From Limited Ceasefire to Regional Deal: Why Is the Lebanon Issue Tied to Iran-US Negotiations?

The core question in Lebanon is whether a distinction can be made between halting the war between Iran and Israel and ending attacks in Lebanon, given that the actors involved have linked their military fronts and security calculations to one another.

Ambassador Arjan - Rasul Safarahang - The main issue in Lebanon is whether it is possible to distinguish between the cessation of the war between Iran and Israel and the end of the attacks in Lebanon, while the actors involved have linked their military fields and security calculations to each other? With the expansion of the direct confrontation between Iran, America and Israel and the diplomatic efforts to end the war, this question has gone beyond the level of a political dispute and has become an important issue in international law and conflict resolution theories.

The Reuters report indicated that Tehran, through mediators, wants Lebanon to be included in any possible ceasefire agreement. A demand that practically linked the cessation of Israeli operations against Hezbollah to the broader framework of the agreement with the US and Israel. In the following, the declared positions of Iran regarding the proposals to end the war emphasized the need to pay attention to several fronts in a negotiation framework. From an analytical perspective, this policy should be examined at the intersection of three logics. The logic of deterrence and the linking of fronts, the legal logic of the independence of conflicts and the sovereignty of governments, and the logic of diplomacy based on mutual guarantees. Each of these logics explains part of the reality, but none alone is sufficient to evaluate the consequences of Iran's strategy. Linking fronts may increase the likelihood of a more durable agreement, but it can also complicate negotiations, expose more actors to practical veto power, and even reduce the possibility of an immediate cessation of violence.

the unity of the fronts; From network deterrence to the expansion of the negotiation field

In order to understand Iran's insistence on Lebanon's inclusion in the agreement, one must first move away from the traditional model of war analysis. In this model, each conflict is usually defined by direct parties, geographic territory, military objectives, and terms of cessation of operations. But in the Middle East, the political, military and security links between governments and non-governmental actors have caused a confrontation in several different geographies to be considered components of a larger equation in terms of strategic calculations. In such a situation, the cessation of conflict on one front does not necessarily mean the end of the threat from the perspective of all parties; Because the capacity of military pressure, the network of coalitions or the possibility of restarting attacks on another front may still be maintained.

The concept of "network inhibition" is important to explain this situation. Network deterrence is formed when an actor increases the cost of the other party's military action, not only through its direct military power, but also by relying on the relationships and capacities of aligned actors in multiple geographies. In this context, Lebanon is not just an independent foreign case for Tehran; Rather, it is considered a part of the regional security environment and one of the components of power calculation against Israel. From this point of view, accepting an agreement that stops the direct war, but leaves the possibility of the continuation of Israel's extensive operations in Lebanon, could mean, from Iran's point of view, accepting a reduction in the immediate costs of the war for itself, without removing the military pressure on one of its regional partners.

This calculation can also be explained by the theory of linking issues in international negotiations. Governments sometimes bundle seemingly independent issues into a single package to increase bargaining power. In the negotiation literature, such an approach can allow trade-offs: a score that is difficult in one area may be achievable in another. On the contrary, if the parties consider their interests to complement each other in different issues, the comprehensive agreement can be more attractive than the limited agreement; Because the cost of violating it increases and creates a greater incentive for the simultaneous implementation of obligations.

However, linking topics has two different functions that should not be confused with each other. The first function is to facilitate agreement by increasing the scope of exchange; The second function is to increase the pressure on the other side by conditioning the solution of one crisis to the solution of other crises. In the first case, the negotiating package can create flexibility. In the second case, any unresolved dispute may become an obstacle to agreement in all areas. Therefore, the inclusion of Lebanon in the talks between Iran and the United States can be both a tool to stabilize peace and become a mechanism to generalize the impasse.

The facts of this year have revealed the importance of this distinction. This point was important because the Reuters report mentioned Tehran's attempt to link the ceasefire with the cessation of Israeli attacks in Lebanon. Later reports about Iran's proposals to end the war also mentioned the issue of stopping hostilities on several fronts and providing a more permanent solution instead of a temporary ceasefire. In the meantime, the main dispute was not only about stopping the operation; Rather, it was based on the scope of the agreement, the arrangement of the implementation of commitments and guarantees that were supposed to prevent a quick return to the conflict.

