Strait of Hormuz After the 40-Day War: Continued Importance in Light of Changing Global Energy Security
For regional countries, including Iran, preserving Hormuz's strategic position depends not only on its geographic location, but also on sustained maritime security, route reliability, regional cooperation, and a role in shaping future energy security arrangements.
Yasser Miri/ Energy security expert
The Strait of Hormuz has always been one of the most important geopolitical bottlenecks in the world; A passage whose importance goes beyond geography and maritime transport, is linked to the security of energy supply, the stability of global markets, and the strategic calculations of great powers. An important part of the Persian Gulf countries' oil exports and a significant share of the world trade in liquid natural gas and energy-related products pass through this route. Estimates by the International Energy Agency show that in 2025, nearly 20 million barrels of oil per day have passed through the Strait of Hormuz; A figure equivalent to about a quarter of the world's maritime oil trade, most of which was destined for Asia. Therefore, the security of Hormuz is directly related to the energy security of large economies such as China, India, Japan, and South Korea, as well as the interests of energy exporting countries and powers affecting maritime security.
The historical importance of this strait is not only derived from the amount of energy passing through, but is rooted in the connection of geography, economy and power. Whenever the possibility of disrupting the movement of oil tankers increases, its consequences are seen in the form of an increase in energy prices, an increase in the cost of insurance and transportation, and concern about the lack of supply in the world markets. For this reason, Hormuz has always had a special place in the security and military calculations of regional and extra-regional actors. However, the 40-day war has highlighted the question of whether Hormuz will remain with the same strategic weight in the future order of energy security, or will the experience of vulnerability lead countries to redefine their dependence on this passage?
40 day war; From a commercial bottleneck to a strategic pressure tool
The 40-day war once again showed that the Strait of Hormuz is not just a route for transporting energy shipments; Rather, in crisis situations, it can affect the scope and cost of war and the calculations of the parties involved. Even the threat to maritime traffic affects market expectations, shipping companies' decisions, insurance costs, and governments' policies, before it leads to a complete shutdown of energy flow. Therefore, the strategic importance of the strait is not limited to its ability to disrupt supply chains and increase economic and political costs, but is also tied to deterrence calculations and geopolitical competition.
This war also showed that interdependence in the global energy market does not necessarily lead to a reduction in tension; Sometimes this dependence can become a source of pressure and vulnerability. Importers face the risk of price increases and supply disruptions, exporters may lose income and access to their markets, and extra-regional powers are forced to strike a balance between protecting trade flows, security costs, and preventing the spread of the crisis.
However, it should not be concluded that every crisis in Hormuz necessarily leads to a permanent interruption of energy supply or that all countries suffer equally. The effects of the crisis depend on the duration of the disruption, strategic reserves, the capacity of alternative routes, and the ability of producers and consumers to react. The importance of the 40-day war is that it made the cost of over-reliance on a strategic path more apparent and increased the motivation of countries to reduce vulnerability.
alternative routes; Reducing dependence or transferring vulnerability?
Persian Gulf countries and large energy consumers have turned to developing pipelines, increasing storage capacity, diversifying import sources, and investing in alternative energies to reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. However, these options have structural limitations. The construction of pipelines requires heavy investment, long time, stable infrastructure and political and security agreements. In addition, the capacity of the existing routes cannot easily replace the entire volume of energy passing through Hormuz. Estimates by the International Energy Agency have assessed the usable capacity of alternative oil transmission lines at around 3.5 to 5.5 million barrels per day; A capacity that covers only a part of the daily flow of oil through the strait.
The export of liquefied natural gas from Qatar and the UAE depends on the Hormuz route, and the transfer of small energy shipments with containers or limited tanks cannot replace mass transportation with tankers and specialized ships; Because it is not comparable in terms of volume, cost and safety requirements. On the other hand, alternative routes are not immune to threats and may be exposed to drone and missile attacks, sabotage or disruption of ports and ground infrastructure.
As a result, reducing dependence on Hormuz does not necessarily mean eliminating risk, but it can lead to its distribution among different routes and infrastructures.
beyond oil and gas; Value chain and related industries
The importance of the Strait of Hormuz is not limited to the transportation of crude oil and liquid natural gas. Refinery products, liquefied petroleum gas, feeds and petrochemical products are also part of the maritime trade flow of the region. Disruption in these flows can affect chemical industries, plastic and polymer production, chemical fertilizers, packaging and parts of manufacturing industries.
