From Morocco to South Africa, Israel's elections were closely monitored across Africa

The October 27 vote could test whether Israel's relations with African countries hold up against the fallout from the Gaza war.

LAGOS, Nigeria — As Israelis prepare to go to the polls on Oct. 27, African governments from Pretoria to Rabat are considering what the outcome could mean for their foreign and domestic policies.

The war in Gaza has exposed sharp divisions across the continent, with some governments pursuing diplomatic action against Israel while others maintain trade and security ties.

Recent polls show a tight race between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud party and the far-right coalition it leads and a Jewish-led bloc of opposition parties.

Neither is expected to win the 61 seats needed for a majority in the 120-seat Knesset, and a long period of coalition talks is expected to follow the vote.

The next administration's approach to Gaza and the Palestinian issue could affect Israel's efforts to maintain and expand its partnerships across the continent.

Israel's relations across Africa are shaped by competing priorities. While the war in Gaza has intensified diplomatic pressure and public opposition in many countries, security needs, commercial interests, and long-standing bilateral partnerships continue to influence government decisions.

Since the start of the war in October 2023, South Africa has emerged as one of the fiercest critics of Israel in Africa. The government of this country filed a complaint against Israel in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) claiming that it violated the 1948 Genocide Convention. Israel denies these accusations. The court's so-called interim measures in 2024, including ordering Israel to act to prevent genocidal acts, are not a final verdict on whether genocide occurred.

In November 2023, South Africa's National Assembly passed a motion calling on the government to close the Israeli embassy and suspend diplomatic relations. The plan itself did not implement those measures, but it emphasized the strength of political opposition to Israel's military campaign.

Other African governments have adopted different approaches that reflect national political priorities and foreign policy calculations rather than a single continental position.

Chad recalled its ambassador from Israel in November 2023, while some countries have maintained relations despite criticism of Israel's military operation in Gaza.

Morocco provides a contrasting example. It restored relations with Israel in 2020 under a US-backed arrangement linked to Washington's recognition of Morocco's sovereignty over the Western Sahara. Despite public demonstrations against normalization, Rabat has continued to pursue closer ties.

On September 16, Israeli Foreign Minister Gidon Saar and Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita met in New York at a trilateral meeting hosted by US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz. The three countries emphasized their plans to promote diplomatic relations, upgrade the relevant missions to embassies and appoint ambassadors.

They also agreed to finalize investment support and double tax agreements by the end of this year, expand flights to include Moroccan airlines and arrange high-level reciprocal visits in the coming months. These were declared commitments rather than confirmation that changes had already been implemented.

For Idowe Johnson, an associate professor of international relations at the University of Ibadan, the diversity of African countries makes it difficult to predict a uniform response to the Israeli election.

Africa's heterogeneity means that governments have managed relations with Israel separately. Since the October 7, 2023 attacks, African criticism has focused on Israel's denial of the creation of a Palestinian state.

"The October 27 election will therefore be very important because the new government's stance on the Palestinian cause will determine how much African cooperation in agriculture, trade, security and technology is guided by self-determination and international law, as well as mutual interest," Johnson said.

Israel's relationship with the African Union (AU) also reflects these differences. In 2021, the President of the European Union Commission approved Israel's representation in the organization, sparking protests from member states.

In February 2022, the African Union Assembly established a committee of heads of state and government to consult on Israel's observer status. The dispute continued until 2023, when the European Union decided to suspend Israel's accreditation pending further review.

The dispute reflects broader differences over Israel's treatment of the Palestinians and the organization's approach to the conflict.

A new Israeli government could seek to ease these tensions, but any change would depend on its policies as well as the positions of EU member states.

Security relations may outlast diplomatic tensions

Security cooperation has been an important part of Israel's relations with some African governments. Israeli companies have pursued defense and security contracts involving equipment, surveillance technology and training.

But the nature and scale of these relationships vary from country to country, and claims about specific agreements or technologies should be linked to documented cases rather than taken as evidence of a uniform Israeli security presence across the continent.

The Democratic Republic of Congo provides a new example of efforts to deepen cooperation. Congolese President Felix Shiskedi visited Israel on August 31 and September 1 and met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Isaac Herzog. Discussions included security, defense, agriculture, infrastructure, energy and high technology. Both sides expressed their desire to strengthen their strategic partnership and expand cooperation in several sectors.

The visit followed a memorandum of understanding signed on July 27. Congolese officials said the visit will review these agreements and further Israeli investment, including opportunities related to the Lobito Corridor. These meetings show the scope of potential bilateral cooperation, but do not prove that a new security agreement has been concluded.

For governments dealing with armed groups, insecurity can create incentives to seek equipment, information, and training from foreign partners. However, the importance of Israel's cooperation varies between countries, and diplomatic tensions do not necessarily have the same effect on security relations.

The limits of Israel's diplomatic outreach became apparent after it recognized Somaliland as an independent country on December 26 last year, becoming the first country to do so. Somalia and other critics rejected the move, arguing that it would undermine Somalia's territorial integrity. This decision caused protests in Somalia and Somaliland.

Speaking to Al Jazeera this month, President Hassan Sheikh Mohammed said that Somalia will not accept Israel's presence in the country under any circumstances. He stated that Israel is planning to establish a naval base in Berbera and use the city's airport, adding that its real goal is to get closer to the Persian Gulf countries and Iran.

According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project, as of the February 2026 Africa Overview, 110 protests directly linked to Israel's recognition of Somaliland have been recorded. Only seven people supported the motion, all of them in Somaliland. Others disagreed that the figures cover demonstrations related to that particular decision, not all African views on Israel, and should not be taken as a measure of public opinion across the continent.

Hossamuddin Ibrahim, an Africa analyst at the Bloomsbury Institute for Intelligence and Security, argues that public opposition can constrain governments even when they see strategic value in maintaining relations.

However, the strongest constraint may come from African peoples rather than governments: the recognition of Somaliland met with widespread opposition, the African Union and many governments asserted Somalia's territorial integrity, and ACLED recorded 110 related protests, with only seven in support.

"Depending on its approach, the next Israeli government could therefore deepen strategic cooperation in Morocco, Sudan and the Red Sea, or face a legitimacy problem if it continues with policies related to the Gaza war and widens the gap between state-level cooperation and public sentiment," Ibrahim told Al Jazeera.

The Somaliland episode illustrates how a diplomatic move can provoke opposition when it is perceived to challenge a core principle of governance.

This in itself does not mean that African governments will abandon security agreements with Israel. The consequences depend on the countries involved, the terms of their cooperation, and the domestic political costs of maintaining them.

Trade, agriculture and competition for influence

Trade and development cooperation offer Israel another way to maintain ties in Africa. Israeli companies and officials have pursued partnerships in areas including agriculture, irrigation, water management, health and technology.

Such collaborations can provide practical benefits to governments seeking investment and technical expertise, but business relationships do not necessarily translate into public support for Israeli policies.

Zambia demonstrates Israel's efforts to deepen bilateral engagement. Israel opened its embassy in Lusaka in August last year after a 52-year absence. Agriculture, water management, health, education and technology have been identified as potential areas for closer cooperation. This move was part of Israel's broader effort to strengthen its engagement with African countries.

Some analysts have interpreted Israel's re-engagement with Zambia as an attempt to cultivate partners that can balance South Africa's influence in the region. This remains an interpretation, not a fixed explanation for the relationship.

Zambia has its own reasons for investment and cooperation, especially in agriculture, water management and technology. Closer bilateral relations alone do not prove that confronting South Africa is Israel's goal.