Dalan Wakhan; Afghanistan's strategic crossing or geopolitical impasse?

Due to being located at the intersection of Central Asia, South Asia, the Iranian Plateau and Western China, Afghanistan has always had a place beyond its economic capacity and internal capabilities in the geopolitical equations of the region.

Guest note - Abbas Kardan, researcher of international issues: Afghanistan has always had a place beyond its economic capacity and internal capabilities in the region's geopolitical equations due to its location at the intersection of Central Asia, South Asia, the Iranian Plateau and Western China. On the one hand, this country can be the connecting link of markets, trade routes and regional transportation networks, and on the other hand, due to insecurity, weak infrastructure and the competition of surrounding powers, it can become an arena of friction and conflict. Afghanistan's geographical location is neither an opportunity nor a threat; Rather, it is a potential capacity whose realization depends on political, economic and security conditions.

The historical experience of this country also shows that being at the crossroads of the region does not necessarily mean enjoying its economic benefits; Perhaps this situation will turn Afghanistan into a competition scene for actors who are each seeking to secure their strategic interests.

In the current regional order, the importance of Afghanistan is more than ever linked to the issue of geographical connectivity, access to markets and diversification of trade routes. China is seeking to expand its land and economic ties with Central Asia and West Asia; Central Asian countries need diverse routes to access regional and global markets; Pakistan is trying to maintain its position in the transit networks of South Asia, and Iran is also seeking to strengthen its communication routes due to its geographical location and restrictions due to sanctions and geopolitical pressures.

In such a situation, any crossing that can strengthen the link between these regions will potentially be of strategic importance. Dalan Wakhan is one of these crossings; A mountainous, remote and sparsely populated region, the importance of which comes from its potential capacity to change the communication arrangement of the region rather than from the current volume of economic exchanges.

Dalan Wakhan; Geography formed in the context of power competition

Dalan Wakhan is located in the northeast of Afghanistan and in Badakhshan province. This narrow strip extends eastward from the territory of Afghanistan and reaches the border of China and the Xinjiang region at its end. Wakhan is bordered by Tajikistan from the north and mountainous areas leading to Pakistan from the south. According to some estimates, the length of this corridor is about 350 km and its width varies from a minimum of 8 to a maximum of 40 kilometers. At its eastern end, the Vakhjir Pass is located at an altitude of nearly 4900 meters above sea level. Extreme cold, snowfall and natural difficulties make this crossing practically closed for at least five months of the year, and traffic is restricted in other months as well. These conditions make the development of a permanent and competitive commercial route face serious technical and economic obstacles.

The historical importance of Wakhan is as significant as its geographical location. The current form of this corridor was mainly established in the context of the British-Russian rivalry in Central Asia, known as the "Great Game", in the late 19th century. In the border agreements of 1895, the Wakhan region remained part of Afghanistan's territory to provide a buffer zone between Tsarist Russia's sphere of influence in Central Asia and British-ruled India.

However, the determination of the border between Afghanistan and China was not finalized at that time and the two countries reached an agreement on their common border in 1963. Therefore, Wakhan is an example of a political geography whose current form has been largely influenced by the calculations of great powers; An area that was first important for managing competition and preventing direct contact between spheres of influence, but now it can become an issue for the development of regional communication in different circumstances.

From the road design to the opening of the route; Why is Wakhan still not a commercial corridor?

The serious discussion about building a road through the Wakhan Corridor dates back to at least 2009; When the then foreign minister of Afghanistan, during his trip to Beijing, demanded the opening of this crossing. At the time, China announced its readiness to consider the proposal, but the plan did not go beyond the preliminary study stage. In 2019, road construction operations started in Afghanistan and part of the route was completed; But the change of government in August 2021 (on the Taliban's effectiveness again) stopped or slowed down the project process. After the Taliban returned to power, the group prioritized the completion of the road again.

In November 2022, the Taliban Council of Ministers emphasized the deployment of troops and the provision of services in the Wakhan region, and in September 2023, road construction resumed. In January 2024, Afghan authorities announced that the road had reached the Chinese border. Finally, on October 4, 2026 / Mehr 12, 1405, the Taliban government announced the opening of a 121-kilometer road from Brogheel region to the border point of China.

However, the opening of the road does not mean the start of an international corridor. The constructed route is dirt and gravel, and on the Chinese side, there are no customs facilities necessary for the regular passage of goods. In addition, the official opening of the border depends on the agreement and political decision of Beijing. In other words, Kabul has brought the road to the border, but the necessary conditions have not yet been met to turn it into an operational trade and transit route.

