Washington After the Iran War: From Fixed Bases to Dispersed Military Posture

The decades-old pattern of US military deployments in the Middle East has been upended in a war where mobility and force dispersal have become an advantage.

Ambassador Arjan - Political Group: Foreign Policy, in an analysis referring to the experience of the US-Iranian war, writes that Iran's missile and drone attacks have called into question the decades-long pattern of deploying American forces in large and permanent bases in the Persian Gulf. Kelly E. Griego, senior research fellow at the Stimson Center's Rethinking American Macro-Strategy Program, and Maximilian K. Bremer, a researcher affiliated with the same program, argues in this analytical note that Washington should not rebuild and strengthen its large and permanent bases in the Persian Gulf, rather than move them to the west, including Jordan and Israel. According to them, the war with Iran has shown that American military power in the Middle East needs access to a series of airports and the ability to quickly move planes, troops and equipment rather than depending on permanent bases.

For the past generation, the United States has relied on large bases across the Persian Gulf to exert its military might. Washington was confident that these bases were beyond the reach of groups like ISIS, and that Iran, despite its expanding missile arsenal, would not risk a sustained attack on them. Iran's war has shattered this assumption; Iranian missiles and drones have repeatedly targeted these bases and forced the US military to evacuate the facilities it has owned for decades.

Now the Pentagon is considering whether to rebuild and strengthen these bases or move its military presence to the west, including Jordan and Israel; The areas that are far from the reach of Iran. But Washington should not choose either of these two ways. Both approaches are based on the assumption that the exercise of military power in the Middle East requires large and permanent bases; While the war has shown that there is no such necessity.

In the first 38 days of the "Epic Rage" operation, America implemented one of its biggest air campaigns in recent decades; More than 10,200 sorties were made and more than 13,500 attacks were made. This campaign did not stop despite Iran's repeated attacks on key centers; Because the American forces, whenever their bases were targeted, they quickly continued the operation from other places.

For example, anticipating an attack on Al-Adeed Air Base in Qatar, the largest US military installation in the Middle East, the US withdrew its forces and instead directed the air war from Shaw Air Force Base in South Carolina. When Iran targeted the Joint Air Operations Center—the center that had directed U.S. air campaigns in the region since 2003—it had already been evacuated.

The equipment was also moved. In the pre-war days, the US Air Force began moving its refueling planes to Ben-Gurion Airport, Israel's main civilian airport. These planes operated using the existing infrastructure of the airport and, if needed, maintenance and equipment specialists were transferred there.

The ability to continue fighting, even when front-line bases were evacuated or damaged, is perhaps the most important lesson of this war for how to deploy American forces in the Middle East. What was important was not large, permanent bases, but access to a range of airfields, including civilian airfields, and the ability to move aircraft, troops, equipment, and ammunition between them when attacking the bases.

Instead of spending billions of dollars to repair bases or build new bases in more western regions, Washington should use this opportunity to review its approach; That is, instead of permanently deploying forces in fixed locations, move towards a lighter and more modular model that is more compatible with the future of warfare in the Middle East and beyond.

Why doesn't rebuilding databases solve the problem?

Neither rebuilding the Persian Gulf bases nor moving them westward will address the fundamental problems that have become apparent in recent months: they are easily identified, expensive to defend, and not always available when Washington needs them.

Simply put, you can't hide a permanent base. The enemy has years to study its map and structure, and Iran has used this opportunity to identify suitable places and times to attack.

For example, on March 27 (April 7), Iran destroyed an AWACS "A-3 Sentry" aircraft at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia; An aircraft that is one of the few airborne command and control systems in the US Air Force fleet. Iran has also targeted operations centers, hangars, troop accommodation and fuel depots at several American bases; A topic that indicates a detailed understanding of the structure and activities of this facility.

Defending these fixed positions against missile and drone attacks has imposed a very high and unbalanced cost on America. The United States used more than a thousand interceptor missiles in the first 6 weeks of the war; including more than 40% of the pre-war reserves of the Patriot system and about half of the interceptor missiles of the THAAD system.

Fortifying the bases will not solve the problem either, and it does not cost much. Reinforced bunkers and underground fuel tanks can protect some equipment, but refueling and early warning aircraft are too large to fit only in very large and expensive bunkers.

Whether Washington spends billions of dollars to refurbish the bases or use up its expensive stockpile of interceptor missiles to defend them, in both cases it will pay a much higher cost than what Iran would incur to attack these bases.

