Technical and operational ambiguities of firing a heavy bomb The mother of all bombs is Trump's trump card?

The plan of reports about the possible use of the super-heavy bomb MOAB (the mother of all bombs) against Iran has once again highlighted the limitations of Washington's military option against Iran's strong nuclear infrastructure.

Evaluation of the new scenario of Washington against Tehran

The plan of reports about the possible use of the super-heavy bomb MOAB (the mother of all bombs) against Iran has once again highlighted the limitations of Washington's military option against Iran's strong nuclear infrastructure.

Ambassador Arjan - Political Group: In an analytical report, the "Defense Security Asia" military think tank has investigated new claims in the US about the use of the MOAB bomb, or the "mother of all bombs" against Iran, the most important points of which you can read below:

Published reports about the US considering the option of using the GBU-43/B high-explosive bomb known as the "Mother of All Bombs" against Iran have raised important questions about Washington's ability to destroy deeply buried nuclear facilities and the military implications of such an attack.

According to these reports, possible scenarios include an attack on Iran's energy infrastructure and some centers related to the nuclear program, including the Pickaxe Mountain underground facilities near Natanz.

However, the information provided does not confirm a definitive authorization by Donald Trump, the timing of the operation, or independent evidence that the use of the bomb is imminent.

Therefore, a distinction must be made between the consideration of a military option and the definitive decision to implement it.

Choosing a bomb with a very high explosive power does not necessarily mean the ability to destroy fortified underground facilities.

The main issue is the difference between creating widespread destruction on the surface of the earth and the actual destruction of protected infrastructure deep in the earth.

This difference can have a decisive effect on the degree of military success of the attack and the achievement of America's political goals.

High explosive power against ground penetration restrictions

The GBU-43/B bomb is one of the largest conventional American bombs in terms of explosive power, whose main destruction mechanism is focused on creating a blast wave and intense pressure, not penetrating deep into the earth's layers.

The weight of this bomb is about 21,600 pounds and the weight of its explosives is about 18,700 pounds.

These dimensions indicate its extensive destructive power, but alone do not determine how far its explosive energy can penetrate thick layers of rock and reinforced structures.

Using the satellite guidance system and the inertial navigation system, this bomb has the possibility of relatively precise guidance to the target.

However, the accuracy of the hit is not the same as the ability to destroy the underground target; Even if the bomb is detonated with high precision at the intended location, parts of the underground facility may still remain intact.

A distinction must be made between the MOAB and the GBU-57 heavy penetration bomb.

The GBU-57 bomb, weighing approximately 30,000 pounds, is designed to penetrate fortified and underground targets and is used with the B-2 stealth bomber.

The difference between these two weapons shows that the explosive power alone is not a suitable criterion for evaluating the ability to destroy underground facilities.

On the other hand, destroying the entrance of tunnels or surface facilities does not necessarily mean the destruction of the equipment inside the complex.

Intelligence and operational challenge for attacking nuclear infrastructure

The Kahlang underground facility, located in the south of the Natanz nuclear complex, is one of the main axes of the reports related to the possible US attack scenario.

The location of this complex near Iran's nuclear infrastructure has drawn the attention of analysts to its possible role in maintaining the technical and industrial capacities of the country.

The available information alone does not specify exactly what equipment and activities this complex now houses or what role it plays in Iran's nuclear capacity.

Some estimates estimate the depth of parts of these facilities to be at least 100 meters below the mountain.

Reports also point to tunnel entrances, reinforced structures and an expanded security perimeter.

Even if a facility is considered a militarily important target, the lack of sufficient information about the equipment deployed there can reduce the level of confidence in the outcome of an attack.

Carrying the bomb and the complications of the operation

The use of the "mother of all bombs" is not only dependent on its explosive power, but also the way it is transported and released has certain operational limitations.

This bomb is used from the MC-130 transport plane and through a special mechanism, including exiting from the rear ramp of the plane and using the parachute system and release platform.

This method is different from releasing conventional ammunition from fighters or strategic bombers.

Since the MC-130 is a relatively slow aircraft and lacks stealth bomber-level stealth technology, regional air defense conditions can affect mission feasibility.

Carrying out such a mission also requires logistical support, fuel supply, aircraft maintenance, specialized equipment and manpower.

Strait of Hormuz and regional and economic consequences

The possible consequences of an attack on Iran are not limited to military objectives and can be related to the situation of maritime security and energy transfer in the region.

Any escalation of tension in the Strait of Hormuz can affect the security of shipping, the flow of energy exports, and the security calculations of the Persian Gulf countries.

A possible attack on Iran's energy infrastructure may also cause significant economic costs; But increasing economic pressure does not necessarily lead to a change in Iran's nuclear decisions.

Likewise, the destruction of surface facilities alone cannot prove that enriched uranium stockpiles or protected equipment have been destroyed.