The calculation error of the West in understanding Iran

In the face of Iran, as with any other complex actor, neither the assumption of inevitable surrender nor the assumption of unlimited resistance is valid. Both interpretations can lead to computational error.

Guest note - Saeed Shahrabi Farahani, an analyst of strategic, security, international relations and national security issues: the phrase "maybe we have gone too far in dealing with Iran's leaders, because we no longer know exactly who we are on the side of", if it reflects the real assessment of the decision makers of a foreign power, it can be considered a sign of a review of their strategic calculations. The importance of this statement is not only in the possibility of accepting a mistake; Rather, it lies in posing a fundamental question: have the tools of pressure and confrontation, instead of forcing the other party to retreat, made it more difficult for decision makers to recognize his strategic behavior and logic? In international relations, military, economic and technological power does not necessarily mean knowing the other party exactly. Sometimes an actor has the ability to exert extensive pressure, but makes mistakes in assessing the political will, tolerance threshold, security calculations and capacity of adaptation of the competitor. In such a situation, the main issue is not the lack of power, but the distance between power and knowledge.

1. The mystery of Iran; Why are simplistic patterns not responsive?

Iran cannot be analyzed with only one variable, one institution or one cross-sectional decision. The foreign policy of this country is influenced by the interaction between national security considerations, official and institutional structures, economic interests, geopolitical concerns, historical perceptions and deterrence calculations. This complexity does not mean that Iran's behavior is incomprehensible or unpredictable; Rather, it shows that valid analysis requires simultaneous examination of several levels. A decision that looks like a retreat from the outside may be considered a tactical move in internal calculations. On the other hand, a position that seems to express persistence does not necessarily mean preparation for an unlimited escalation of confrontation. A strategic error occurs when a government predicts the competitor's reaction based on its own preferences and decision-making logic and ignores the differences in the security and political environment of the two sides.

2. passing from the first level to the second and half; The problem of uncontrolled escalation

The reference to "the first level, the second level, and the second level" can be interpreted as a metaphor for gradually increasing the range of pressure and passing through the limited stages of confrontation; Of course, without knowing the original context of this phrase, it cannot be considered an official classification or established military term. In the first stage, pressure may be applied in order to send a message, create deterrence or change the calculations of the other side. In the next stage, the expansion of pressure can involve more areas of competing interests and capacities. But as the scope of confrontation increases, the probability of unexpected reactions also increases. The issue here is not simply the intensity of the action; Rather, it is the relationship between the intensity of the action and the expected result. If increased pressure does not lead to the desired behavior change, the decision maker is faced with a dilemma: continue on the path and accept the increasing costs, or revise the initial assumptions. In such a situation, what is called "exaggeration" does not necessarily mean taking a specific action; It may mean entering a stage where the costs exceed the benefits to be achieved.

3. pressure paradox; Why does increasing costs not always lead to surrender?

One of the controversial assumptions in pressure politics is that increasing the costs of the other party directly weakens his political will. This relationship does not hold in all situations. External pressure may limit a country's economic and operational resources, but at the same time strengthen security motivations, political cohesion, or the desire to maintain decision-making autonomy. The final result depends on several factors, including the level of economic vulnerability, the leaders' assessment of the threat, internal support, the capacity to adapt and the existence of ways out of the crisis. On the other hand, too much pressure can limit the space for compromise. When the cost of backing down increases in the eyes of decision makers, an agreement that was previously possible may become more difficult. Therefore, the main issue is not that pressure is always ineffective or always counterproductive; The problem is that its effectiveness depends on the purpose, timing, appropriateness of the tools and the perception of the other party.

4. cognitive error; When we measure the other party with our mental model

One of the most dangerous mistakes in strategic calculations is to replace the real knowledge of the competitor with a simplified image of him. If a government assumes that the other side will back down at exactly the point it deems reasonable, it may ignore warning signs. This error can lead to an incorrect assessment of my red lines, affordability, security priorities and possible reactions

to move Also, over-reliance on initial estimates may cause new information to be interpreted not to refine the analysis, but to confirm previous hypotheses. The possible admission that "we don't know who we are with anymore", from this point of view, expresses a serious question about the quality of strategic knowledge; Not necessarily a sign of definitive weakness or failure on the part of the other party.

5. regional implications; The risk of expanding the scope of conflict

In the security environment of the Middle East, the intensification of confrontation between Iran and foreign competitors can create consequences beyond bilateral relations. Increasing uncertainty, changing deterrence calculations, disrupting trade and energy routes, and increasing the possibility of misuse are among the risks that must be considered in the evaluation of every decision. However, the occurrence of such consequences is not certain. The power of crisis management, diplomatic communication, tension reduction mechanisms and accurate calculation of costs can prevent the spread of conflict. As a result, any strategy that only focuses on increasing pressure and does not have a clear plan for the possible reactions of the other side, alternative scenarios and the way out of the crisis, will face the risk of increasing unforeseen costs.

6. strategic lesson; Power is not enough without knowledge

The most important lesson of this discussion is that strategic success is not measured by the number of actions taken or the intensity of pressure applied; Rather, it depends on the degree of achievement of goals, control of costs and ability to manage secondary consequences. An effective policy must specify what the ultimate goal is, what indicators show its achievement, which actions are likely to be counterproductive, and at what point course should be changed. Also, it is necessary to continuously evaluate the real reactions of the other party; Because a strategy that is based on incorrect assumptions, even with extensive resources, can lead to unfavorable results.

Conclusion: The problem is not only excess; It is a matter of knowing the limits of power

The phrase in question can be seen as a warning about the gap between the ability to apply pressure and the ability to predict its results. In the face of Iran, as with any other complex actor, neither the assumption of inevitable surrender nor the assumption of unlimited resistance is valid. Both interpretations can lead to computational error. The criterion for evaluating a strategy is not its strictness, but the suitability of the tools with the goals and its ability to manage anticipated and unanticipated reactions. Ultimately, the decisive question is not how much pressure one side can exert; Rather, it is whether he can properly recognize and control the consequences of his pressure. In international politics, sometimes the most dangerous moment comes when a power still has plenty of tools, but is no longer sure of the extent to which those tools actually affect rival calculations.