Moving the bases to the west, to Jordan and Israel, also simply transfers the problem to another place; Because both countries are still in the range of Iran's missiles. The establishment of more permanent US installations in these two countries will provide Tehran with another set of targets to identify and map and have more incentive to expand its arsenal of medium-range missiles and long-range drones.

the transfer of troops to Israel; New political costs

The transfer of forces to the West will be associated with more political risks. Israel has repeatedly engaged in risky military behavior that has conflicted with Washington's positions.

In August, Israel bombed an airbase in northern Syria near the Turkish border without informing the US. The US ambassador to Turkey described the attack as "unnecessary escalation" and suggested that it was intended to provoke Türkiye, a US ally in NATO, to enter a wider war.

Because of its alliance with Israel, America is now bearing the costs of getting involved in this country's conflicts; But the large and permanent deployment of American forces in Israel will increase these costs. Such a presence would expose American forces to retaliatory strikes in response to Israeli actions, may draw Washington into Israel's next war, and further strain American relations with Arab partners.

On the other hand, the existence of permanent bases does not guarantee that the host country will allow the US to use them in the most critical moments.

In May, when the U.S. began escorting merchant ships in the Strait of Hormuz, relying heavily on Gulf-based aircraft, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait temporarily restricted U.S. access. Reports indicated that Saudi officials were worried about Washington's downplaying of Iran's attacks on Persian Gulf countries and doubted that the US would protect them if the conflicts escalated.

Shortly thereafter, in July, Israel imposed a cap on the number of American refueling planes stationed at Ben Gurion Airport to avoid disrupting summer tourist traffic, prompting the US Air Force to relocate its planes.

Both cases show how quickly the US can lose access to a base; Even when it has old bases in the host country or enjoys close strategic relations.

A network of airports instead of permanent bases

Washington now has a rare opportunity to review the strategy of deploying its forces. Instead of insisting on permanent bases, it should strive for access to a wide range of host country airports and air bases across the Persian Gulf, Europe and around the Middle East.

Some of these airports can be the main centers of operations; With enough space to park aircraft, fuel reserves and large cargo handling equipment. Others may have much more limited facilities: a clear runway, aircraft parking space, fuel and ammunition storage; In these cases, American forces are only sent to the site during a crisis.

This pattern creates more flexibility; Because the opposition of a host government alone cannot stop American air operations, and Iran will also face a much larger number of places that it must monitor and target.

Access to this network can be likened to buying options in the stock market: Washington can maintain its options for facing a crisis by paying a relatively limited cost, without having to pay the political, economic and military costs of maintaining forces at all deployment points during peacetime.

Keeping the majority of the forces inside the United States also increases their readiness; Because inside the country, they will have wider technical support and manpower, a support that the units stationed abroad are usually deprived of.

Much of the equipment needed for emergencies can be pre-deployed in the region while troops train and improve their readiness inside the US. The U.S. can stockpile weapons, equipment, and fuel in some locations, keep some supplies on ships, and hold regular exercises to quickly deploy troops to the region, disperse them in multiple locations, and relocate in the event of a threat.

This precautionary strategy is more than just related to technology, it also has political dimensions. In the current situation, the dispersion of forces creates a significant advantage against enemies who have limited surveillance and long-range attack capabilities; Because it makes targeting more difficult.

But with the development of surveillance systems and the expansion of long-range arsenals, this advantage will decrease. In a world where sensors are ubiquitous, there are fewer places to hide, and the balance may eventually shift once again in favor of a limited number of heavily fortified bases. This uncertainty is reason enough for Washington to decide more carefully before committing resources to a fixed model.

How does the dispersion of forces strengthen deterrence?

This approach can also strengthen America's deterrence. If Iran has learned anything in this war, it is that major American bases will probably be evacuated when the conflict starts. This awareness reduces the validity of the deterrent message that these bases used to convey and, as a result, weakens the strategic justification for maintaining them.

Deterrence requires that Washington credibly demonstrate that it can deploy sufficient military power to thwart Iran's political and military goals; But this does not mean the permanent deployment of tens of thousands of American troops on the front lines.

Of course, a lighter strategy that relies on the rapid deployment of troops in times of crisis will not be without costs and compromises. The forces that are stationed outside the region need more time to reach the Middle East and at the beginning of the crisis, they put more pressure on the strategic air transport capacity, air refueling and other logistics facilities.

Keeping a wide network of airports ready also requires continuous follow-up; From maintaining agreements with host countries to managing pre-deployed reserves.

However, this model can increase the readiness of the forces. Units deployed to the region for regular exercises will have more opportunity to train jointly with partner nations' militaries and practice operations that the U.S. military expects to rely on in the Indo-Pacific region: moving reinforcements to the scene of a crisis and then operating from dispersed positions under threat conditions.

Finally, according to the authors, the slowing down of the response speed in the Middle East is less important than in other regions.