Even if Netanyahu loses the election, Israel's policy against Iran will not change

Israel's election may end Netanyahu's rule, but it is unlikely to fundamentally change its long-term approach to the Middle East.

According to the report of Ambassador Arjan's international reporter, the "New Arab" analytical site analyzed the upcoming Israeli Knesset (Parliament) elections in an article, which follows.

Israel's October 27 election could be a major political turning point domestically. However, it is unlikely to lead to the dramatic changes in Israeli foreign policy that many around the world might hope for.

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A victory for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would likely strengthen the influence of Israel's far-right parties, while a government led by figures such as Gadi Eisenkot, Naftali Bennett or other opposition leaders could bring a less confrontational tone and more diplomatic flexibility.

Nevertheless, there is considerable continuity in mainstream Israeli politics regarding Iran, Lebanon, and the Palestinians. Therefore, this month's elections are unlikely to fundamentally change Tel Aviv's approach to the region.

Three years after the Hamas-led invasion of southern Israel on October 7, 2023, Israel is still at war, its relations with some Western countries have deteriorated significantly, and its tensions with Jordan and Egypt are increasingly tied to developments in Gaza and the West Bank.

However, the election offers no clear choice between fundamentally different views on Israel's regional role. The opposition has a chance of defeating Netanyahu, but the leading candidates largely agree on the centrality of military power, the perception of threats from Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas, and the denial of basic rights for Palestinians.

However, this does not mean that the question of who will be the prime minister of Israel is unimportant. Netanyahu has become increasingly dependent on far-right partners such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Benguir, whose influence far exceeds their electoral power.

Their leverage has contributed to the expansion of settlements, the weakening of the Palestinian Authority and the hardening of the position towards Gaza and the West Bank at the center of the government's policy. Netanyahu's re-victory could strengthen the political power of such extremist forces. However, replacing Netanyahu does not necessarily mean replacing the strategy that has led Israel to its current confrontation with various state and non-state actors in the region.

A government led by Eysenkot, Bennett, or another opposition figure would likely be less dependent on the far right, open to American pressure, and more cautious in its rhetoric.

Perhaps such a post-Netanyahu government could curb settler violence to some extent, adopt a more cooperative approach to Gaza reconstruction, and give more diplomatic space to Jordan and Egypt, although on the larger questions—mainly Iran, Hezbollah, Israeli control of Palestinian land, and the creation of a Palestinian state—differences would be much narrower.

Israel's political center has moved so far to the right since the "Oslo years" (1993-2000) that a government led by one of Netanyahu's rivals could change the tone and tactics of Israeli politics, though without making fundamental changes in direction.

"Netanyahu's successor will likely find himself dealing with the same regional issues with the same tools and pursuing largely the same interests," explained Aron Lund, a research associate at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, in an interview with New Arab. There will certainly be differences, and perhaps Israel will frame its involvement differently in places like Lebanon, Syria, and Iran. But the general path may be similar."

He added: "Israel probably wants to keep the occupied lands, weaken its enemies and charge a high price for any concessions."

Other experts also agree. Discussing the possibility of a post-Netanyahu government as a result of this month's elections, Dr. Rozbeh Parsi, an associate researcher at Lund University, said that we should not expect a change in Tel Aviv's foreign policy strategy. "Eysencott, Bennett and Lapid are arguing with Netanyahu about fine-tuning the approach, the weight of diplomacy, etc. — not about whether wars are necessary or how they should behave," he told New Arab. While they may be more willing to go along with any American administration in tactics, they will pursue the same strategy."

"Regional capitals are less concerned about who becomes prime minister because all the candidates will be on their way on the big issues."

Some observers see Gaza as a place to look at in meaningful contrast to a post-Netanyahu government that is less dependent on Smotrich and Benguir.

There may be reason to expect that such an Israeli government would be more willing to cooperate with international efforts aimed at rebuilding the devastated region and accept some form of Palestinian administration, rather than allowing the current stalemate to continue.

This government may also be more responsive to pressure from Washington, Cairo and other governments seeking to stabilize Gaza after the war. However, the scope for change will be severely limited.

The disarmament of Hamas, Israel's security demands, and the sensitive question of who will ultimately rule Gaza are unlikely to be resolved in the foreseeable future, regardless of who becomes Israel's prime minister.

