The endless war between Iran and America; There is no agreement and no cessation of hostilities / the only way out of the war is the "less for less" agreement

While Iran and the United States are caught in a deadlock in negotiations and both sides consider continued pressure to be less costly than accepting difficult concessions, Ali Vaez and Mohammad Ayatollahi warn in an interview with Faren Afraz that this situation neither means stability nor a sign of the end of the war. Relying on its missile power, the Strait of Hormuz and its regional partners, Tehran tries to increase the cost of confrontation for Washington, but the risk of miscalculation and expansion is involved.

According to Ambassador Arjan, the stalemate between Iran and the United States has entered a stage where the continuation of the conflict, despite the heavy economic and military costs, seems less expensive for both sides than accepting difficult concessions. Ali Vaez and Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabar, in an interview with Foreign Afraz magazine, by examining the prospect of negotiations, Iran's deterrence power, the future of the US military presence in the region and the consequences of economic pressure, argue that the current situation is not necessarily stable and will not automatically lead to peace.

Ali Waez, Iran Project Manager at the International Crisis Group and Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabar, Associate Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M University, dissected the roots of the continuation of the conflict, the reasons for the failure to revive previous agreements, changes in security arrangements in the Middle East, and the future prospects of this conflict.

The main focus of this conversation is the formation of a kind of "endless war"; A situation in which direct conflict may cease for a time, but fundamental differences remain unresolved and the two sides once again enter a cycle of escalation, attack, and retaliation. In such a situation, Iran tries to dissuade America from continuing the pressure by expanding the costs of confrontation; On the other hand, Washington still hopes that military and economic pressure will force Tehran to accept more concessions.

impasse of negotiations; Why did the temporary understanding not last?

According to the narrative presented in the conversation, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, efforts were made to bring Iran and the United States back to the negotiating table. Iran's proposal focused on shortening the timing of the previous understanding: Tehran was ready to open the Strait of Hormuz within seven days instead of 30 days; On the other hand, America should have taken measures to reduce the economic pressure, lift the blockade and end the war in the first days of the agreement.

However, from Washington's point of view, this proposal was not fundamentally different from the previous understanding; An understanding that, according to the American critics, gave Iran significant points. The Trump administration also wanted Iran to propose nuclear concessions; An issue that Tehran was opposed to, because it considered the acceptance of the change of American conditions as a sign of the success of Washington's policy of maximum pressure.

As a result, the New York negotiations ended without tangible progress. The issue was not only the dispute over the opening time of the strait or the order of the implementation of obligations; The two sides did not have the same opinion about the nature of the agreement and its ultimate goal.

The previous understanding was supposed to focus on reopening the shipping route, stopping the bombing of Iran by the US and moving towards nuclear negotiations, and postponing the assignment of basic issues, especially the future of Iran's nuclear program, to later stages. But even this limited framework did not last. The time gap between two months of negotiations to reach an understanding and a little more than two weeks until its collapse shows how difficult it is to reach a lasting agreement between the two sides.

In such a situation, the possibility of a new round of confrontation is still raised; Both on the eve of the US mid-term elections and after that. The result can be a repetition of the same cycle in which a temporary truce or understanding gives way to a new conflict, without the fundamental differences being resolved.

Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabar: Tehran believes that America will not adhere to the agreement

Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabar, in explaining the possibility of escalation of tension by Iran, emphasizes the gap in perception of the two sides regarding each other's abilities and will. According to him, there is a widespread perception in Washington that Iran is severely weakened and may face collapse at any moment. This assessment, although it is not baseless from the economic and military point of view, does not take into account all of Iran's capabilities.

Ayatollahi Tabar explains that Iran has suffered as a result of sanctions and economic blockade and has suffered heavy military losses in recent wars. But it still has significant capabilities, tools and resources. From his point of view, Washington's long-term waiting for the collapse of the Islamic Republic has caused insufficient motivation to reach a lasting agreement.

From Tehran's point of view, until this perception in America changes, an agreement that can last will not be formed. Iran believes that if Washington thinks that the Iranian government is on the verge of collapse, it will see no reason to retreat from its demands.

Ayatollahi Tabar also points to the perception that both sides think that the passage of time is in their favor. However, according to him, Iran is worried that the continuation of the current situation will turn into another long-term blockade; A situation similar to the sanctions that have put pressure on the country's economy for years.

From his point of view, Tehran may have come to the conclusion that it needs to change the equation before the US has more time to compensate for the shortage of ammunition, stabilize the energy market or find alternative routes to pass through the Strait of Hormuz. In addition, the next American administration may have less internal differences than the Trump administration and be able to form a more effective coalition against Iran.

For this reason, Ayatollahi Tabar makes it possible that Tehran will escalate the tension in order to change Washington's calculations. The possible tools of this strategy, according to him, could be the use of regional partners, targeting data centers and even internet cables; According to him, this issue has been raised before in some Iranian conservative circles and Mohsen Rezaei has also mentioned it.

