Riyadh warns Beijing about Yemen; The complicated dragon game between Naft and the Houthis

Source link: Riyadh's warning to Beijing about Yemen; The complex dragon game between oil and the Houthis at a glance Prince Turki al-Faisal, warning against the erosion of the "Beijing Agreement", asked China to prove its practical neutrality against the attacks of the Houthis on Saudi facilities and airports and to show that it is a sincere mediator. While Beijing is the biggest trading partner and buyer of Saudi oil, there are reports of the arrival of dual-purpose parts […] Source site: Safir Arjan

Prince Turki al-Faisal, warning of the erosion of the "Beijing Agreement", asked China to prove its practical neutrality against Houthi attacks on Saudi facilities and airports and to show that it is a sincere mediator.

At the same time, Beijing is the largest trading partner and buyer of Saudi oil, and reports indicate that Chinese dual-purpose parts have entered the Houthis' missile and drone arsenal. An approach that aims to ensure safe sea passage, divert the focus of the US and maintain oil purchases from Iran.

By sending a clear message, Riyadh stressed that Beijing's agreement is not a blank check and that insecurity in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab seriously threatens China's economic interests and vital energy flow in the region.

At the height of the Houthi attacks against the strategic facilities of Saudi Arabia, the statements of Prince Turki Al-Faisal, the former head of intelligence of this country, attracted attention as an indirect criticism of Beijing's policy towards Tehran and the failure to take a decisive position against these attacks.

On October 5, Prince Turki Al-Faisal, the chairman of the board of directors of the King Faisal Center for Islamic Research and Studies and the former head of the Saudi Intelligence Organization, emphasized that China must continue the role it played during the mediation between Riyadh and Tehran in the form of the "Beijing Agreement" on March 10, 2023, and show that it is a sincere mediator. He added that we should wait and see what Beijing will do.

Al-Faisal related the erosion and reduction of the effectiveness of the Beijing agreement to three axes, including the expansion of Houthi attacks inside Saudi Arabia, the dependence of the Houthis on Tehran's support, and the need to build trust in Tehran based on practical and verifiable measures.

In September 2026, after Washington refrained from direct military intervention, Riyadh extended a helping hand to Beijing. According to a Reuters report, before publicly condemning the attacks on two Saudi airports on October 12, 2026, China had put pressure on Tehran behind the scenes, but in official positions it only called on the parties to exercise restraint and dialogue.

Turki al-Faisal's sharp statements are made in a situation where the security pressures caused by the Houthis' deadly attacks on the international airports of Riyadh and Dammam and energy infrastructure facilities have reached their peak, and at the same time, reports have been published of the Houthis' control over key points in the Red Sea and the endangering of alternative routes for the export of Saudi oil.

Saudi Arabia and China have had official relations since 1990, and Beijing is Riyadh's largest trade partner. Military cooperation between the two sides began in the 1980s with the purchase of DF-3 missiles and continued in 2014 with the contract for DF-21 missiles. However, the basis of Saudi Arabia's security still relies on the West, with the United States providing 78 percent of Saudi Arabia's imported weapons over the past decade. In contrast, China's share is only 1-2%.

On the other hand, Bloomberg reported on September 23, 2026 that instead of relying solely on assembled weapons, the Houthis have started building indigenous drones and missile systems inside Yemen by importing dual-purpose commercial parts from China.

Geopolitical dimensions and three strategic messages from Riyadh to Beijing

Turki al-Faisal's positions as an influential but unofficial figure reflect the views of the main circle of the Saudi leadership and a clear message that China must either prove its practical neutrality by exerting real and deterrent pressure on Tehran, or bear the cost of indirect alignment with the opposite front. Riyadh is seeking to move China out of its passive position without harming macroeconomic interactions.

In fact, Saudi Arabia's message to China consists of three key parts. First, the Beijing agreement is not a blank check and its value depends on tangible security achievements. Second, insecurity in Bab al-Mandab threatens the export of energy needed for China's economy, and third, the issue of Chinese equipment entering Houthi arsenals requires clear monitoring and accountability. These messages show that Riyadh interacts with China not as a symbolic mediator, but as a real political guarantor.

Beijing restrictions and bilateral calculations

China still prefers calm diplomacy to maintain the balance of its relations with both sides of the Persian Gulf and to avoid entering into acute conflicts or sanctions by the Security Council. Beijing in the Security Council is likely to support negotiations and avoid imposing severe sanctions against Iran or the Houthis due to the damage to its relationship with Tehran.

However, Saudi Arabia's informal remarks did not receive a strong reaction from China either, as Beijing does not usually ignore messages from influential Saudi figures. Saudi Arabia's geopolitical weight and maritime security are likely to prevent Chinese policymakers from ignoring these warnings, although Beijing will still try to maintain a hybrid approach of public condemnation and behind-the-scenes pressure, avoiding overt partisanship.

It should be noted that China is Saudi Arabia's largest trading partner and also, Saudi Arabia is China's largest trading partner in the Middle East. Bilateral trade will reach $107.5 billion in 2024, with China buying 78.6 million tons of Saudi Arabian crude oil. China trades about 300 billion dollars annually with the six Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, and almost half of the country's oil imports come from the Middle East.

However, ignoring the Houthis' supply chain, at least until the fire spreads to Chinese interests, serves Beijing's three main goals. First, the safe passage that in 2024, Houthi leaders promised Chinese and Russian ships a safe passage through the Red Sea. Second, a conflict with Iran and the Houthis diverts the focus of US warships and munitions, leaving China freer to pursue its own goals. And third, Iran itself, China bought more than 80% of Iran's marine oil exports in 2025, and Beijing has little desire to put pressure on Tehran's allies.