Why Doesn't Public Dissatisfaction Bring Netanyahu Down?

The October 7 earthquake not only upended Israel's security calculations but also pushed Israeli society toward deeper extremism. However, although Netanyahu's popularity has faded, this does not mean the end of his career in the political arena.

According to ambassador Arjan; The Israeli parliament elections will be held on October 27 in a situation where the October 7 attack, the Gaza war, the military confrontation with Iran, and internal disputes over issues such as Haredi military service have affected its political atmosphere. In such a situation, the main question is not only whether Benjamin Netanyahu will retain power or not; The more important issue is what direction the Israeli society will move after these developments and what effect the possible change of government/cabinet will have on Tel Aviv's foreign policy.

Ahmad Zeidabadi, a journalist and analyst of political issues, says about the profound changes in the attitude of Israeli society after October 7; The changes that he believes have affected both its political atmosphere and made the equations related to the future of Israel's relations with the countries of the region more complicated.

How did October 7 change Israeli society?

In your opinion, what is the impact of the October 7 attack on Israeli society? What consequences will this event have for the future elections and Benjamin Netanyahu's position?

The fact is that October 7 shook the Israeli society and had a deep impact on the mentality of the people of this country.

In Israel, usually more than half of the population, or at least a large part of it, supported finding a peaceful way to coexist with the Palestinians, through territorial separation or a two-state solution. But October 7 pushed a significant part of Israeli society towards further extremism and made many people pessimistic about the possibility of coexistence with the Palestinians.

As a result, the previous balance in Israel's public opinion has largely disappeared and the tendency towards radical and extreme currents has increased. The two-state solution now seems to have much less support in Israeli society, with support reaching about a quarter of the population or less. However, the problem is that there is no clear alternative solution either. If the Palestinian issue is not going to be resolved through territorial separation and the formation of two countries, what will be the fate of this conflict? This question remains unanswered.

Politically, October 7 also helped the survival of Netanyahu's government. His government was facing serious crises and massive street protests before this event, but the war and the security situation after that allowed him to stay in power for a long time.

However, Netanyahu's handling of the October 7 attack has become one of his weaknesses. His critics believe that he ignored the threat, did not assess its dimensions correctly and could not react properly to it.

More importantly, Netanyahu, unlike some Israeli security and military officials, has not accepted the political responsibility for this failure and has not allowed a state investigation commission to be formed to investigate its dimensions. All these factors have weakened his personal position against his competitors.

Why dissatisfaction with Netanyahu does not mean removing him?

Despite the criticism of Netanyahu's performance in the October 7 incident, the Gaza war, and internal issues such as Haredi military service, why do his opponents still face a challenge to reach a parliamentary majority? If dissatisfaction with the government is so widespread, why is it not easy to remove Netanyahu?

There is dissatisfaction with Netanyahu, but this dissatisfaction does not mean a complete change in the Israeli society's view of him.

Netanyahu has been the prime minister for many years and has been known in the past as a figure with the ability to provide security. His position was very strong at times and his distance from other political figures for the leadership of Israel seemed significant. The Likud party was also in the position of the first party by a long distance.

On the other hand, as I said, after October 7, Israeli society has moved towards more extremism and harsher treatment of Palestinians. Therefore, some of the factors that previously worked in Netanyahu's favor are still present in Israel's political environment; However, his performance in managing the security crisis has weakened his position.

A distinction must be made between two issues: a person may have become weaker than in the past, but this does not mean that his opponents can easily gain a parliamentary majority and completely remove him from the political scene.

It seems that Israel's current ruling coalition will lose some of its seats and its position has weakened compared to the elections four years ago. However, the extent of this weakening is not necessarily enough for the opposition to form a parliamentary majority without difficulty.

Another point is that the war with Iran is not as controversial as some other issues in Israeli society, and it seems that there is more agreement in this regard. Even in the case of the Gaza war, public discontent does not necessarily mean widespread opposition to the principle of the war. What has been criticized especially for Netanyahu is his responsibility in preventing the October 7 attack and his inability to predict it.

Change of government in Israel; Less threat or more loneliness for Iran?

If another coalition takes power in Israel in the upcoming elections, what effect will this change have on the country's foreign policy and especially on its relations with Iran? Can we expect a serious change in Israel's security approach?

It should be noted that the statements and personal positions of politicians cannot be considered completely equivalent to the policy of a future government. Every politician may put forward positions during the election campaign, but when he forms the government, he has to take into account the views of other parties that are members of his coalition.

Therefore, in order to evaluate the foreign policy of the possible future government of Israel, in addition to the positions of the prime minister, the composition of the coalition and the political and geographical requirements of this country should also be considered.

In the case of Iran, it is not possible to conclude that Israel's policy will necessarily change based on the change of the prime minister. It remains to be seen what kind of composition the new government will have and what policy it will follow in practice.

However, one of the possible consequences of the change of government in Israel can be related to the country's relations with other countries in the region; An issue that is also important from Iran's point of view.

Qatar and Türkiye; Israel's new enemies or potential partners?

In his statements, Naftali Bennett talked about Qatar's influence in Israel and even called Qatar an enemy of Israel's interests. Regarding the possible changes in the order of the region, what direction will Israel's relations with Qatar and Türkiye go? Can the coming into office of a government led by Bennett or figures like Gadi Eisenkot turn these two countries into a more serious threat to Israel?

Currently, it cannot be said that with the new administration, the level of tension between Israel and Qatar or Turkey will necessarily increase. Some of these positions are related to the political and geographical conditions of the region, and it should be seen what approach the future government will take in practice.

In my opinion, in the scenario that can be drawn now, there is not necessarily a reason for Israel's level of tension with Qatar and Türkiye to increase. Even if the new coalition wants to show some flexibility towards the Palestinian issue, there is a possibility that Israel's relations with these two countries will improve, as well as a series of Arab countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

In such a situation, the change of government in Israel may be a problem for the Islamic Republic because if Iran wants to continue its current policies, it is likely to become more isolated in the region and some countries in the region will find more convergence with Israel.

Of course, this issue depends on the practical policies of the future government and the reaction of other countries in the region, and it cannot be considered a definite result.

Finally, could the change of government in Israel also affect its relations with China? Will the coming to power of a different coalition make a significant change in this relationship?

Israel's relations with China are not fundamentally based on the party and political planning of currents that come to power in Israel. The Chinese have accepted to have relations with Israel and usually do not involve themselves too much in the current political issues of the country.

For this reason, I don't expect that just by changing the government in Israel, there will be a fundamental change in the country's relations with China. Most likely, these relations will continue in the general framework of the previous one, and the change of the government alone will not be a decisive factor in this regard. Source: Ambassador Arjan