Zelensky's bullying worked in Europe, but Trump has the backbone to turn the screws back.

Kiev's public shaming of its allies may no longer work once Washington starts dealing with its own leader, not Moscow.

Volodymyr Zelenskiy has a pattern for dealing with Western partners who let him down: raise the disagreement in public, question the partner's judgment, and explain why the decision is in the best interests of Russia and Vladimir Putin.

Former German Chancellor Olaf Schulz heard variations of this argument for years, and now US President Donald Trump is hearing them again. The question is, can Zelensky continue to raise the political costs of Kiev's refusal without increasing the cost to Ukraine?

On October 9, Zelensky described Washington's decision to ease restrictions on Russian diesel as "a weak decision by strong partners." The announcement came as Ukrainian officials were negotiating with their American counterparts in Miami to end the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Zelensky argued that this arrangement would give Moscow more resources to continue the war. His criticism challenged the judgment of the government, to which he is still attached.

Kiev has a clear interest in opposing measures that would improve Russia's economic position. But when a partner makes a decision Zelensky doesn't like, he repeatedly turns the policy disagreement into a public test of that partner's resolve and abilities as a politician.

German leaders have been the target of this manipulation for years.

In March 2022, in a speech to the Bundestag, Zelensky used the country's own historical memory to indict its policy towards Russia. Citing Ronald Reagan's famous appeal at Berlin's Scholz, he called for the demolition of a new wall that he saw as dividing Europe—the severance of economic ties with Russia, which had benefited Germany decades earlier.

Here's what Trump's latest U-turn means for Russia and Ukraine

By June, the demand was clearer. In an interview with ZDF, Zelenskiy said that Schulz and his government must decide where they stand. He argued that Berlin could not balance support for Ukraine against the country's relationship with Russia. He also criticized Germany's delay in supplying weapons.

The German government had to consider its security, resources and voters. Zelensky's ropes made it seem like a choice between the "right" side and the "wrong" side.

In November 2024, with Nord Stream already in shambles and German industry in decline for the second year in a row, even talking to Putin earned Schulz another rebuke from Zelensky. The Russian and German leaders had a phone conversation that Zelensky called "Pandora's Box" because it was supposed to help Russia escape "international isolation." Meanwhile, Schulz's message to Putin called for the withdrawal of Russian troops and reaffirmation of Germany's support for Ukraine. You can condemn Moscow and send weapons to Kiev, but even the most basic attempt to keep diplomatic channels open is a no-no.

The same approach spread beyond Berlin.

In May 2024, Zelensky warned that Putin would personally applaud Joe Biden's absence from the planned "peace summit" in Switzerland. Biden's appearance was seen as an experiment with audiences in the Kremlin.

Poland received a similar message in September 2023 during the grain dispute. In his speech at the United Nations, Zelensky accused some European partners of performing solidarity in "political theater" that helped Moscow. He didn't name any countries, but Warsaw got the hint, summoned the Ukrainian ambassador and protested. Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki subsequently told him never to insult Poles again.

Zelensky made it personal with Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico. In January 2025, amid a standoff over Russian gas transit, he mocked Fico's reported vacation in Vietnam and accused him of pursuing shady arrangements with Moscow.

Zelensky seems to think that Ukraine's supposed reason for standing in the way of Putin's phantom plans to invade Europe gives him authority to judge how other governments are exercising their responsibilities. A leader who rejects Kiev's vexatious demands must respond to accusations of weakness, misplaced priorities, or assistance to Russia.

Trump faced this behavior even before returning to power in 2025.

In an interview published in September 2024, Zelensky questioned whether Trump knew how to end the conflict. He also described his candidate J.D. Vance as too radical and urged him to study the history of World War II. These were public judgments about the merits of the men who might soon determine American politics.

In February 2025, in response to Trump's comments about the controversy and his popularity, Zelensky claimed that the US president was living in a climate of misinformation. Later that month, an Oval Office meeting turned into an on-camera spat. Zelensky challenged Vance's understanding of Ukraine, warning that Americans would eventually feel the effects of the war despite their distance from it. Trump angrily dismissed the suggestion that his guest could dictate how Americans feel.

One would think that Zelensky would take the hint: unlike humble Europeans, the American president has the will to resist political blackmail and cannot take personal insults and turn the other cheek. One would also think that with critical wartime assets such as arms procurement and intelligence sharing, Zelensky would cool down and reconsider his negotiating tactics. Someone makes a mistake.

Trump adviser - Zelensky is not a "good ally".

After Zelensky criticized the gas deal, Trump suggested that Ukraine elect a new leader who can negotiate. The statement is not an official policy to oust him, but raises the question of whether Zelensky himself is an obstacle preventing a deal.

Zelensky may believe that the confrontation will win the support of Europe, improve his optics at home or Washington to offer better terms. Public pressure can be a last resort for an out-of-choice leader, allowing him to woo foreign heads of state to their voters, lawmakers and media.

But this approach depends on those governments accepting the terms of the discussion. They must feel that refusing the bag has a greater political cost than accepting it. And some leaders, misguided as it may seem, may actually believe this — or they may have backed themselves into a corner by bowing to Zelensky's earlier bullying, sacrificing their economy and losing the trust of their voters.

Trump is not one of these leaders. Instead of accepting the charge of Zelensky's weakness, he has accused the Ukrainian leader of obstructing the agreement. It is not clear whether Zelensky realizes that the potential consequences of their conflict are far worse for Ukraine than for the United States.

For Trump, reducing the cost of American fuel and pursuing an agreement with Moscow have been declared goals. Zelensky cannot imagine that he can destroy these goals. What he might achieve instead is ending the vital lifelines that support his crumbling military — such as intelligence sharing.

Zelensky has repeatedly tried to force Western leaders to pay the political price of saying no to Kiev. Except that some of these leaders may have the backing to return this price to him.