These developments can also be analyzed in the framework of the "commitment dilemma" theory. The problem of commitment arises when the parties do not have enough trust in each other's promises, even if they want to stop the war. One side may accept a cease-fire, but worry that the other side will attack again once it stabilizes its military position. The other party may also see the cessation of operations as a loss of leverage, without having received a guarantee that the competitor's behavior will change. In such a situation, the limited agreement can be legally valid, but strategically fragile.

From Iran's point of view, linking Lebanon to a larger agreement can be seen as an answer to the same dilemma: preventing the end of direct war from allowing Israel to continue military pressure on the Lebanese front without limits. But this impression is only one of the possible interpretations. From Israel's point of view, operations against Hezbollah may be defined as part of the country's independent defense and security policy; From the point of view of the Lebanese government, including the country's situation in the negotiations led by Tehran and Washington may bring the risk of reducing national authority. As a result, what is considered a security guarantee for one party, may be considered a means of influencing or limiting freedom of action from the point of view of the other party.

The basic point is that the strategic unity of the fronts is an analytical fact, not necessarily a legal fact. The operational, political or ideological connection between actors does not by itself transform all conflicts into a single conflict in terms of international law. Determining the legal nature of any conflict requires a real investigation of the parties involved, the level and type of their participation, the command structure, control relationships and the specific conditions of each conflict. Therefore, even if Iran considers Lebanon to be part of a regional equation, it cannot be concluded that Tehran alone has the legal authority to determine the final terms of peace in Lebanon.

This distinction is decisive for evaluating Iran's strategy. Linking fronts can create bargaining power, but bargaining power is not the same as legal authority. A government may be able to politically influence the crisis resolution process in another country, but this political influence alone does not replace the consent of the sovereign government, the participation of the relevant parties, and compliance with the rules of international law. Therefore, the success of this strategy depends not only on the level of Iran's pressure on America and Israel, but also on its ability to transform regional ties into clear, enforceable commitments compatible with Lebanon's political independence.

Lebanon's sovereignty against the logic of comprehensive agreement; The border between guaranteeing security and the right to decide

In international law, the most important limitation on any attempt to regulate the fate of a country through the negotiations of other governments is the principle of sovereignty and legal equality of states. The United Nations Charter emphasizes the sovereign equality of members and the international legal system supports the political independence and territorial integrity of states against interference and threats of force. On this basis, Lebanon is not merely a security issue in the dispute between Iran, America and Israel; Rather, it is an independent state that has its own interests, institutions, obligations and political will.

This principle, of course, does not mean banning any regional agreement about Lebanon. States can negotiate a cessation of hostilities, border security, ceasefire monitoring, protection of civilians, and regional arrangements. Even an agreement between governments that are not directly involved in the conflict in Lebanon may actually affect the situation on the ground in that country. The legal issue starts when the understanding between the foreign powers wants to make a binding decision about the rights, powers or security arrangements of that country without the effective participation of the Lebanese government.

Here we must distinguish between two propositions. First, that Iran wants to stop attacks on Lebanon and respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country; Second, that Iran considers itself the authority to determine the political and security conditions of Lebanon. The first proposition, if it complies with the principles of the United Nations Charter and the rules of protection of civilians, can be aligned with reducing violence and respecting the rights of the Lebanese government. However, the second statement, if it means granting decision-making authority to Tehran about the political or military future of Beirut, is in tension with the principle of Lebanon's independence and sovereignty.

This distinction is also important regarding the role of Hezbollah. Hezbollah is a Lebanese armed and political actor that has a long-standing relationship with Iran; However, the extent of its operational independence, its internal decision-making structure, and its relationship with the Lebanese government are separate issues that must be evaluated based on concrete evidence. The mere existence of a close relationship between Tehran and Hezbollah is not enough to prove Iran's legal control over all the actions of this group; Just as simply declaring the independence of a group from a foreign government does not solve all legal issues without a real examination of command and control relationships.

In international liability law, the attribution of a non-state actor's conduct to a foreign state is subject to certain legal and factual criteria and cannot be concluded solely from political alignment, funding or ideological alignment. On the other hand, a government's support of an armed actor in the territory of another government does not automatically create a license to interfere in the internal affairs of that country. The evaluation of each action should be done according to the nature of the behavior, the level of participation, the rules of prohibition of intervention, the prohibition of resorting to force, and obligations related to respect for the sovereignty of governments.