This difference forms the core of Wakhan's geopolitical issue: can the construction of infrastructure on one side of the border lead to the creation of an international corridor without the political will of the other side? The answer is negative. A route becomes a trade corridor when, in addition to the road, there are customs facilities, security arrangements, logistics services, bilateral agreements and sufficient economic flow. In Wakhan, the gap between geographic capacity and operational reality is still significant.

Afghanistan's interests and neighbors' strategic considerations

Regarding the Wakhan Corridor and its activation, the most important country is China. If the activation of Wakhan is strategically important for Afghanistan, for China this crossing has a more limited and conditional priority compared to other regional communication routes. Beijing primarily benefits from the development of economic connections and the expansion of its land networks in Eurasia; But this public interest does not mean an immediate desire to open every border crossing.

In evaluating Wakhan, China takes into account the security considerations related to Xinjiang, the possibility of the activities of armed groups and the concern of the transfer of insecurity from Afghanistan. In this context, for Beijing, the opening of Wakhan is not just an economic decision; Rather, it is a security decision, the consequences of which can affect the Xinjiang region and other Chinese projects in the region. On the other hand, Beijing has made significant investments in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor within the framework of the "Belt and Road" initiative. In such a situation, Beijing may consider the development of existing routes to be less expensive and more reliable compared to the creation of a new and de-secured crossing.

On the other hand, Afghanistan seeks to make Wakhan a route to reduce transit dependence on other countries and strengthen economic ties with China. This difference in priorities has created a kind of asymmetry in interests: for Kabul, the activation of the crossing can have important economic and political benefits; But Beijing can use its existing routes with Central Asia and Pakistan without immediately opening Wakhan. Therefore, China has no incentive to accept the security and economic costs of opening a difficult route just because of Kabul's request.

Regarding Pakistan, reducing dependence on the country's transit routes is one of the most important motivations of Kabul to activate the Wakhan Corridor. Afghanistan's trade with Pakistan is highly dependent on crossings such as Torkham and Chaman, and the political and security tensions between the two countries have repeatedly led to the closure of borders and disruption of trade exchanges. In such a situation, creating a direct route to China can provide more options to Kabul and increase its bargaining power against Islamabad. From this point of view, Wakhan is not only a development project for Afghanistan; Rather, it is part of the strategy to reduce vulnerability to political and transit pressures.

However, it should not be expected that a dirt road in the highlands of the Pamirs can replace crossings like Torkham, which have more established infrastructure and trade flow, in the short term. Wakhan, at least in the current situation, can be more of a complementary option and a bargaining tool than a complete replacement for Pakistan's routes. From Islamabad's point of view, the activation of this route may mean the reduction of Pakistan's transit and political influence on Afghanistan.

Regarding Central Asian countries, Wakhan Corridor is not the only regional connectivity project in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan signed an agreement in July 2025 to explore the possibility of building a trans-Afghan railway; A route that can connect Central Asia to Pakistan and southern ports through Afghanistan. Besides that, Turkmenistan is also developing its communication routes with South Asia. These projects show that countries in the region are increasingly tying the future of their trade to the creation of land and rail routes through Afghanistan.

In the meantime, the activation of Wakhan Corridor can be a different link in the communication network of the region. However, the multiplicity of projects does not necessarily lead to convergence. If countries act without coordination and based on geopolitical competition, instead of creating a complementary network, parallel and costly paths may be formed.

The situation in Tajikistan should also be examined separately. The country shares a border with the northern part of Wakhan, but its political relations with the Taliban government have been accompanied by challenges. Dushanbe's security concerns and political differences with Kabul can affect border and regional cooperation. However, it cannot be concluded from this issue that Tajikistan is necessarily against the activation of Wakhan; Its position will depend on how the border is managed, security implications and possible economic opportunities.

Wakhan and Iran; From geopolitical pressures to the strategy of connecting to the East

For Iran, the importance of Wakhan should be examined in the broader geopolitical framework of regional connectivity. Due to its geographical location, Iran can be a link between Central Asia, Afghanistan, Caucasus, Persian Gulf and open waters. However, sanctions, regional tensions and disruption of sea and trade routes increase the necessity of diversifying communication options. In such a situation, any development that expands the regional transportation network can become important for our country in the long run.

In this framework, the development of Afghanistan's transportation infrastructure and its connection to regional networks can provide new opportunities to expand Iran's trade and transit links. The connection of the Khaf-Herat railway to Iran's rail network in 2020 and the agreement between Iran and Afghanistan in October 2025 to review the construction of the Herat-Mazar-e-Sharif railway are among the developments that, if realized and completed, will increase Afghanistan's transit capacity. Also, the financing plan of the Herat-Mazar-e-Sharif railway from Afghanistan in June 2026 shows the continued attention to the development of these infrastructures.

