empty stock trap; Why can't America support a long war?

Middle East Monitor reports three developments that indicate the United States may be preparing to intensify its military campaign against Iran.

Ambassador Arjan; Mohammad Hassan Gudarzi - Middle East Monitor wrote: In recent days, three developments have emerged as key early indicators that the United States may be preparing to intensify its military campaign against Iran.

First, the dispatch of the third aircraft carrier task force along with additional American forces to the waters around Iran; second, US Central Command (CENTCOM) directive to achieve full operational readiness; And third, the continuation of economic pressure, sanctions and blockades, along with the disputes around the Strait of Hormuz and the diplomatic friction around the negotiations.

While these developments clearly indicate an expansion of military options and an escalation of coercive pressure, they do not by themselves constitute conclusive evidence of an executive decision to initiate a full-scale war.

This new force status has at least three strategic functions: deterrence, diplomatic leverage in negotiations, and operational readiness for a military option. Consequently, while a belligerent stance increases the statistical probability of conflict, it does not by itself indicate a definitive decision to enter a major war.

Military power is not simply measured by the number of aircraft carriers, aircraft or missile launchers. Rather, sustainable combat power is a function of the balance between consumption capacity, reserves, production, replacement, human resources, logistics, and the ability to absorb the large costs of war.

A great war requires great preparations

Extending a military stance to a major war requires the simultaneous presence of at least four structural capacities.

First, there must be sufficient reserves of ammunition and weapons to carry out initial operations and continue subsequent conflicts against Iran, against the country that has the largest and most diverse missile stockpile in the region.

Second, a strong equipment replacement capacity is needed to ensure that if missiles, munitions, aircraft, defense systems, or command assets are consumed or destroyed during hostilities, the military industry can replace them at a commensurate rate; An outcome that seems operationally improbable for the US regime.

These two requirements seem unattainable at present. An April 21 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies found that in four of the seven key ammunition categories analyzed, consumption during the 40-day conflict likely exceeded half of pre-war stockpiles, and that replacing some of these stocks could take between one and four years.

In addition to depleting ammunition stocks, the "Ramadan War" has imposed tangible costs on the air fleet of the hostile US government. At least 81 US military aircraft, including fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters and unmanned aerial systems, have been destroyed or damaged, according to an official report by the US Congressional Research Service on October 5.

Third, there must be sufficient human resource and logistical capacity to sustain long-term operations over a wide range while maintaining the existing military commitments of the US regime and its global readiness in other regions.

Fourth, the capacity to absorb economic and geopolitical consequences must be available; including the ability to withstand energy price spikes, supply chain disruptions and reduced oil transit through the Strait of Hormuz, financial pressure, strategic stockpile depletion, vulnerable military bases, and domestic political pressure ahead of the November elections.

Hormuz is still Iran's strategic weapon

Iran's ability to disrupt public confidence in the world's main energy corridor has become a strategic lever that significantly increases the cost of any military adventure for the global economy and decision makers in Washington.

The cumulative weight of the munitions limitations and the examined economic variables confronts the enemy's decision makers with three possible strategic paths:

In the first scenario, the American and Zionist regimes rely on continued heavy military posturing, economic sanctions, naval pressure, intelligence operations, and cognitive warfare without starting a new major conflict. Operationally, this option is quite feasible. Its main appeal for Washington lies in preventing further evacuation of vulnerable stockpiles of Patriot, THAAD and Tomahawk missiles, as well as preventing further aircraft casualties.

However, the evidence suggests that this path is not without cost and risk: maintaining a state of continuous neither war nor peace means continued insecurity in the Strait of Hormuz, lower-than-normal oil flows, recessionary pressure on global energy demand, continued attrition of forces stationed in the region, and increased difficulty in managing unwanted maritime incidents.

In the second scenario, instead of directly entering into a full-scale war, the American and Zionist axis considers the implementation of limited and phased air and missile attacks against specific targets, including Iran's military, missile, nuclear or energy infrastructures; The option mentioned by "Axios" sources as one of the plans under active consideration.

Although the presence of three aircraft carrier task forces and current reserves make such attacks operationally viable in the short term, the central dilemma of this scenario remains escalation control. When an actor launches a limited attack with the assumption that the response of the other party will remain limited, he exposes himself to an unintended escalation of tension due to an asymmetric perception of thresholds and a lack of unilateral control over the defender's decisions.

The third scenario, which is a direct entry or a gradual slide towards a full-scale regional war, could be the most costly and dangerous path that the US regime and the genocidal Zionist entity are facing. If such a scenario materializes, it is unlikely to remain a one-dimensional conflict. Operationally, this could simultaneously or sequentially include high-intensity air battles, mass missile exchanges, severe disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, cyber operations, and attacks against enemy regional bases and energy infrastructure across the wider region. In such a context, a punitive operation can quickly degenerate into a multilateral war of attrition.

Besides the military variables, the autumn political and electoral calendar is another factor that affects the calculations related to the timing and ceiling of the escalation of tension. The deployment of the third aircraft carrier and 10,000 additional troops to the waters around Iran, along with the Pentagon's directive to the US Central Command to complete operational preparations, clearly shows that the timing of possible operations in the decision-making circles of Washington and Tel Aviv is weighed against the congressional mid-terms in November, as well as the Zionist parliamentary elections scheduled just one week before.

The other dimension is related to the concern of Iran's potential capacity to cut off submarine internet cables, completely cutting off the connection throughout the Arabian Peninsula as well as the Zionist aggressor government and disabling all exchange and financial markets related to this network infrastructure. The important point is that Iran has changed the balance in this area to its strategic advantage through the creation of its national information network and its relative independence from internet financial transactions dominated by the West.

From the perspective of deterrence theory, imposing costs that exceed the scale of the initial attack often serves as a rational mechanism for fundamentally redesigning the adversary's cost-benefit calculations regarding subsequent actions. Given Iran's documented capabilities, should the United States or the Zionist regime commit such a miscalculation, the likely strategic position for Tehran would include launching a multi-domain, asymmetric, and broad response designed to challenge containment or moderation. Consequently, even a limited military strike would force Iran to formulate a response that would go far beyond the initial scale of the aggression. This underlying logic of an escalating response to limited war significantly increases the miscalculations of any new military adventure.

The main danger in the current security environment is not necessarily a pre-planned decision for full-scale war, but rather the intentional or unintentional escalation of a small war into a large war through crisis instability.

If the deployment of military force as a pressure tactic leads to a miscalculation and a limited attack, and that limited attack is met with an asymmetric and multi-domain response, a cycle of mutual retaliation will form. This chain reaction can force a war whose initiators lack the capacity to absorb its full consequences.