The same caution should be observed regarding Israel's actions. The security concern of a state is not only unlimited permission to use military force on the territory of another state. Every military action must be weighed against the rules related to the use of force, the conditions for claiming legitimate defense, necessity and proportionality, as well as international humanitarian law. Even if a state faces a real threat from an armed group, this does not mean that it abandons its obligations to civilians and limits governing the methods of warfare. Also, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a military action cannot be determined solely on the basis of its stated purpose; The real context, the need for action and how to implement it are also important.

In this framework, Iran's position regarding the inclusion of Lebanon in the agreement can be measured from two different angles. The first angle is supporting the cessation of attacks and preventing the continuation of insecurity in a country where the people are paying the heavy price of the conflict. The second angle is to use the Lebanon case as a bargaining lever in bilateral negotiations with Washington. These two motivations may exist simultaneously, but they do not have the same legal and political consequences. If the main goal is to create a guarantee to stop the attacks and protect Lebanon's sovereignty, the optimal solution should strengthen the position of the Lebanese government. If the goal is to maintain or increase the influence of a foreign actor on Lebanon's security decisions, the agreement may stabilize the competition for the country's sovereignty instead of resolving the crisis.

From this point of view, criticizing Iran's strategy does not necessarily mean rejecting the need to stop attacks in Lebanon. At the same time as opposing the illegal attacks, it is also possible to oppose turning Lebanon into a subject of a deal that takes place without the effective participation of that country. In the same way, opposing Iran's foreign influence should not lead to the justification of ignoring Lebanon's sovereignty or legitimizing military actions outside the framework of international law. A single legal standard must be applied to all actors; Otherwise, the language of international law will become a selective tool for legitimizing allies and condemning rivals.

In practice, a valid agreement on Lebanon should have at least three features: first, it should clarify the obligations related to the cessation of attacks and the protection of civilians; Second, recognize the role of the Lebanese government in making decisions and implementing security arrangements; And third, establish a mechanism to monitor, verify and deal with the violation of obligations. Without such a mechanism, phrases such as "an end to war on all fronts" may remain politically attractive but operationally ambiguous.

Here, the difference between a ceasefire and a peace agreement becomes particularly important. A ceasefire can be established with the aim of immediately stopping the violence, without resolving fundamental political and security differences. A peace agreement, in contrast, may include broader arrangements, security guarantees, and dispute resolution mechanisms. Lebanon's inclusion in a regional package has added legal value when it clarifies which obligations are immediately implemented, who monitors their implementation, and what response is envisaged in the event of a breach. Otherwise, making the text of the agreement more comprehensive does not necessarily mean making it more effective.

regional agreement test; Does joining the fronts lead to lasting peace?

The developments of recent months show that the difference between Iran and America is not only over the principle of stopping the war; It is also about the definition of the end of the war, the scope of obligations, the order of their implementation and the guarantee of preventing a return to conflict. In the reports published at the end of September 2026, it was mentioned about the continuation of indirect contacts with the mediation of the countries of the region and the review of proposals to end the war. According to the Reuters report, Iran's discussed proposal included issues such as the cessation of conflicts in Iran and Lebanon, issues related to sanctions, frozen assets and the Strait of Hormuz. Later reports also mentioned receiving the official response of the United States to Iran's proposal, although the full details of the positions of the two sides and the final status of the negotiations were not publicly clear. Therefore, a difference should be made between the existence of diplomatic proposals and contacts, on the one hand, and the achievement of a binding agreement and its successful implementation, on the other hand.

These developments are important from the point of view of bargaining theory in war. According to this approach, war ends when the parties to the conflict conclude that the continued use of force is more costly than an agreement or that the probability of achieving desired goals through war has decreased. But this calculation is not only dependent on military power; Economic costs, domestic pressure, political prestige, support from allies, access to vital resources, and the prospect of a shift in the balance of power also affect it. Therefore, negotiations to end the war will not necessarily succeed when the parties simply agree to stop firing; The agreement should bring their expectations about the post-war situation closer to each other so that the continuation of the conflict is less attractive from a strategic point of view.

In the case of Iran, Lebanon and the Strait of Hormuz, the connection of issues can help to increase the cost of the failure of negotiations. For example, if the cessation of attacks in Lebanon, the reduction of the threat against Iran, and arrangements related to shipping security are placed in a coordinated framework, the parties may find more incentive to implement mutual obligations. However, this link also has an important risk: each actor can use a dispute in one area to stop the implementation of commitments in other areas. In such circumstances, a narrow breach or dispute over the interpretation of the agreement may lead to the collapse of the entire package.