The expansion of such a network can turn Afghanistan into an important link in the connection between the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and China, and along with the eastern and western routes, provide the basis for the formation of more diverse options for the regional connection of Iran.

In the conditions of sanctions pressure and restrictions on sea routes, such a network can become more important for Iran. However, a difference should be made between strategic capacity and the possibility of its realization. Wakhan is located in the northeast of Afghanistan and Iran is located in the west of this country; Therefore, its activation by itself does not create a direct and ready route for Iran's trade with China. Iran's exploitation of the possible capacity of this crossing depends on its connection with Afghanistan's transportation networks, the development of rail and road infrastructure, customs agreements and the existence of sufficient economic flow.

From this point of view, Wakhan is not an immediate solution for Iran to neutralize sanctions, but a variable in a long-term strategy of regional connection. If Iran can strengthen its transit links with Afghanistan and the railway and road networks of the region are developed in a coordinated manner, the activation of Wakhan can also increase part of the potential opportunities for trade and transportation. But if this crossing is developed without an effective connection with Iran's routes and other regional infrastructure, its direct benefits for Tehran will remain limited.

As a result, Iran's politics should not be focused solely on supporting or opposing a particular path. What is important is Iran's position in the overall network of regional connectivity; A network in which routes to Afghanistan, Central Asia, China, the Persian Gulf and southern ports can complement each other. For Tehran, the main issue is how to take advantage of its geographical location to effectively participate in this network and prevent new routes from becoming separate networks from Iran's infrastructure.

Security of Badakhshan; A ring that should not be ignored

One of the important issues related to Wakhan Corridor is the security situation of Badakhshan province. The area that this corridor passes through and the continuation of the project depends on its stability and security. The protests of 2024 in response to the destruction of poppy fields as well as the attacks of the National Resistance Front in recent months - from groups opposed to the Taliban - show that the security situation in Badakhshan cannot be evaluated solely based on the official statements of the Afghan government officials.

The continuation of insecurity in this area can increase project implementation costs, disrupt the construction process, and affect its exploitation prospects. At the same time, some former Afghan officials have made a connection between the security tensions in Badakhshan and the Wakhan project, and have suggested that some regional or international actors will not welcome the rapprochement between Afghanistan and China.

All in all, one thing is clear: without security stability in Badakhshan and reliable security arrangements on both sides of the border, investment in turning Wakhan into a trade corridor will face high risk. Security here is not just a military issue; It is also considered as a basic condition for the continuation of transportation, attracting capital and the trust of traders.

from the buffer zone to the connection corridor; Can Vakhan change his nature?

Historically, the Wakhan Corridor was formed in the context of the competition of great powers; A geography whose political function was largely dedicated to separating spheres of influence and managing competition. Today, this region is subject to security and strategic calculations, but at the same time, its capacity to play an economic and communication role is of interest. The main question is whether Wakhan can be transformed from a remote buffer zone into a corridor for regional connectivity.

The realization of this transformation depends on the simultaneousness of several conditions: China's readiness to open the border, Afghanistan's ability to provide security, the economic justification of the route, the creation of the necessary infrastructure and the formation of cooperation between the surrounding countries. If these conditions are not met, the Wakhan may remain more than an active trade route, a tool for political bargaining and a symbol of Afghanistan's efforts to reduce its dependence on its neighbors.

The future of Wakhan can be imagined in the form of three scenarios. In the first scenario, by providing security and infrastructure guarantees, China will open the border for limited and then wider passage of goods, and Wakhan will become part of the regional trade network. In the second scenario, the border will operate on a limited or seasonal basis and the route will have more of a local and political function. In the third scenario, security considerations, high costs and lack of economic justification prevent commercial exploitation and Wakhan remains closed as a road leading to the border.

Finally, the importance of Wakhan is not that it is necessarily the shortest or most profitable route between Afghanistan and China; Rather, it shows how geography can become a topic for redefining power relations in the context of changing regional order. Afghanistan tries to turn its geographical and transit limitations into an opportunity to increase its strategic independence; China balances economic interests and security considerations; Pakistan is worried about the change in the arrangement of regional routes; Central Asian countries are seeking to establish their position in new transportation networks, and Iran must also redefine its position in this broader network.

Therefore, the Wakhan Corridor should not be seen as Afghanistan's definitive way of salvation, nor as an insignificant path in the geography of the region, but rather as a test to transform geographical capacity into real connection in the conditions of geopolitical competition. The opening of the road is the first step in this direction; But its fate will not be determined by the opening ceremony, but by China's decision, Afghanistan's security situation, economic feasibility and the level of cooperation of regional countries. Until these conditions are met, Wakhan will still be in the distance between geographical possibility and political reality.