Pakistan gambling in Afghanistan; Endless war on the horizon

Pakistan's military gamble in Afghanistan to contain armed groups and regain lost influence has increased the risk of Islamabad being caught in an erosive cycle of violence and instability. Pakistan gambling post in Afghanistan; Endless War on the Horizon first appeared in Safir Arjan.

According to Ambassador Arjan, Eurasia Review published a note and wrote: In the early hours of September 24, Pakistan carried out air and drone attacks against 10 points inside Afghanistan. After that, the Afghan media announced that Kandahar provinces - the residence of Hebatullah Akhundzada, the supreme leader of the Taliban group - as well as Khost and Paktia, were among the target areas of these attacks.

A few hours later, Pakistan's Information Minister Attaullah Tarer announced on social media that the attacks were "targeted, precise, calculated and proportionate" and were "only limited to specific military targets that were directly related to the recent attacks against Pakistan." By "recent attacks", the Pakistani official meant Islamabad's previous claim about the downing of 10 primitive drones, which were said to have entered Pakistan's territory from inside Afghanistan, and that the Pakistani army shot them down with a "soft destruction" approach.

Two days before these attacks, on September 21, Pakistan's airstrikes on Kunar and Paktika provinces in Afghanistan resulted in the death of three civilians - a man, a woman and a girl - in the Nurgul area of Kunar province. Islamabad claimed that 28 militants were killed in this operation. The civilian casualties, which were also confirmed by the Office of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), followed a wave of popular protests in Kabul and other parts of Afghanistan.

Pakistan's attack was carried out in response to an attack against a police complex in Kohat district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province; An attack that killed at least 16 policemen on September 18. On that day, a car bomb started its operation by infiltrating the premises of this police station, at the same time as Friday prayers were held, and then the armed men continued the ground attack.

The "Ittihadul Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP)" group claimed responsibility for this attack; A coalition led by the Hafez Gul Bahadur Group (HGB) and closely linked to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Pakistani officials announced that one of the attackers was an Afghan national.

From October 2025 to September 2026, Pakistan has carried out at least 15 air and drone attacks inside Afghanistan. Unofficial estimates show that more than 1,100 civilians have been killed or injured this year as a result of cross-border violence in Afghanistan.

In May, an attack on a drug addiction treatment center in Kabul, which left 269 dead, led to requests to investigate this attack as a "war crime".

Inside Pakistan, the number of victims of civilians and security forces in terrorist attacks in 2026 has reached about 1,700 people. Of these, 545 people have been killed in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; The area where Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan are active.

Pakistan's claims that Afghan soil is being used for the operations of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan are also consistent with some periodic reports of the United Nations Monitoring Committee. One of these reports, published in August 2026, clearly stated that the Afghan Taliban "continues to support the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan".

However, the Afghan Taliban has repeatedly denied these claims.

Behind the scenes, however, the Taliban may have made efforts to contain the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. The UN report indicates that the Afghan Taliban authorities have transferred about 2,000 fighters and families affiliated with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan from the border areas of Pakistan to the interior parts of Afghanistan.

It has also been said that Hebatullah Akhundzada warned the leadership of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan through informal communications to stop attacks against Pakistan; Otherwise, he will lose the support of the Taliban. Of course, it is not clear whether a similar action has been taken to restrain the Hafez Gul Bahadur group or not.

Although efforts to control the TTP have not been entirely successful, according to data from the Armed Conflict Location and Events Data Project (ACLED), the activities of the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group and the Ittihadul Mujahideen Pakistan since the start of a new round of conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan in late February have reduced to less than half compared to the previous period.

On February 27, Pakistan launched Operation Ghadbul Haq (Righteous Fury) against the Taliban in Afghanistan; This action was considered the country's first direct attack against its former ally and its former support group. At that time, Islamabad stated the reason for this operation was "provocative and unprovoked shooting" by Taliban forces on the other side of the border.

Khawaja Asif, the Minister of Defense of Pakistan, announced at that time: "Now an open war has started between us."

