China Shifts from 'Cautious' Player to 'Normative Architect' of World Order / How Will the Dragon's White Paper Dominate the World? / Is China Paying the Financial Price of Being the World's New Leader?
This white paper advances three interconnected propositions at its core: first, the world must move toward a genuinely multipolar order. Second, the United Nations must remain the central institution of global governance. Third, the Global South must have greater influence and a larger share in setting global rules and priorities... These ideas constitute an explicit call to redistribute power within the current international system. Normative leadership ultimately requires «a
Chatham House's analysis of Beijing's new "White Paper" document on national security and global governance
At its core, the White Paper advances three interrelated propositions: First, the world must move toward a fundamentally multipolar order. Second, the United Nations must remain the central institution of international governance. Third, the Global South should have greater influence and stake in determining global rules and priorities...these ideas are a clarion call for a redistribution of power within the current international system. Normative leadership ultimately requires "credibility"; Credibility that is often based on tangible commitments... The White Paper shows that China is increasingly confident in offering a vision for the future of global governance. What remains unclear is whether Beijing has the willingness—or ability—to match its growing normative ambitions with the economic statecraft needed to realize them.
Andisheh Group: Editing, Revising and Editing: Forozan Asif Nakhai: Yu Jie, Senior Researcher for China in the Asia-Pacific Program, Chatham House, in his theoretical article published on the Chatham House website and translated into Farsi by artificial intelligence, by dissecting China's 45-page white paper on "fairer global governance", shows that Beijing is consolidating its role from a beneficial actor in the existing system to an "architect of an order". "New International". In a situation where Washington is shunning the burden of traditional leadership by ignoring international law and isolationism, Beijing has seen the opportunity to present a "new political vocabulary". This document tries to rebalance the rules of distribution of power in international affairs by focusing on the three principles of multipolarism, maintaining the centrality of the United Nations, and increasing the share of the global south.
However, Chatham House's analysis reveals a fundamental contradiction and suspension in Beijing's behavior: China calls itself the flagship of global governance reform, which, unlike the American historical model (such as the Marshall Plan), refrains from providing large financial commitments and strict guarantees. The slowdown in economic growth and the adoption of cautious policies have kept China suspended between "political ambition" and "fiscal self-restraint". Finally, the author concludes that Beijing seeks to exercise "normative power" and redefine the concepts of governance and development rather than seeking "financial hegemony"; An approach whose success will be determined not only in the attractiveness of the discourse, but also in the extent of Beijing's ability to provide concrete economic support for its plans. You will read this article below:
China's new white paper on global governance shows the country's tightrope walk between global ambitions and fiscal restraint. While the world's attention is focused on the wars in the Middle East and Ukraine, Beijing issued a comprehensive statement on the future of the international order. The 45-page white paper, titled "Fairer and Fairer Global Governance: China's Principles, Proposals, and Practices," appeared just as the Group of Seven (G7) recommendations for global affairs were released. This document shows China's evolution and transition from a "mere participant in the existing international system" to an "architect of a new world order".
The importance of this white paper is not because of the presentation of a new and revolutionary idea, but because it brings together Beijing's long-standing diplomatic themes in a unified and integrated format for the redesign of global governance. This document integrates the categories of development, security, culture, technology and institutional reforms under a single conceptual framework.
At its core, the White Paper advances three interrelated propositions: First, the world must move toward a fundamentally multipolar order. Second, the United Nations must remain the central institution of international governance. Third, the Global South should have more influence and share in determining global rules and priorities. (Ambassador Arjan: Even though it is one of the three propositions of the International Governance Center in the White Book, Mr. Xi Jinping's Vice President came to speak at the United Nations and went to meet Trump himself. Is this a significant change in behavior?)
These ideas are a clarion call for a redistribution of power within the current international system. However, the document also reveals a striking contradiction: while China increasingly presents itself as a supporter of global governance reform and a defender of multilateralism, it remains hesitant and reticent about the allocation of large-scale financial resources—historically tied to "global leadership."
