Why Should Ghalibaf's Recent Remarks Be Seen as an Important Shift in Iran's Strategy?

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said in his speech last night that the cycle of 'war, negotiation and peace' should be turned into the equation of 'war, negotiation and deterrence.' The significance of this formulation lies in presenting sustainable deterrence not merely as a possible outcome of war or negotiation, but as a goal that both tools must serve. This remark can be seen as a sign of a more explicit shift in Iran's strategic outlook; a shift from focusing on ending

Ambassador Arjan - Political Group: In Iran-US relations, the main question for years has been how to reach an agreement that will end the conflict and pave the way for peace. But the experience of recent confrontations has brought to the center of attention a more difficult question: if the agreement cannot prevent the recurrence of war, how much strategic value is there to end the war alone?

Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, Speaker of the Islamic Council, gave a different answer to this question in his speech last night by suggesting that the cycle of "war, negotiation and peace" should be changed into the equation of "war, negotiation and deterrence". The importance of this formulation is that it introduces sustainable deterrence not simply as a possible outcome of war or negotiation, but as a goal that both tools should serve to achieve. This statement can be seen as a sign of a more explicit change in Iran's strategic outlook; A shift from focusing on ending conflict to trying to prevent its recurrence.

Why is peace alone not enough anymore?

In the conventional logic of international relations, war ends in order to achieve peace, and negotiation is the way to turn the cessation of conflict into a political agreement. But this model will be efficient when the agreement can regulate the behavior of the parties and reduce the possibility of returning to war. Signing a document alone will not provide lasting security if one party violates its obligations or sees the agreement as merely a pause to regroup.

Qalibaf advances his argument from exactly this point. He considers the idea that negotiation and agreement with America will automatically prevent another attack to be insufficient; But at the same time, it also rejects the assumption that simply fighting and increasing the costs of the enemy will dissuade him from his goals. From his point of view, the solution is not to choose one of these two paths, but to combine them to create deterrence.

This is an important distinction. In this formulation, negotiation is no longer just an attempt to reach an agreement under the title of peace, and war should not become an endless and erosive process. Both should help change the calculations of the other party; In such a way that the cost of attacking Iran is greater than its possible benefits.

Of course, mistrust of America and doubts about its adherence to agreements do not necessarily mean that diplomacy is useless. On the contrary, if the agreement is supposed to be part of the deterrence strategy, it should be designed in terms of obligations, executive guarantees and the cost of its violation in such a way that the security of the country does not depend solely on the will and promise of the other party. The main issue is not to negotiate or not; The issue is what the negotiation will bring for Iran's long-term security.

From the field to national power for sustainable deterrence

Another part of Qalibaf's words is the emphasis on turning a military victory into a political achievement. He interprets the Islamabad Memorandum in this framework and claims that this understanding, in addition to consolidating the achievements in the field, has provided an opportunity to strengthen the components of Iran's power. Regardless of the evaluation of the degree of realization of these goals, the principle of the issue is of strategic importance: the military achievement is permanent when it can be turned into a political result. If superiority in the field does not lead to arrangements to reduce the threat, stabilize the country's position and increase the defense and economic capacity, it may lose some of its effect over time. On the other hand, a negotiation that preserves real achievements and provides an opportunity to strengthen national power can complement the field.

But this logic has a basic condition: not every military victory necessarily leads to a lasting political achievement, and not every agreement means securing victory. The result should be measured with criteria such as the degree of threat reduction, the ability to fulfill commitments and the impact of the agreement on the defense and economic power of the country.

Another noteworthy point in Qalibaf's words is to extend the concept of power beyond military dimensions. Along with offensive power and air defense, drones, the resistance front and Iran's position in the Strait of Hormuz, he also mentions national cohesion, social and economic resilience and having a clear vision for the future. This emphasis reveals the link between Iran's deterrence and development. Military power without stable economic support is limited; National cohesion suffers without public trust; And social resilience is not formed simply by inviting people to endure difficulties. The quality of governance, economic stability, hope for the future and the feeling of participation of citizens in the country's destiny, all play a role in the national capacity to face threats.

From this point of view, sustainable deterrence cannot be defined only by increasing weapons power. This deterrence finds real support when military power is combined with a resilient economy, cohesive society, and efficient institutions. Security, if it is to be sustainable, must also allow for development.

However, deterrence, unlike a signed document, is not a fixed status that is achieved once and remains forever. This concept depends on the continuous assessment of the other party's ability, will and costs of military action. Therefore, even increased defense power alone does not guarantee that all threats will be eliminated.

On the other hand, sustainable deterrence is different from endless war. If the country is continuously exposed to conflict, economic erosion and social insecurity, the strategy that is supposed to create security may conflict with its purpose. The success of this approach should be measured not only in the ability to respond to the attack, but also in reducing the possibility of war, maintaining the country's capacities and opening the way for development.

Meanwhile, diplomacy has a task beyond buying time. The opportunity of negotiation should lead to the real strengthening of national power, and the agreement should be arranged in such a way that it is possible to verify commitments and face their possible violation. Without such a link, the cycle of war and negotiation may simply repeat itself, without the country reaching a more stable state.

Ghalibaf's words are worthy of reflection because they move the discussion from the duality of war and negotiation to a more fundamental question: how can we create conditions for the other side to refrain from repeating the war? His answer is to link military power, diplomacy and continuous strengthening of national power components in the form of sustainable deterrence strategy.

In this framework, peace no longer simply means the cessation of conflict or the signing of an agreement; Rather, it is a situation that must be supported and survive against the change of the other party's calculations. However, deterrence should not become an independent goal of peace and development. Its ultimate value is to reduce the possibility of war and enable the country to focus on the future.

Iran's problem, in this formulation, is not just ending the current war; Avoid returning to the starting point. To what extent this change in expression leads to a practical change in the security and foreign policy of the country, depends on how it is implemented. The final criterion is also clear: can the combination of war, negotiation and national power create more stable security and provide more resources and opportunities for Iran's development?