This issue is related to the concept of "severability of obligations". An agreement that binds all issues together may be politically comprehensive, but more vulnerable to executive crises. In contrast, an agreement that defines all issues completely independently may fail to contain the real linkages between the fronts. The proper solution is neither absolute separation nor complete integration, but rather a multi-layered consensual design: immediate commitments to stop violence and protect civilians, security and political commitments among the parties concerned, and separate but coordinated arrangements to resolve long-term disputes.

Such a model is especially important for Lebanon. Stopping the attacks in Lebanon should not be postponed until all the differences between Iran and America are resolved. If the protection of civilians and the prevention of the spread of human losses are conditional on the realization of a comprehensive regional agreement, the cost of the failure of the negotiations will be borne by those who have the least role in determining its terms. Therefore, even if Tehran and Washington agree on the political relevance of the Lebanon case to their negotiations, the immediate obligations related to the protection of civilians must have an independent and clear position.

Also, from the point of view of international humanitarian law, this separation is of fundamental importance. The obligations of the parties to the conflict in the field of distinguishing between military and civilian targets, proportionality in the attack, taking necessary precautions and humane behavior, are subject to the rules related to the conflict, and their implementation should not be dependent on the success of political negotiations. A diplomatic agreement can provide a way to more effectively implement these obligations, but the failure of negotiations does not eliminate existing legal obligations. Also, any ceasefire should make it as clear as possible what actions are prohibited, what its geographical scope is, which forces it covers, and what mechanism exists to record and investigate violations.

One of the most important obstacles to reaching such an agreement is the issue of the multiplicity of actors and the limitation of their authority. The Iranian government can negotiate its behavior and obligations, but any agreement that is supposed to regulate the behavior of Israel, Hezbollah, the Lebanese government, or other armed actors, will face the issue of consent, delegation authority, and the possibility of implementing obligations. No political guarantee can replace the question of whether the signatory party really has the necessary authority to bind the actor in question and whether it has the effective means to implement the obligations.

This limitation should also be taken into account in the evaluation of the claim of unity of fronts. From a strategic point of view, Iran may be able to use its relations with regional actors to increase pressure on its rivals. But this ability does not necessarily mean that Tehran is able to completely control the behavior of all these actors or impose any agreement on them. The greater the distance between political influence and operational control, the riskier the agreement will be to rely on general assurances and indirect promises. For this reason, a sustainable agreement should rely as much as possible on specific commitments, direct or agreed communication channels, monitoring mechanisms and dispute resolution procedures.

Meanwhile, the role of mediators is also very important. Mediation is not only the transmission of messages between two parties; Rather, it can help design the text of the agreement, clarify the ambiguities, propose the order of implementation of commitments and reduce the political cost of retreating from the original positions. However, the mediator is effective when the parties trust in his relative neutrality, communication capacity, or ability to facilitate the implementation of his obligations. In a regional agreement, the multiplicity of mediators may facilitate access to different actors, but in the absence of a clear division of labor, the risk of differences in the interpretation of the text and competition over its implementation also increases.

From this point of view, the main issue in Iran-US negotiations is not whether Lebanon should be left out of the negotiations or whether it should be integrated into a single package without any conditions. The more precise question is how to recognize the real connection between the fronts, without weakening the decision-making right of the Lebanese government or postponing the cessation of violence to the resolution of all regional disputes. The answer can be formed in the form of a multi-level framework. an urgent agreement to stop attacks and reduce human losses; Lebanon's special security arrangements include the effective participation of the country's government and other relevant parties and a separate negotiation path for Iran and the United States, including sanctions, security guarantees, and disputed issues.

The advantage of such a model is that it balances between the political necessity of coordination and the legal necessity of separation of obligations. On the one hand, it does not allow the conflicting parties to neutralize the effects of the ceasefire by transferring military pressure from one front to another; On the other hand, it prevents a humanitarian or security crisis from being delayed until all strategic issues are agreed upon. In this framework, linking the fronts will not be an absolute principle, but a tool for conflict management; A tool whose effectiveness depends on the way it is designed, the limits of commitments and the level of participation of relevant actors.

Finally, Iran's strategy to include Lebanon in a possible agreement with the US and Israel should be seen as an attempt to change the regional bargaining structure, but rather an attempt to increase the cost of a limited agreement and prevent the formation of a situation in which one front calms down, but another front remains vulnerable to attack. This strategy is theoretically understandable and can help create broader guarantees, but its success depends on Tehran's ability to move beyond the logic of mere leverage and move toward measurable commitments.