Brussels' Double Standards: What Is the EU Seeking in Engaging With the Taliban?

The European Union, prioritizing migration management in its engagement with the Taliban, has become caught in contradiction between its declared human rights principles, counterterrorism, and domestic political considerations.

According to the report of Ambassador Arjan, National Interest published a note and claimed: Taliban in the field of measures to fight terrorism and human rights; The two variables that the European Union has depended on for the diplomatic recognition of this group have made little or no progress at all.

In this regard, it can be said that five years after the American withdrawal from Afghanistan and the return of the Taliban to power in Kabul, the European Union is still trying to formulate a coherent policy towards Afghanistan; An attempt that has not been successful so far.

The limited focus of this union on domestic political concerns, especially the issue of immigration, has led to the formation of partial and case-by-case reactions; Reactions that lack strategic logic and are even in conflict with the declared positions and interests of the European Union.

June 2026, European officials met with representatives of the Taliban government in Brussels. The importance of examining this event is not because negotiating with such actors is inherently wrong, but because this interaction reveals the growing gap between the principles that Europe declares and the results that its policies produce in practice.

Several EU member states, notably Sweden, Belgium and Germany, pushed for the meeting, which was hastily arranged without extensive planning.

Since Belgium was the host of this meeting, the responsibility of issuing visas for the five-member Taliban delegation was placed on this country. The delegation headed by Abdul Qahir Balkhi, the spokesman of the Taliban's foreign ministry, traveled to Brussels.

This visa was only valid for entering Belgium and did not include the entire Schengen area; Besides, it was only issued for 24 hours.

The fact that the Minister of Immigration and Asylum of Belgium, from the Flemish Nationalist Party, initiated this process, clearly shows the main agenda of the meeting: to return as many Afghan migrants from Europe to Afghanistan as possible.

It is noteworthy that the Belgian Foreign Minister had opposed the invitation of the Taliban. Because he believed that such an action would give legitimacy to this group, but he was in the minority in his government and could not prevent the meeting.

The Commissioner for Home Affairs and Migration of the European Union, Magnus Bruner from Austria, tried to make these negotiations appear merely "technical"; It means an action lower than the level of official recognition of the Taliban.

But the members of the human rights sub-committee of the European Parliament opposed these negotiations. Many human rights activists and Afghan experts are also concerned that the European Union's unilateral focus on migration will create a slippery slope towards official recognition of the Taliban.

The critics' concerns are not without reason. In exchange for cooperation with the European Union, the Taliban delegation demanded the control of the Afghan consular offices in European countries. Although this request appears to be a practical measure to facilitate the deportation process, handing over such authority to the Taliban will be an important symbolic and political achievement for this group.

In contrast, the EU's gains from this interaction are not so clear. After the Taliban took over Afghanistan in 2021, the European Union set five criteria to recognize this government. These criteria included serious commitments in the field of fighting terrorism, respecting human rights - especially women's rights and girls' right to education - and forming an inclusive government.

Five years later, the Taliban's track record in all these fields is still dark and worrying. Hopes that this group has changed are unfounded.

Take, for example, the counter-terrorism situation. According to Carter Malkasian, a former American official who advised the US forces in Afghanistan from 2010 to 2021, Taliban representatives told the American parties that "they do not intend to allow any group to use Afghan soil to plan or carry out terrorist attacks abroad." However, they added to the existing ambiguity by maintaining their ties to Al-Qaeda.

In an article he recently published in Foreign Affairs magazine, Malkasian mentioned that Taliban negotiators in Doha, Qatar, had acknowledged cooperation with Al-Qaeda; At the same time, they did not accept the requests of the United States to ban the financing, recruitment and training of the forces of this group.

In addition, UN assessments have documented the presence of more than 20 terrorist groups active in Afghanistan. The number of foreign forces of these groups may reach 13 thousand people. Among them are about 6,000 members of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, between 2,000 and 3,000 Daesh forces in Khorasan, and hundreds of Al-Qaeda members.

During the Taliban rule, these groups have a safe haven, freedom of movement and a favorable environment for their activities. According to Asim Iftikhar Ahmad, Pakistan's ambassador to the United Nations, in Pakistan alone, more than 5,300 terrorist attacks and more than 1,200 casualties were recorded in 2025, which were related to militants active in Afghanistan. Pakistan has also identified more than 60 terrorist camps and deployment areas inside Afghanistan.

Pakistan is not the only target of these groups. November 2025, attacks originating from Afghanistan killed five Chinese citizens and wounded five others in Tajikistan in four days.

European authorities are also not unaware of this situation. EU Special Envoy Gilles Bertrand acknowledged in June 2026 that terrorist safe havens, training camps, arms supply chains and financing networks are still active in Afghanistan.

This contradiction is hardly justifiable: the European Union engages with the Taliban, while at the same time documenting the terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan's soil, without taking any action to eliminate these threats. Bertrand resigned in August without explanation; An event that is another sign of turmoil in the European Union's policy towards Afghanistan.

Protecting basic human rights, including the rights of women and girls, is another key EU criterion for engagement with the Taliban. However, the track record of this group in this field is still disastrous. According to UNICEF, more than 2.6 million Afghan girls are denied secondary and higher education. Women also face severe restrictions in the field of employment, travel and participation in the public arena.

The situation of ethnic and religious minorities is not much better. Shia Hazaras, who experienced a massive massacre at the hands of the Taliban in 1998, continue to face systematic discrimination in accessing government services, holding public office, and enjoying justice. The religious rights of Shias are also violated; Some important events of Muharram and Ashura have been restricted and a number of Shia clerics have been arrested.

The Taliban's power structure also reflects this exclusionary approach. Out of about 1,185 senior management positions, nearly 90% are held by Pashtuns; While they constitute only 40 to 45 percent of Afghanistan's population. Tajiks' share of these positions is 5.3%, Uzbeks 2.5% and Hazaras only 0.6%. None of these positions are available to women.

These cases are not isolated and scattered failures, but show a continuous pattern. Such a pattern indicates that the commitments of the Taliban in the Doha agreements with the United States have been tactical tools to advance the goals of this group, rather than real requirements. As long as the ultimate power remains in the hands of Hebatullah Akhundzada, the hardline leader of the Taliban, there is little prospect of change.

According to this record, Europe's unconditional engagement risks the gradual normalization of a government that takes concessions, but does not give concessions in return. By limiting its concerns to the issue of migration, the European Union is giving the Taliban disproportionate pressure and at the same time squandering its leverage.

The European Union should not abandon the dialogue, but it should stop thinking that cooperation on migration alone can be a strategy. The Taliban have realized that sooner or later Europe will come to them to solve their problems; Be it for deporting immigrants, for border management, or for any other issue related to the internal political needs of European countries.

This process must be reversed. Engagement with the Taliban should be conditional, reversible and dependent on verifiable actions. These measures should be dependent on dismantling the terrorist infrastructure used by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Daesh Khorasan and al-Qaeda, restoring girls' right to access to secondary and higher education, and ending sectarian discrimination against Shia Hazaras and other ethnic and religious groups.

If the Taliban continue to refuse to accept these terms - as they have done for the past five years - the EU must be prepared to abandon engagement. The alternative is the situation we are witnessing now: a gradual normalization of relations in which Europe gives legitimacy to the Taliban without gaining anything in return. This is not a strategy; Rather, it is aimless movement in an uncertain direction.