economic geography; A challenge beyond a military war/Houthi's strategy is to threaten Riyadh's economic infrastructure

The experience of this war showed that air power is not a sufficient tool to resolve a political conflict, when the other side is able to disperse forces, rebuild operational capabilities and continue to operate at a lower level than conventional war. The Houthis have adapted to this imbalance over the past decade.

In order to put pressure on Saudi Arabia, Iran and its allies do not need to seize all the country's oil fields or all the shipping routes completely, but it is enough to increase the risk of using the routes through which Saudi oil reaches the world markets.

Maybe Saudi Arabia's military superiority and economic strength are enough to deal heavy blows to Yemen's Houthis, but it does not provide any guarantee of a strategic victory over this group.

The expansion of the Houthis' influence on the shores of the Red Sea and their proximity to the Bab al-Mandab strait, along with the disruption of Saudi oil transport infrastructure, has faced Riyadh with a challenge beyond a military war. The main issue now is not only the ability to defeat the Houthis, but also the protection of infrastructure and economic routes, the vulnerability of which can impose a heavy cost on the Saudi economy.

Ronnie P. Sasmita wrote in the Middle East Monitor: Saudi Arabia has the necessary financial power to continue a long war. It can buy warplanes, missiles, drones, defense systems and advanced intelligence equipment, and sustain losses that could bankrupt the economies of poorer countries.

However, the ability to finance the war does not necessarily mean the possibility of defeating the Houthis; A distinction that is now more important than ever.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reportedly called Donald Trump twice last week and asked Washington to directly target Houthi positions. Trump did not agree to this request, but agreed to provide Saudi Arabia with intelligence support and assistance in identifying and determining targets.

Air superiority is necessary, but insufficient

This development shows that Riyadh's problem is not a lack of military power; Rather, it is the conclusion that the problem of the Houthis cannot be solved solely by relying on the power of fire.

According to estimates, Saudi Arabia will spend about 83.2 billion dollars on military affairs in 2025, ranking the eighth largest military spender in the world. This country has advanced fighters, precision weapons, modern air defense systems and wide access to Western military technology and information. In contrast, the Houthis are a non-state actor with limited financial resources operating in one of the most difficult geographical environments in the Middle East. Despite this significant difference, the conventional military superiority of Saudi Arabia has not led to a decisive strategic victory.

The author claimed: Riyadh entered the war in Yemen in 2015 relying on its air superiority. The declared goal was to prevent the Houthis from consolidating their power and to restore a government aligned with Saudi Arabia. These airstrikes caused extensive damage and slowed the Houthis' advances at times, but the desired political result of Saudi Arabia was not achieved.

From 2015 to the April 2022 ceasefire, the Houthis launched nearly 1,000 rocket and missile attacks and more than 350 separate drone attacks against targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, according to ACLED data. During this period, the nature of the weapons used by them also changed. The share of guided missiles in the total rocket and missile attacks of the Houthis increased from about 15% in 2015 to 89% in 2022, and drone attacks gradually surpassed missile attacks.

The difference between the strategy of Saudi Arabia and the Houthis

Riyadh has tried more to increase the cost of this group's actions by destroying the military equipment and weakening the operative capacity of the Houthis. On the other hand, the Houthis have gradually followed a strategy that aims to deprive Saudi Arabia of the possibility of safe and predictable activity. This difference shows the distance between military punishment of an enemy and depriving him of his ability to operate.

Saudi Arabia can destroy the missile launch pad, but the political and economic incentives that maintain a dispersed missile force are much more difficult to destroy. Also, intercepting one drone does not guarantee that the next drone will not be able to target another weak point.

Attacking command centers does not necessarily destroy an actor's access to a strategic geographic location.

The 2019 attack on the Bagiq and Khurais oil facilities clearly revealed this vulnerability. The attack temporarily knocked out more than half of Saudi oil production and affected nearly five percent of global oil supply. Regardless of the disagreements about the starting place of the attack and the role of different actors in it, the strategic message was clear: an asymmetric and relatively low-cost attack can cause very heavy damages to one of the most equipped countries in the region.