The timing of the publication of this white paper is not accidental. The document comes at a time when Washington is showing less willingness to shoulder the burden of international leadership. The United States remains the world's most powerful nation, but domestic political divisions, the Trump administration's apparent disregard for international law, and its unpredictable approach to foreign policy have raised questions about the future of American leadership in the international system.
China clearly sees an opportunity here. The White Paper repeatedly portrays Beijing as a defender of the UN-centered order against unilateralism and power-based politics. Unlike emerging powers in the past that sought to overthrow existing institutions, China insists that the UN remains inevitable and irreplaceable. The message is this: global governance should not be dismantled, but "rebalanced".
This distinction is important. Beijing is not looking to provide an alternative to the UN; Rather, it tries to reconstruct the existing system in a way that better reflects the realities of power in the present era. In Beijing's mentality, the post-1945 order does not reflect the world today; A world where developing countries have the majority of the world's population and an ever-increasing share of economic production.
The beneficiaries of this rebalancing of the world will be the countries of the global south. Throughout this document, China presents itself as both a "member" and a "representative" of this broad spectrum. Demands for more representation of developing countries in international institutions and enhanced participation in global decision-making have a strong presence in the text. While Global South cooperation has traditionally focused on economic development, this White Paper seeks to extend it to other areas of global affairs, including security and technology.
There is considerable appeal in this message. Many developing countries have long argued that global financial institutions and regulatory processes continue to be disproportionately influenced by advanced economies. Hence, China's emphasis on inclusiveness and representation overlaps with real and genuine grievances that extend far beyond Beijing's circle of cronies and partners.
However, leadership in international affairs requires more than political ideas and literature; Leadership requires "resources". History shows that every great architect of the international order has paid a heavy price for playing that role. After World War II, the United States supported the reconstruction of Europe through the Marshall Plan, financing and supporting international institutions, guaranteeing security arrangements, and providing global public goods. Regardless of one's positive or negative view of American leadership, this role was backed by huge financial commitments.
China's white paper is clearly imprecise and general on this front. The document talks in detail about principles, cooperation and institutional reforms, but does not make any major new financial commitments to help make them happen.
This omission is especially striking given China's own economic situation. Slower economic growth and the pursuit of technological supremacy at home have limited Beijing's willingness to make costly commitments overseas. The era of government-driven investments in the "Band and Road Initiative" is over, giving way to a more cautious approach focusing on smaller, more targeted projects.
As a result, China seems to be suspended between "ambition" and "self-restraint". It increasingly fills the diplomatic void left by American withdrawal—whether by choice or by necessity—but is still unwilling to bear the costs traditionally associated with "hegemonic leadership."
However, perhaps this is what China wants. Chinese policymakers have long emphasized that China is not seeking hegemony and should not be expected to assume the responsibilities that the United States once held.
This means that perhaps the White Paper should not be measured by the yardstick of "past American leadership." Beijing is not offering a Marshall Plan 2.0 (Ambassador Arjan: In analytical, media, and technology parlance, adding "2.0" (two zeros) after a title or concept is a term to denote an "updated, newer, and more advanced version" of an old idea or pattern.) nor is it proposing to financially support the world order through massive capital transfers or endless security guarantees. Instead, China appears to be pursuing a different approach to influence: one rooted in its past development experience and existing institutional legitimacy.
From this point of view, the white paper is less about "financial hegemony" and more about "reflection of normative power". China is trying to shape how others think about sovereignty, development, security, and the distribution of authority in international affairs. Beijing's ambition is not necessarily to replace America as the world's main supplier of public goods, but to "redefine the principles" by which these goods are governed and distributed.
The repeated emphasis on multipolarity, the centrality of the United Nations, and the voice of the Global South reflects an attempt to establish a "new political vocabulary" for the international order in which China plays a leading diplomatic role.
The success of this strategy will depend on more than just the attractiveness of its ideas. Normative leadership ultimately requires "credibility"; Credit that is often based on tangible commitments. The White Paper shows that China is increasingly confident in providing a vision for the future of global governance. What remains unclear is whether Beijing has the willingness—or ability—to match its growing normative ambitions with the economic statecraft needed to realize them.
Currently, China is offering the world a new language for international order. The main question is whether it will provide the real means of building this order?
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