Due to the level of violence that the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Taliban and the Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen continued to create inside Pakistan, Islamabad is facing a classic example of "Strategic Blowback"; A situation in which a country's past policies and support end up working against the country's interests.

More importantly, the feeling of impunity seen in Pakistan's repeated attacks against Afghanistan - despite the limited effectiveness of these operations - indicates serious weaknesses in the country's counter-terrorism strategy.

Most of these attacks so far have only been accompanied by sharp reactions from Taliban officials, promises of revenge, and scattered border clashes between Taliban and Pakistan forces, and have not brought tangible results.

In addition to trying to contain the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan, it seems that Pakistan also pursues broader strategic goals; including trying to regain his lost influence in Kabul.

From the point of view of Islamabad, the former ally of this country has deviated from the expected path and the show of forced power, along with supporting the opposition fronts of the Taliban, is the only remaining path to exert pressure on Kabul.

Creating a weak and dependent Afghanistan has been the goal pursued by the political-military structure of Pakistan for the past few decades.

During the period of the former Republic of Afghanistan, Hafez Gul Bahadur's group did not mainly target the government of Pakistan and its main focus was on fighting the American and NATO forces in Afghanistan. But after August 2021 and with the support of Al-Qaeda, this group has become one of the important figures of the rebellions against Islamabad.

Although the group is smaller in strength than the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, this has not stopped it from carrying out some of the most sophisticated attacks against security centers in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.

Hence, eliminating the threat of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Mujahideen - although it is much more difficult to fully confront Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan - can reduce some of the negative consequences of Islamabad's past policies.

Also, continued attacks, including those that sometimes directly target the Taliban regime, may fuel internal divisions in the multi-layered and factional structure of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and strengthen small pro-Pakistani elements within this structure.

However, achieving such a goal is much more difficult than Islamabad's calculations suggest.

Despite reports of internal disputes and political rifts between the Taliban Leadership Council in Kandahar (Rahbri Shoori) and the Taliban administrative structure in Kabul, the Leadership Council, which operates under the direct guidance of the Taliban Supreme Leader and under strict religious orders, has maintained primary control and uncontested legitimacy within the movement.

Moreover, every attack by Pakistan so far has intensified anti-Pakistani sentiments inside Afghanistan. This process can also strengthen the Afghan Taliban; Because this group has little motivation to accept the demands of Islamabad.

The Taliban government, which relies on the Pashtun ethnic identity and the cross-border ties of this people on both sides of the disputed Durand Line, may once again provide the ground for the strengthening of Pashtun nationalism.

The Taliban seem to have learned lessons from their former patron, Pakistan, about the art of creating "strategic assets" and using them as leverage.

Trying to force the Taliban to surrender through bombing can be a short-sighted strategy and have a counterproductive result; Especially if the experience of two decades of American military intervention in Afghanistan is considered.

In fact, Pakistan's military attacks may not only weaken the Taliban's ability to resist, but also strengthen the group's internal cohesion and increase its legitimacy against an external threat.

Islamabad has entered a cycle of punitive measures in a situation where the historical experience of Afghanistan has shown that foreign military pressure rarely leads to the establishment of a stable political order in this country.

Pakistan's main problem is that it is caught between two conflicting goals: on the one hand, it wants to curb the security threats caused by armed groups active in Afghanistan, and on the other hand, it seeks to restore its political influence in Kabul; The influence that has been greatly reduced after the return of the Taliban to power in 2021.

But using military power to restore leverage can strengthen the same group that Islamabad is trying to contain. Every cross-border attack gives the Taliban an opportunity to present itself as the defender of Afghanistan's national sovereignty and increase anti-Pakistani sentiments.

Finally, Pakistan's punitive gamble in Afghanistan may plunge the country into a war of attrition with no clear end in sight; A war that is not able to completely destroy the armed networks opposing Pakistan, nor can it restore Islamabad's former influence in Kabul.

Afghanistan's experience has repeatedly shown that strategies based on military pressure without a broad political framework often lead to a cycle of violence, backlash and further instability.