Therefore, the military superiority of Saudi Arabia should not be equated with the strategic immunity of this country.

The expansion of the crisis beyond the borders of Yemen

The author claimed: The most important development in 2026 is that the threat of the Houthis is no longer limited to controlling the territory in Yemen and has gained wider geographical and economic dimensions.

The capture of Mokha port on the coast of the Red Sea and the advance of this group towards the island of Mayon, known as Prim, and the Strait of Bab al-Mandab, have changed the strategic equations of the region.

Bab al-Mandab is one of the most important sea straits in the world that connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. According to a Reuters report, Houthi forces reached the strategic island of Mayon on September 11 and got closer to the sea passage, which is considered as the route for the transfer of energy and goods between the Middle East, Europe and Asia.

This development is of special importance for Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has been trying for years to reduce its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. The east-west pipeline is one of the main pillars of this strategy; Because it provides the possibility of transferring Saudi crude oil to Yanbu port on the coast of the Red Sea without crossing the Strait of Hormuz. However, current developments may turn this strategy into Saudi Arabia's weak point.

pressure on key passages; From Hormuz to Bab al-Mandab

While the Strait of Hormuz is under pressure from Iran, Bab al-Mandab is more vulnerable to Houthi attacks than in the past. In the meantime, the east-west pipeline has also been disrupted due to drone attacks in Iraq.

Reuters has reported that the shutdown of this pipeline could endanger up to four percent of the world's oil supply; At the same time, Saudi oil production had also decreased from its previous levels.

The main challenge is economic geography

In such a situation, the issue is no longer just a conventional war, but a competition over the reliability of economic geography; That is, the question of whether the vital routes of energy transfer and trade can operate without interruption and at a predictable cost or not?

Iran and its allies do not need to take over all the country's oil fields or all the shipping routes in order to put pressure on Saudi Arabia. Rather, it is enough to increase the risk of using the routes through which Saudi oil reaches the world markets.

In this war pattern, controlling the entire territory is not the main goal; Rather, it is important to create a pressure lever on the limited passages through which a huge amount of world trade inevitably passes.

critical infrastructure; A low-cost goal with far-reaching implications

The Houthis' ability to threaten economic infrastructure is not limited to recent developments. ACLED data shows that the group has also previously targeted airports and hydrocarbon facilities, rather than just focusing on military targets on the battlefield.

From 2018 to early 2022, about 43 percent of Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia targeted civilian airports and energy infrastructure.

The logic behind this strategy is simple: target assets that the counterparty cannot afford to lose. For Saudi Arabia, these assets include oil facilities, ports, pipelines, airports and sea lanes.

In such a situation, the Houthis do not need extensive territory control or weapons on par with Saudi Arabia to win a conventional war. They can put economic and security pressure on Riyadh by increasing the cost of maintaining the normal situation; A pressure that may increase faster than Saudi Arabia is able or willing to bear.

A cheap drone could force Saudi Arabia to use very expensive interceptors. A limited attack on a single pipeline could disrupt the export of millions of barrels of oil. Even a credible threat to shipping, without a tanker sinking, can increase the cost of insurance. Temporary disruption of a maritime bottleneck may also have economic consequences far beyond the battlefield.

Therefore, the evaluation of the threat of the Houthis should not be done only based on the territory under their control or the number of their weapons; A more important criterion is the amount of strategic and economic uncertainty that this group can impose on Saudi Arabia.

Riyadh is at a crossroads; Escalation of conflict or loss of assets?

In such a context, Mohammed bin Salman's request to Trump for a direct attack on the Houthis acquires a clearer meaning. The crown prince of Saudi Arabia did not necessarily want Washington to lead the country's war instead of Riyadh.

His goal could be to change the cost-benefit calculations by adding US military power to the deterrence equation.