the arbitration court.
But their question can also be measured by their proposed criterion: if Rezaian's arrest was the determining method of collecting the demand, why was this method not repeated for collecting other demands?
More importantly, is arresting foreigners for the purpose of collecting government demands a legal and defensible method in international negotiations? Based on which authority can the detaining authority pursue such a goal?
These questions become necessary when the arrest of a defendant is presented as a means of obtaining money, rather than being explained on the basis of a criminal charge.
Defense of the performance of an institution, at what cost?
There is no need to attribute all the achievements of prisoner exchange and financial reconciliation to that organization in order to defend the role of SAS in the detention of Rezaian. In this case, the arresting agency, the counter-espionage evaluation agency, the judicial authority, the officials of the exchange negotiations, and the legal and financial experts had different duties. The contribution of each should be evaluated based on the responsibility and documents related to the same department.
On the other hand, to prove the success of a security operation, the purpose of arrest should not be changed to collect money. Such a narrative may provide an excuse for legal claims against Iran; Without even proving the alleged role of the arresting institution in collecting the money.
This brother must answer a specific question:
Was Rezaian arrested because of espionage charges or to make America pay money? If you claim the second, what is the legal document and the reason to prove it?
This question cannot be answered by repeating the name of Rezaian, the amount of 1.7 billion dollars or the simultaneous payment and release of the prisoners.
Iran had a decades-old legal case to claim this money. The exchange agreement was about four people in Iran and the legal actions of the United States against 21 Iranians. The collection of the settlement amount was the result of negotiations that the Ministry of Information declared responsible for its management, and experts such as Dari Esfahani played a role in its financial part.
Defense of national interests is possible by documenting liabilities, not by turning a judicial arrest into an alleged method of collecting financial claims.