At the same time, the Israeli political mainstream has little appetite for a return to the pre-October 7 situation. Thus, while a post-Netanyahu government may make Gaza politics less adversarial and more diplomatically manageable, it is hard to imagine it fundamentally ending Israel's military control of the coastal enclave or taking meaningful steps to resolve the underlying conflict.

The West Bank could be an even more important test of whether an Israeli government has truly changed course. Under Netanyahu, settlement expansion, settler violence, and actions that strengthen Israel's control over Palestinian land have accelerated, while the Palestinian Authority has weakened economically and politically.

The main concern is not necessarily immediate formal annexation, but a slower process of making life more difficult for Palestinians through some kind of "soft transition" that could gradually encourage Palestinians to leave.

A less right-wing government could put the brakes on some of these policies and restore more restraint to the security forces and the settler movement. However, this would still fall far short of reversing the occupation, and prominent opposition figures have shown no sign of being prepared to return Palestinian statehood to the center of Israeli politics.

"An Israeli government that is not beholden to the likes of Smotrich and Benguir is likely to be more flexible on the margins in relation to Gaza and the West Bank, and certainly in terms of rhetoric and public framing," Lund told New Arab. After Netanyahu, Israel will have a cabinet that is less prone to saying extreme and crazy things. With or without a real change in policy, it may help placate Western governments and make some diplomatic progress possible."

The benefits for Jordan are really high. The leadership in Amman has been watching the deterioration of the West Bank with growing concern. It is an established fact that any significant movement of Palestinians across the Jordan River will have direct consequences for the political and economic stability of the Hashemite Kingdom itself.

Dr. Rob Geist-Pinfold, who teaches international security at King's College London, explained to The New Arab: "The Israeli government is pushing the land to the brink more than ever before. This has been the case since Bezalel Smotrich became finance minister, showering benefits on settlers while protecting violent extremists among them. "He has also refused to pay income to the Palestinian Authority."

"It's a toxic mix: the PA is weaker, more bankrupt and more illegitimate than ever," he added. "Israeli ministers are openly talking about annexation and ethnic cleansing, both of which mean Jordan could see an influx of Palestinian refugees."

Jordan is already facing serious financial pressures and unemployment, and the issue of Palestinian identity is deeply rooted in its domestic politics. Thus, a new influx from the West Bank would potentially pose a serious threat to Jordan's existing political order, leaving Amman with few attractive options.

Jordan could ask Washington and other Western governments to pressure Tel Aviv, pursue diplomatic and legal action at the international level, or, in an extreme scenario, reexamine aspects of its relationship with Israel that were normalized in 1994.

From Amman's point of view, the most important question after Israel's election is whether the next government, regardless of who leads it, is prepared to stop the West Bank from moving toward the point of no return.

Egypt is primarily concerned with preventing the Gaza war from becoming a new source of displacement and regional instability. Cairo's main red line is any Israeli policy that effectively drives Palestinians out of Gaza and across the Rafah border into the Sinai Peninsula.

Egyptian authorities also want to maintain their role as a central mediator and play an important role in the reconstruction of Gaza. This is due to both security implications and Egypt's long-standing interest in maintaining regional influence.

Perhaps a less confrontational Israeli government could give Cairo more room to pursue these goals, especially if it is willing to cooperate with the international reconstruction effort and accept a Palestinian governing structure in Gaza.

However, until Israel and Hamas can agree on security, disarmament and governance, Egypt will continue to face the risk of the unresolved Gaza conflict spilling directly over its borders.

Iran and Hezbollah are two cases in which continuity in Tel Aviv's foreign policy will most likely be strong. Confronting Iran and weakening Hezbollah are consensus positions in Israel's political mainstream.

A post-Netanyahu government might be more willing to listen to Washington, place more emphasis on diplomacy, or exercise more restraint in choosing when and how to use military force. However, this does not mean abandoning the key goal of neutralizing the Islamic Republic and its regional allies and partners from rebuilding their military capabilities and reducing their perceived threats against Israel.

This brings us to the distinction to be drawn between strategy and tactics. If Netanyahu fails, the next administration could be less provocative and more predictable, without being fundamentally less willing to use force. Finally, it is safe to say that a change in Israeli government will not necessarily translate into a more peaceful Middle East.

Homan Majed, author, journalist and Iranian-American contributor to NBC News, explained: “Iranians will definitely be watching closely; "Although they will be happy to see Netanyahu defeated and possibly even jailed, they are under no illusions that Israel's policy towards Iran will change in any significant way."