Ukraine showed Trump how easily an enemy can cripple an AI power plant

Ukrainian drone strikes on three Yandex data centers in four days showed how adversaries can cripple AI without breaching software.

Ukraine says Russia continues to attack energy facilities after Trump announces energy truce.

An adversary can disrupt an AI system without defeating its software. It just needs the infrastructure that keeps the system running. Ukraine proved this within Russia last week.

President Trump and his national security team should pay attention before the enemy tries the same thing here. On October 8, a Ukrainian drone strike forced Yandex, the tech company often referred to as the "Google of Russia," to suspend operations at its Sassoon data center. The next day, another attack disabled several modules at the Kaluga facility, which Yandex called its most powerful data center in Russia. On October 11, the company announced that its Vladimir region data center was completely shut down after the drone attack. Ukraine disrupted three major Yandex computing facilities in four days.

The Sasovo facility houses two of Yandex's three supercomputers, which are used to train artificial intelligence models, including YandexGPT. Yandex said it could not yet determine whether the equipment was recoverable. Whatever the final damage assessment, Russia's leading artificial intelligence developer lost a major computing center overnight.

America must defend our digital infrastructure here and abroad to win the next war.

During my years as an Army officer and Pentagon strategist, I learned to judge military capabilities based on whether they were there when needed. A weapon that stares at range becomes a liability when its supply line fails in battle.

This standard should govern our reliance on artificial intelligence.

The word "cloud" hides physical machines behind computing services. These services require buildings, processors, electricity, cooling equipment and communication networks. The agency calls cybersecurity and the security of energy and communications infrastructure "fundamental to the operation of virtually every other critical infrastructure sector."

The AI revolution will go wherever there is electricity - and China knows it

This vulnerability goes beyond Russia. Government missions, essential services, and American businesses are all powered by advanced computing. When a private facility supports an essential defense or intelligence function, its continued availability becomes a national security concern. This does not mean that Washington should take over these facilities. The government license plate on the gate won't even stop a drone. What matters is who defends these sites and how quickly they are restored.

An outage does not need to destroy equipment to cause serious damage. Information obtained after a commander must act may be too late to protect troops or shape a decision. A recovery plan that misses the mission deadline is no plan at all.

After Rubio's drone warning, the commander-in-chief revealed that US military bases are "ill-equipped" to stop drone swarms.

Russia is a war zone and America is not. But consider Loudoun County, Virginia, which has the highest concentration of data centers in the world, and neighboring Prince William County. Fences, cameras and guards protect those campuses on the ground. None of this will stop a drone, and federal law reserves the authority for authorized federal agencies and state and local police to shoot down a drone. The Ukraine attacks give Washington every reason to test whether our essential calculations can survive an airstrike.

President Trump has already laid a policy foundation. His June 5 national security memo directed agencies to work with private companies willing to secure America's most advanced artificial intelligence technologies. It specifically envisions threat intelligence sharing, joint artificial intelligence red team exercises, and stronger physical and cyber security safeguards for the country's data centers. The memo gave the agencies 120 days to develop those partnerships, a deadline of Oct. 3. The government must now report what it has done: which partnerships are in place, what protections they provide and whether essential missions can continue after a major facility is unavailable.

The president must direct four practical steps.

First, identify the computing capabilities necessary for national defense, intelligence, and other essential government missions. Assess the cost of losing them, the availability of alternatives and the time required to restore operations. The mission, not the price tag or size of the facility, should determine its security priority

Second, determining responsibility. Private operators have to harden their facilities and create redundancy. Defending their upper airspace is the government's responsibility, so federal agencies and local police must plan anti-drone coverage for the most critical locations. Federal agencies must also provide timely threat intelligence, define the requirements of the missions they procure, and coordinate emergency assistance. The president should appoint a single official responsible for gathering these efforts and bridging the gaps.

Third, establish appropriate and enforceable security requirements. Government contracts can require safeguards and continuity arrangements for essential services, and Congress should close identified gaps in authority. Requirements should include power, cooling and communications as well as computing equipment.

Fourth, test recovery in the way that Washington-area agencies have long implemented continuity of operations plans in exercises such as FEMA's annual Eagle Horizon. These tests shall include the loss of more than one facility or utility or common communications. Can another site accept the workload? Are the necessary data, equipment and personnel available? Will the operation resume within the mission deadline? Where the answer is no, fix it before the crisis.

Congress should receive classified reports on these results. A public summary can create accountability without disclosing sensitive facilities or defensive measures.

The civilian nuclear industry provides a useful precedent. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission requires nuclear power plants to maintain armed security officers, physical barriers and intrusion detection, and tests these defenses with force-on-force exercises. Most of these factories are privately owned.

AI data centers pose different risks, and Washington should not copy nuclear law wholesale. The principle continues: private property and enforceable federal security obligations can coexist.

America must maintain the entrepreneurship that drives technological progress while requiring reliable service for essential national missions. Targeted protections can provide both.

The greater danger lies in the Pacific Ocean. In any conflict with China, America will need computing power to survive the first strike. Washington must determine how an adversary would try to destroy this capability and require defense and recovery plans that are proven in exercises.

Ukraine attacks are a warning shot. President Trump should demand a tested answer to the question they raise: When a critical US AI center goes down, can our essential missions continue?

Robert Maginnis is a retired US Army infantry officer, senior national security fellow at the Family Research Council, and author of 14 books. His latest, "AI's New Cold War: Freedom Against Tyranny in the Age of Machine Empire," examines the global race for AI supremacy and its implications for freedom.

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