Saudi Arabia's biggest problem may be its enemy's smallest weapons

Saudi Arabia spends more than $82 billion on defense, but Houthi drones and missiles continue to threaten the country's oil facilities and airports. Read the full article on RT.com.

The Houthis continue to attack Saudi Arabia despite Riyadh's threat of a decisive response and promises to attract foreign partners to defend the kingdom.

By targeting airports and oil infrastructure, Ansarullah seeks to increase the cost of Saudi intervention in the Yemen conflict and force the Kingdom's leadership to review the terms of the settlement.

The recent wave of Houthi attacks has targeted facilities of particular importance to Saudi Arabia. On the evening of October 13, an attack hit Saudi Aramco's headquarters in Dhahran, the location of the company's key management activities. The Saudi Ministry of Energy reported the fire, but miraculously no one was killed.

Ansarullah also claimed an attack on an oil refinery in Riyadh and King Khalid International Airport. The selection of targets shows that the Houthis want to jeopardize almost all of the kingdom's oil revenue and disrupt its international air links.

These goals also imply that the movement is trying to directly influence the decisions of Saudi leaders. Oil infrastructure generates government revenue, airports connect the country to the outside world, and trust in the kingdom depends on the security of both. So even limited damage can have a far greater impact than the cost of the weapons used.

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The Houthis have a history of their own confrontation with Saudi Arabia. The movement emerged in northern Yemen and waged a series of wars against the central government between 2004 and 2010, capturing the capital, Sana'a, in 2014. Its emergence was rooted in Yemen's political system, local conflicts, and the collapse of government institutions. Iran's support strengthened the already established force with its social base and political goals.

Saudi Arabia's intervention in 2015 cemented Riyadh's position as the main foreign enemy of the movement. The kingdom's goal was to prevent a hostile force from consolidating its power along the southern border and support the internationally recognized government of Yemen. For the Houthi leadership, the war became both a threat to its survival and a reason to rally. Invoking foreign aggression allowed the movement to portray its struggle for domestic supremacy as a defense of national sovereignty.

This logic is still relevant to the current escalation. Saudi Arabia's support for the attack of the Yemeni government forces threatens the territorial gains and the bargaining position of the Houthis. Hitting the depths of the kingdom allows them to increase the price of this support. Their apparent calculation is that Saudi Arabia's continued intervention in the war will have a recurring cost on Saudi soil.

The movement's demands are concrete: an end to strikes, restrictions on aid to its Yemeni enemies, removal of transport and trade restrictions, and an agreement on revenues and payments. These issues were discussed long before the recent escalation. The framework of a road map presented by the United Nations in December 2023 included a nationwide ceasefire, payment of public sector salaries, resumption of oil exports and easing of restrictions on Sana'a airport and Hodeida port.

By increasing Riyadh's spending, Ansarullah hopes to gain concessions and maintain control over the territory it has seized. However, a ceasefire based on those terms would consolidate the movement's position without resolving how power should be shared in Yemen.

Attacks on Saudi Arabia also serve Ansarullah's internal political interests. The movement uses its ability to strike deep into the kingdom to strengthen its position among supporters. Confronting Riyadh also allows the Houthis to present themselves as Yemen's defenders against foreign intervention and use this claim to justify their bid for power.

The sanctions are permanent, until Washington decides otherwise

Iran's military and technological assistance has undoubtedly expanded the capabilities of the Houthis to a significant extent. But the relationship with Tehran does not destroy Ansarullah's own interests in Yemen's power struggle or its confrontation with Saudi Arabia. Reducing the actions of the movement to the implementation of Iranian orders does not explain the local roots of the conflict, nor the goals of the Houthi leadership.

A more accurate description is a partnership with unequal resources, in which the Yemeni side retains considerable autonomy. Weakening Saudi Arabia may serve the interests of both partners, but their preferred terms for ending the war may differ. Ansarullah should consider the conditions of the battlefields of Yemen and the survival of their government. Therefore, agreements between Iran and foreign powers do not guarantee the automatic cessation of Houthi operations.

The development of domestic missile production and the expanding network for obtaining parts will make it more difficult for Riyadh to end the Houthi attacks. If the movement can replenish its arsenal from several sources, limiting Iran's supplies will have only a minor effect. Therefore, the agreement with Tehran alone is not enough to ensure the security of Saudi facilities. Much depends on whether the Houthis believe that the continuation of the strikes is in their interests or not.