Therefore, the security of Hormuz should be examined in a broader framework than the security of oil supply and with regard to supply and value chains. Even if some of the crude oil is exported through alternative routes, the export of petrochemical products, access to feed, port capacity and connectivity between industrial units and global markets may still depend on maritime security. Disruption in the strait can also affect countries that are not direct importers of oil passing through Hormuz through increasing the cost of raw materials, delaying delivery and changing the trade route. Therefore, assessing countries' vulnerability should take into account their direct and indirect dependence on energy, petrochemical products, transportation and supply chains.
The advantage of sea transportation and the limitation of alternative energies
Due to its high capacity, relatively low cost per unit of goods and access to distant markets, sea transportation still has a fundamental place in the global energy trade. Although insecurity can reduce part of its economic advantage by increasing insurance premiums, cost of marine protection, and delivery delays, pipelines and other methods also face capacity limitations, investment costs, and their own vulnerabilities. Hence, it is more likely that countries will turn to a combination of diversified routes, strategic reserves and complementary infrastructure than abandon sea transport altogether.
Insecurity in the Persian Gulf and Oman Sea can also accelerate the process of diversifying the energy portfolio. The development of renewable energy, increasing productivity and expanding electrification can reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels; However, this development requires investment in power grid, storage and equipment supply. Switching to coal, although it may meet some of the demand in the short term, comes with emissions and environmental costs.
In addition, the development of clean energy is also dependent on minerals, industrial equipment and global supply chains, and the replacement of energy sources does not mean complete independence from the region's energy production and transit network. As a result, insecurity can speed up the diversification process instead of quickly eliminating fossil energy and gradually change the relative contribution of Hormuz in energy security calculations.
Technological developments and the formation of a different order
In order to understand the future of the Strait of Hormuz, one must consider the simultaneous developments of the international system and the acceleration of technological development. In the past, the concentration of energy supply and the limited transmission options give a special strategic weight to the geography of the strait. Today, the development of energy technologies, the improvement of storage and network management, the expansion of production capacity in different regions and the evolution of logistics have changed the possibility of responding to disturbances. Conversely, technologies such as drones and electronic warfare tools have also made threats to infrastructure and transportation routes more complex. Thus, technology simultaneously increases the capacity for resilience and in turn creates new forms of vulnerability.
In this framework, Hegel's dialectic can be used to explain the transformation of the energy security order; Not as a definitive model for predicting the future, but as a framework for understanding how new arrangements emerge from the contradictions of the existing order. The previous order was based on the economic advantage of sea transportation and extensive reliance on Hormuz. War and the revelation of vulnerabilities caused by route concentration have, in the opposite direction, strengthened the drive to diversify resources, routes and infrastructure. The outcome of these two processes can be a different order in which Hormuz remains an important passage, but the amount of strategic reliance on it and the maritime security management mechanisms change.
An example of this evolution is the formation of a multi-layer model of energy security; A model in which countries, while using Hormuz, also strengthen pipelines, strategic reserves, various supply contracts and alternative sources.
In such an order, the free and smooth flow of energy will no longer depend only on geographic location and cost of transportation, but also on deterrence, regional cooperation, legal arrangements, crisis management, and the resilience of supply chains. This evolution can be seen as a transition from a centralized reliance on a strategic bridge to a more distributed risk management.
Conclusion: stable importance, but with different strategic weight
The 40-day war should not be considered the end of the importance of the Strait of Hormuz. The limited capacity of alternative pipelines, the difficulty of transferring huge amounts of energy from other routes, the advantages of sea transportation and the dependence of industries on petrochemical products in the region show that Hormuz will continue to be one of the important bottlenecks of the global economy in the foreseeable future. However, continued importance does not mean stability of its position at the same level as before.
The experience of war, along with technological developments and changes in the international system, increases the motivation of countries to reduce vulnerability. The probable result of this process is not the removal of Hormuz from the world energy security map, but the reduction of exclusive reliance on it and the change of criteria for evaluating its strategic importance. Of course, the realization of this change depends on real investment in complementary paths, technology development and sustainable change of energy supply patterns; A mere increase in concerns alone is not sufficient to prove a reduction in dependence.
For countries in the region, including Iran, maintaining the strategic position of Hormuz is not only dependent on the geographical location; It also depends on sustainable maritime security, route reliability, regional cooperation and role-playing in future energy security arrangements. Ultimately, the main question is not whether the world will still need the Strait of Hormuz, but to what extent it will depend on it in the future order and what mechanisms will ensure the safe and sustainable passage of energy.