When the only way to manage the network is to disconnect; Will winter be harder than summer?

Everyone talks about the lack of electricity, but the problem of winter is not only the lack of power plants; The problem is a network that has to cope with the lack of electricity and the lack of gas at the same time, without having a clear mechanism to manage these two conflicts. In summer, blackout becomes a tool to contain the lack of electricity, and in winter, when gas is not available enough, the same tool is supposed to carry another burden. The question is whether it is possible with the same me

This summer, according to a member of the Board of Directors of the House of Industry, Mining and Trade, blackouts reached twenty hours a day in some industrial towns; That too, in the situation where it was mentioned earlier about passing the year without a blackout. The gap between this promise and what happened is not just a gap between a false prediction and a bitter reality. The problem is deeper: a policy that promises, but apparently does not have the capacity to fulfill its promise.

The numbers don't paint a promising picture either. According to published statistics, the average blackout due to lack of production and load management has increased from 3.64 minutes per day in 1401 to 19.21 minutes in 1403; An increase of more than five times. These figures, with any definition used in calculating the index, are a sign that the management of electricity supply is becoming more difficult. Now, we have to see what kind of way the army, which resorts to restricting consumption in the summer to control the electricity shortage, will take in the winter when faced with the lack of fuel.

Imagine a surgeon who has only one tool for each disease: a saw. It is natural that sooner or later he solves all problems with the same tool; Even if the price of this solution is harming the patient. The load management in the country's electricity network sometimes gives such a picture: as soon as the balance of production and consumption collides, the industry is placed in the first line of restrictions. This choice may be the easiest way in the short term, but the simplicity of a decision does not make it the right decision.

Industry is not just a collection of counters and switchable switches. Behind every industrial unit, there is human power, raw materials, commercial obligations, export market and a chain of production and distribution. A factory shutdown may appear to reduce power consumption by a few hours, but the real cost lies elsewhere: in lost production, wasted raw materials, an order that is not delivered on time, and a market that will simply be ceded to a competitor. A charge that does not appear on the dispatch bill is not necessarily a small charge.

Of course, network officials also have arguments that cannot be easily ignored. Anticipated shutdowns may be eliminated by improving production conditions or reducing consumption, and the sudden exit of several power plants is not always predictable. From an operational perspective, these explanations make sense; But from a manufacturing perspective, the question remains: how does a factory that must buy raw materials, organize manpower, and commit to delivering orders work with a schedule that is not guaranteed until the last minute?

For the network operator, a possible outage may be a precautionary scenario; For the economic enterprise, the same possibility can become a real disruption in the production schedule. More than general promises, the private sector needs clear rules: restrictions should be as predictable as possible, sensitive industries such as food and medicine should be provided with appropriate protection mechanisms, and it should be possible to monitor and control the status of industrial feeders. Crisis management does not only mean making decisions at the moment of crisis; Part of it is to provide the possibility of planning before the crisis.

First, the same limitation instead of economic prioritization. Not all industries have the same economic value, and power outages do not have the same effect on all of them. A unit that creates extensive employment, is dependent on the supply chain of several other industries, or makes a significant contribution to exports, is not in the same position as a unit that has more limited value added and economic linkages. This does not mean the unconditional exemption of large industries; This means that the cost of the restriction should be measured and a decision should be made based on indicators such as employment, added value, export, intensity of energy consumption and the possibility of moving the production time. Equal distribution of scarcity is not necessarily fair; Sometimes it just means recklessly equal distribution.

Second, the capacity-building snack interval and the measurable result. In the summer of 1404, in reports of the development of 4.7 gigawatts of solar capacity until the summer of 1405, it was mentioned as one of the ways to overcome the electricity crisis. But the summer of 1405 was spent with the declared shortage of about 13,640 megawatts. This is not about denying solar energy or underestimating the development of renewables; The problem is the need to answer about the result. How much of the promised capacity was actually used? How much of that would provide reliable power to the grid during peak hours? What were the storage quotas and network connection limits?

Until a clear distinction is made between declared capacity, installed capacity and power actually deliverable during peak hours, large numbers may become a cover for ambiguity rather than a measure of success. In the power industry, what matters is not just capacity on paper; The power is delivered at the same time that the network needs it.

Third, an issue that becomes more important as the weather gets colder: the link between electricity management and gas management. In winter, power plants need fuel to generate electricity; But at the same time, domestic consumption of gas also increases and its provision is prioritized. In this way, the lack of gas can turn into a limitation of electricity production and tie the imbalance of two networks to each other. In such a situation, load management alone is not responsible; The decision about fuel allocation, use of liquid fuel, readiness of power plants and the priority of supplying different sectors will also be decisive.

If the daily deficit of about 130 million cubic meters of gas, according to the figures presented in the relevant reports, is used as the basis of the assessment, the dimensions of the problem become clearer; However, the date and basis for calculating this figure must be precisely known. The main question is, to face this situation, is there an integrated plan that sees the allocation of gas, liquid fuel reserves, the readiness of power plants and the limitation of industrial electricity together? What institution is responsible for summarizing this risk and answering about its consequences? A clear answer to these questions is part of the country's winter preparation.

In addition to these issues, the difference in power plant performance should not be neglected. Simple gas units usually have lower efficiency than combined cycle power plants; Because in the combined cycle, the output heat of the gas turbine is also used to generate electricity. As a result, converting eligible units to combined cycle can increase electricity generation without proportionally more fuel consumption. Of course, the amount of savings depends on the technical specifications of each power plant, operating conditions and investment cost, and a single number cannot be generalized to all units.

In the winter when every cubic meter of gas is important, the delay in upgrading the appropriate units does not only mean the delay of a technical project; It can mean using more fuel to produce the same amount of electricity. For this reason, the program of conversion of power plants to combined cycle should be followed with clear criteria, specific schedule and evaluable progress report.

From this point of view, before the end of November, three demands should be put on the agenda.

First, a clear plan for winter load management should be published, in which the rules of industrial electricity restrictions and fuel supply priorities are clear. Whenever it is not possible to announce a definite plan, the scenarios, implementation conditions and deadline for informing the industries should be clearly stated. Calling outages "probable" should not replace designing mechanisms to reduce uncertainty.

Second, the main network readiness indicators should be made available to the public on a weekly basis; including the state of liquid fuel reserves in terms of reliable days, the share of gas delivered to power plants, the actual limit of industries and its difference from the announced plan. Without such indicators, performance evaluation will be limited to a series of promises and explanations after the fact.

Third, the responsibility for winter fuel risk coordination should be clear and trackable. When decisions related to gas, electricity, and industrial production affect each other, accountability cannot be dispersed among several entities, without knowing which entity is responsible for the final summation and announcement of the situation. Coordination between devices is essential; But coordination without clear responsibilities can easily turn into passing of responsibility in times of crisis.

Winter will not be warmed by promises, and the power grid will not be freed from real limitations by changing the name of the crisis from "production shortage" to "load management". The issue is not simply how many megawatts of electricity we have short or how much gas is not available; The question is whether or not we have designed a clear mechanism to distribute this shortage, protect production and account for decisions before the cold days arrive.

*If the answer is no, then the easiest way is still available: disconnection*. But this time we have to ask who will pay for this simplicity? The power grid, factories or the economy that cannot bear another winter with the same logic?