However, Ayatollahi Tabar differentiates between the evaluation of experts and the actual calculations of decision makers. Analysts may conclude that neither side is capable of completely defeating the other, but Iranian and American leaders still believe they can inflict enough damage on the other side to force it to back down.

Can Iran drive America out of the Middle East?

Ayatollahi Tabar further considers the attack on American bases in the region and even beyond as part of Iran's effort to increase the cost of Washington's military presence. From this point of view, the withdrawal of American equipment from some bases can be interpreted in Tehran as a sign of the success of this strategy.

He explains that in the 12-day war and then in the February 28 attacks, Iran has come to the conclusion that the goal of the American and Israeli attacks is not only to weaken the country's military power, but also to target the political and religious leadership of the Islamic Republic. From Tehran's point of view, this confrontation can lead to an attempt to destroy Iran's political system and turn the country into a failed state.

In such a perception, some ideas that were previously on the fringes of Iran's political space, including targeting American bases in Europe, can become more mainstream. The logic of this approach is to increase the cost of direct or indirect cooperation of countries with Washington.

However, Ayatollahi Tabar warns that this strategy has serious risks. Attacking US bases may cause the withdrawal or relocation of forces in the short term, but in the long term, it can lead countries in the region to mend their differences with Washington and participate more in a coalition against Iran.

Ali Vaez: Kicking America out is not the same as damaging the bases

Ali Vaez is more pessimistic about the possibility of the complete expulsion of America from the region. His main argument is that damaging American bases and forcing Washington to change its military alignment is different from permanently removing American influence.

According to Waez, even if America is forced to withdraw its forces or equipment from some bases during the war, this does not mean the end of its ability to exercise power in the region. The United States does not necessarily need a permanent presence in Bahrain, Qatar, or European bases to maintain its military power, and it can launch airstrikes from long distances.

Waez also believes that after the end of the conflict, America will most likely remain the main military player in the region; However, its credibility with its allies may have been damaged. The countries of the region will probably seek to diversify their security relations and may increase cooperation with Turkey, Pakistan, Ukraine, China or Russia, but the defense infrastructure of the Persian Gulf countries will still be largely dependent on American systems.

He points to Iraq to explain this limitation; Where, despite the withdrawal of parts of the American forces, Washington still has the ability to maintain a military presence and exercise power. From the preacher's point of view, therefore, driving America out of the region is more than an entirely achievable goal, it is an ideological concept that promises the complete elimination of American influence, without being able to ignore the military and security realities of the region.

From "strategic depth" to "strategic entanglement"

Another part of the conversation is dedicated to changing Iran's security strategy. Before the war, Tehran relied on a network of regional partners to keep the conflict away from its borders. This policy was based on the assumption that Iran's influence in countries such as Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen will prevent enemies from directly attacking Iran's soil; Because they had to include the reaction cost of Iran's partners in their calculations.

Along with this network, Iran's missiles and drones, conventional military capabilities and potential nuclear capacity formed other layers of deterrence. The Strait of Hormuz was also considered as a strategic lever to put pressure on the world economy.

However, the recent war showed that the network of regional allies could not prevent the attack on Iranian soil. On the other hand, Iran's missile and drone power has been in the center of attention. This change does not mean that the regional partners become unimportant, but it can lead to the rearrangement of the network and the change of the weight of different groups in Tehran's calculations.

In this framework, the role of Ansarullah forces in Yemen has become more prominent; Especially in a situation where Lebanon's Hezbollah has weakened and Ansarullah's ability to threaten Red Sea shipping and Saudi energy infrastructure has become more important.

But this strategy has an internal contradiction: Iran wants to show the countries of the region that Iran's insecurity leads to their insecurity; However, if the pressure on neighbors increases too much, those same countries may move closer to the US to counter threats.

In this way, Tehran is facing two different paths: intensifying the pressure to increase the cost of confrontation with Iran, or showing readiness for compromise and reducing the neighbors' worries. The result depends on how Iran balances these two goals.

Ansarullah and Saudi forces; Deterrence or creating a coalition against Iran?

In another part of the discussion, the attacks of Ansarullah forces on Saudi Arabia are analyzed as an example of this strategy. From Ayatollahi's point of view, Iran's leaders and their partners may have considered the past restraint as a sign of weakness, and now they are trying to transfer the same pressure they have endured to the other side.

In this view, if Iran faces a naval blockade, others may also face such pressure; If Iran's oil exports are disrupted, the security of oil exports from other countries will not be guaranteed. Ansarullah's attacks on Saudi Arabia can also be interpreted in the same framework.

Ayatollahi Tabar considers this approach as an attempt to expand the scope of conflict costs; A strategy that, if continued, may go beyond the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea and threaten other routes such as the Suez Canal or Gibraltar.

However, he emphasizes the danger of miscalculation. From Tehran's point of view, the gradual increase in pressure may be a way to force rivals to retreat, but the same process can lead to the expansion of the war and the involvement of more actors.