Is This Man Likely to Succeed Netanyahu? Will Eisenkot Attack Iran After a Possible Victory?

If Eisenkot wins, we will likely see continued hostile Israeli policies toward Iran, whether through Mossad covert operations or efforts to build an anti-Iran regional coalition. However, his approach is likely to be more methodical and cautious, and more reliant on behind-the-scenes diplomacy with Washington, rather than Netanyahu's public exaggerations and unilateralism.

According to Ambassador Arjan, on the eve of the crucial Knesset elections, a retired general with a different background from famous Israeli politicians has become Benjamin Netanyahu's main rival. Gadi Eisenkot, the former chief of staff of the Israeli army, is leading the polls for the October 27 election, promising to "restore trust" and offer a different security strategy. But the key question is: Will he continue Netanyahu's path towards Iran or will he take a different approach?

Gadi Eisenkot was born on May 19, 1960 in Tiberias, a city in the north of the occupied territories, in a Jewish family of Moroccan origin and grew up in Eilat. He came from the working class and marginalized people of Israel; A background that sharply distinguishes him from Netanyahu, the son of wealthy Ashkenazi Jerusalemites who was educated in America.

Eisenkot entered the army at a young age. He joined the Golani Brigade in 1978 and gradually rose in the ranks of the army. He is the commander of the Golani brigade, head of the Judea and Samaria department, head of the operations department, commander of the northern region and deputy of the general staff. In 2015, Netanyahu appointed him as the 21st Chief of General Staff of the Israeli Army; A position he kept until 2019.

During his time as Chief of Staff, Eysenkot was known as a cautious and methodical commander who believed in the decisive use of military power, but was skeptical of operations without political goals and achievable strategies. However, he is the architect of the "suburban doctrine"; A strategy that calls for a devastating Israeli response to Hezbollah attacks by targeting civilian population centers.

Entering politics and quickly climbing the ladder of progress

Eisenkot entered politics in 2022 and joined the National Unity coalition led by Benny Gantz. This entry was accompanied by a disappointing result (12 seats). After the attack on October 7, 2023, he joined the "emergency government" and served as an observer in Netanyahu's war cabinet.

In 2025, Eisenkot separated from the National Unity Party and founded the moderate party Yashar (meaning "right" or "honest"). Introducing his party, he said: "This time it's our turn. Do we turn a blind eye to the disaster that has descended upon us? Do we accept division and rush to the next disaster? Or do we heal and rebuild ourselves?”

Eysenkot's lead in the polls

The latest published polls show that Eisenkot has surpassed Netanyahu in the race for prime minister. According to the Kahn poll, 43 percent of respondents considered Eysenkot the most suitable choice for prime minister, while this figure was 38 percent for Netanyahu. Another survey indicates that Yashar Eisenkot's party is leading in the polls.

However, Israel's fragmented political system and the 61-seat threshold to form a government make Eysenkot's path difficult. The evidence shows that none of Netanyahu's blocs and his opponents will get an overwhelming majority in the polls.

Eysencott's approach to Iran: "killing zone" instead of direct attack

Eysenkot's position towards Iran is perhaps the most important difference between him and Netanyahu. He has repeatedly accused Netanyahu of exaggerating Iran's nuclear threat in order to scare Israel's public opinion and stay in power. "Iran has never had a nuclear bomb," Eisenkot said at a conference in the center of the occupied territories. [Netanyahu] falsifies the reality to scare the people of Israel."

But this does not mean that Eysenkot is soft towards Tehran. He described Iran as "the biggest threat to Israel" and called for the formation of a "new international coalition" with the participation of westernized Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia to confront Iran.

Eysenkot has floated an idea that, according to the Jerusalem Post, no other Israeli official has publicly expressed: the creation of an aerial "kill zone" by the United States over the few areas where 60 percent of Iran's uranium is still stored underground, particularly at the Natanz, Fordo and Isfahan facilities.

According to this plan, Washington must make a clear public commitment that any movement of nuclear materials in these areas will be the target of immediate airstrikes. This approach requires the long-term deployment of US air resources in the region, similar to the no-fly zone that the US established over Iraq in the 1990s. Eysenkot presented the plan as his "outside the box" solution if maximum pressure and negotiations fail.

However, the evidence shows that Eysenkot was actually tougher on Iran than Netanyahu. According to the Maariv report, after Iran's direct missile and drone attack on Israel in April 2024, Eisenkot called for a wider military response in the War Cabinet. He argued that the Israeli Air Force should fly to Iran immediately after the end of the Iranian attack and implement all three levels of response "in full force." But Netanyahu chose the most limited response option, and Israel launched only one missile attack on a specific target in Iran.

Netanyahu's continuation or change of course?

According to the above evidence, the key question is: will Eisenkot, if he wins, continue Netanyahu's path or take a different approach?

In Iran, the similarities between Eysenkot and Netanyahu are more than the differences. Eysenkot, like Netanyahu, considers Iran to be the main threat, opposes any agreement that only postpones the nuclear threat, and wants to weaken the axis of resistance led by Tehran. According to Al Jazeera's analysis, Israel's opposition has "backed the war with Iran and criticized Netanyahu only for not taking into account Trump's volatility." Therefore, there is no significant difference between Eysenkot and Netanyahu.

It seems that the differences are in the methods and strategies of the two sides. Unlike Netanyahu, instead of exaggerating Iran's nuclear threat, Eisenkot emphasizes "preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons through long-term and comprehensive inspections." He also emphasizes the need to link military action to a coherent diplomatic strategy and believes that Israel cannot achieve sustainable security through military operations "alone".

In an important statement, Eysenkot admitted that "we entered the war with Iran with the unattainable goal of regime change, and unfortunately, we acted aimlessly in Gaza and Lebanon." These statements show that, unlike Netanyahu, he acknowledges the limitations of military activity to change strategic realities and does not seek unattainable goals in Iran and Lebanon.

As a result, it must be said that if Eisenkot wins, we will probably see the continuation of Israel's hostile policies towards Iran; Either through Mossad secret operations, or through trying to form a regional anti-Iranian coalition. But his approach is likely to be more methodical, cautious, and based more on behind-the-scenes diplomacy with Washington than Netanyahu's overt, unilateralist exaggerations. In other words, Eysenkot may follow Netanyahu's path, but at a slower pace, more caution, and a preference for diplomatic and strategic tools over military displays.