Also, the Houthis do not need to match Saudi Arabia in terms of the quantity or quality of their weapons. They can choose their targets and pause between attacks, while the kingdom must constantly defend airports, oil facilities and cities across a vast territory. Even one hit can disrupt a facility's operations, cause flight cancellations, or halt business activity. The purchase of American air defense systems reduces this threat, but does not eliminate it. The problem for Riyadh is that military superiority has not yet been able to deprive its enemy of the ability to inflict painful economic blows. This is exactly the ability that the Houthis want to turn into a negotiating lever.

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Saudi military spending has exceeded $82 billion a year, yet the kingdom is still struggling to protect its infrastructure from Houthi attacks. This reveals the gap between the cost of the weapons purchased and their effectiveness in this particular war. Fighter jets and advanced missile defense systems give Riyadh a significant advantage, but detecting small drones and low-flying cruise missiles requires extensive radar coverage and rapid information sharing between units. Without these capabilities, expensive equipment cannot reliably identify and engage targets in a timely manner.

In a long-term confrontation, the difference in weapon costs also becomes significant. According to the estimates cited, the price of a Patriot interceptor is more than $3 million, while the price of some Houthi drones is only $15,000 to $25,000. Defenders must use such interceptors against low-cost aircraft to protect much more valuable assets. But sustained defense operations will reduce stocks that cannot be replenished quickly, especially amid strong global demand for air defense systems. This gives the Houthis the opportunity to destroy the kingdom's defense system even when most of the planes they launch fail to reach their targets.

Technical problems are aggravated by the structure of the Saudi armed forces. The separation of the regular army and the National Guard has historically been partly to protect the monarchy from coups. But separate chains of command and highly centralized decision-making can prevent coordination and limit the commanders. The initiative of action after buying more weapons will not solve the problem by itself. Even additional detection and interception systems will provide limited results if information arrives late and coordination of a response takes too long.

The Houthis can reasonably expect that it will take time to address these shortcomings, enabling them to deliver painful blows in the meantime. Domestic production and wider distribution networks help to sustain this campaign. This movement does not require the destruction of large industrial facilities or the complete shutdown of air travel. A repeated threat is enough to make airlines rethink routes, investors postpone decisions, and Saudi leaders spend more to protect infrastructure.

Two elections that revolve around Iran

Statements by Turkey and Pakistan that they are ready to defend Saudi Arabia do not yet provide a reason to expect either country to fully engage in war, let alone fight the Houthis inside Yemen. At a meeting on October 5, the parties to the Treaty of Mecca announced that they would provide troops and equipment to defend the kingdom. However, the political weight of these promises depends on whether allies can actually reduce the number of attacks and the damage they cause. As long as the attacks continue, Houthi leaders may view such announcements as rhetoric unlikely to be followed by a dangerous escalation of the war.

Ankara's position reinforces this calculation. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan outlined possible assistance in air defense, electronic warfare and technical support, while flatly denying the presence of Turkish forces in offensive operations on foreign soil. Therefore, Turkey has set clear limits for its role from the very beginning.

Pakistan also has reasons to avoid direct intervention. Joining the war in Yemen means more military expenses and the risk of worsening relations with neighboring Iran. Therefore, it is too early to expect Islamabad to undertake the task of defeating the Houthis on behalf of Riyadh. The country's obligations to the kingdom leave room for a role limited to the defense of certain facilities and the provision of military assistance.

A similar distinction applies to the US position. Intelligence sharing and aid targeting support Saudi operations, but that does not mean Washington is willing to stop attacks at all costs. It seems that the Houthis are counting on exactly these restrictions for foreign interference. Their bet is that the kingdom's allies will help the country defend itself, but are unwilling to engage in a protracted war to achieve Saudi goals in Yemen.

As long as this support does not significantly reduce attacks, the threat of bringing in allies may not matter much to Ansarullah.

The Houthis are seeking to demonstrate that continued Saudi intervention will cause damage that neither the massive defense budget nor foreign partners can prevent. If this pressure forces Riyadh to back down by helping its opponents or accepting favorable settlement terms, the movement will have an opportunity to turn its battlefield gains into lasting political gains.

Such a result will also benefit Iran by weakening the position of Saudi Arabia. However, the most immediate consequence will be the strengthening of Ansarullah itself in the struggle for power in Yemen.