Behind the 2,500-Year Celebrations: Three Major World Leaders Absent, Lavish Banquet at Persepolis, Widespread Poverty in Iran

The 2,500-year celebrations at Persepolis in October 1971 were more than a 'lavish splurge' or 'prelude to the Pahlavi fall'; they were a 13-year project shaped at the intersection of ancient-revivalism, oil revenues, and the Shah's diplomatic ambitions. Document reviews show a deep gap between its cultural and developmental goals and the lived reality of society.

Amir Mahdi Naderi: Mehr 1350 (October 1971), Takht Jamshid became the scene of one of the most expensive and noisy events in Iran's contemporary history for a few days. In a dry plain next to the ancient ruins, a city of well-equipped tents was erected and sixty-two heads of state or their representatives, hundreds of scientists, journalists and cultural figures from different parts of the world gathered at the invitation of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to commemorate the 2,500 years of the Iranian Empire. This event had several competing narratives from the very first day; The greatest celebration of history, the manifestation of arrogance or the prelude to the fall. Examining existing documents and research shows a more complicated picture; An image that was placed at the intersection of archaic nationalism, the cultural policy of the Pahlavi regime, the increase in oil revenues, the expansion of Iran's regional role, and the Shah's attempt to introduce his government as a continuation of the long-standing tradition of the kingdom.

Its initial plan was proposed in 1337, that is, five years after the coup d'état of August 28, 1332, by Shojauddin Shafa, the court's cultural advisor.

An idea that was thirteen years in the making

Contrary to popular belief, the idea of ​​holding 2,500-year celebrations did not suddenly take shape on the eve of 1350. Its initial plan was proposed in 1337, that is, five years after the coup d'état of August 28, 1332, by Shojauddin Shafa, the court's cultural advisor. Shafa himself narrated that an unofficial representative of the Jewish community reminded him that Cyrus opened Babylon and freed the Jewish captives. The "2500th anniversary" of the event was in 1961, which explains why the date of the celebration was originally set in 1340. Shafa also considered being inspired by UNESCO as another reason; Since 1954, UNESCO has been encouraging countries to commemorate important events, and in the General Conference of 1960, it had recommended to accompany this commemoration.

The plan was more humble in the beginning than the final result. The center of the program was thought to be an Iranology Congress. The central council of celebrations was formed with 33 members and chaired by Hossein Ala, minister of the court. But the celebration was delayed many times; to 1341, then 1344 and then 1346. The main cause was financial problems and organizational weakness. In a letter in 1340, Ala writes about the "financial crisis of the government" and the Minister of Roads at the time accuses the Council of planning expenses without calculation. In the 1340s, even some American officials advised the Shah to stay away from "disruption"; Such advice is contained in a memo to the Kennedy administration.

The coronation celebration was held separately in 1346, and a part of the budget of the 2500-year celebrations, about three million dollars, was spent for it. One reason for the separation was the protocol; Usually they don't invite other kings in the coronation ceremony. In the official narrative, the 2,500-year celebrations belonged to all Iranians, and even according to Mohammad Reza Shah, they were introduced as belonging to human history and civilization. But the composition of the guests and the way the ceremony was held showed that this event has other goals. Inviting the political leaders of the world and holding ceremonies in Persepolis, Cyrus' tomb and other historical places, the celebration went beyond a domestic program and turned it into an international show of Iran.

But why did the Pahlavi government decide to display the history of ancient Iran, the monarchy and the image of modern Iran at the same time in front of domestic and foreign audiences?

In response to this question, there are three categories of explanations, and researchers do not agree on the weight of each one:

Legitimacy and identity: Many authors consider the festival as a means of legitimizing the monarchy. According to them, linking the Pahlavi monarchy to ancient history was the main goal after the memory of the coup on August 28, 1332 and against the criticism of the government's dependence on foreign countries. In the book, The Shah's Imperial Celebrations of 1971: Nationalism, Culture and Politics in Late Pahlavi Iran, Steel considers this orientation as a continuation of the official ideology of the 1340s; An ideology that had two pillars: linking Iranians to the family of Europeans through the Aryan myth, and confiscating Iran before Islam. The Shah had repeatedly emphasized the national role of "positive nationalism" and the connection between the nation and the monarchy.

International position: Based on Gramsci's concept of "hegemony", it is argued that in 1350 the Shah thought of playing a regional role. Several factors were effective in the emergence of this idea: Britain had announced its decision to withdraw from the Persian Gulf in January 1968 by the end of 1971, the Nixon doctrine encouraged regional allies to play a greater role, and the growth of oil income also provided financial opportunities. In this sense, the celebration was a stage to introduce Iran as an international actor, not just a tool for domestic consumption. He considers leaving out the list of Iranians from foreign committees and entrusting the heads of these committees to the presidents of other countries as a sign of this direction.

Economy and Culture: Steele disagrees with both of the above interpretations. In his opinion, the celebration should not be read only in the light of the fall of 1357; It should be measured in the context of the height of the Shah's power and prestige at the beginning of the 1350s. From his point of view, the goals were threefold: spreading the official narrative, attracting investment and tourism, and international cultural policy. Among other explanations, personal motives have been mentioned; Some narratives speak of the king's arrogance. Steele acknowledges that mainstream research has under-documented this motivation.

The common point of the narratives is that the nature of the celebration changed over the years. Steele writes that if the celebration was held in 1340, it would probably remain small and fleeting; But by 1350, the economy had grown, economic and social reforms had progressed, oil income had increased, and the Shah had gained more confidence. Vahidirad also says that this transformation of the domestic and international situation gave a new meaning to the celebration.

Kourosh; The link between past and present

The ideological center of gravity of the celebrations was Cyrus the Great. In the official ceremony, Cyrus was introduced as a symbol of peace, tolerance, governance and historical glory of Iran. Mohammad Reza Shah, during the ceremony of the tomb of Cyrus in Pasargad, placed himself along the historical path of that king and spoke about the heritage of ancient Iran. Steele shows that this choice was quite conscious: the Pahlavi regime sought to establish a link between the ancient past, the reforms of Mohammad Reza Shah, and the image it presented of a "modern Iran". In this narrative, the contemporary Shah was introduced as the heir of the Iranian royal tradition.

This policy was not limited to speech. Steel talks about a wide collection of books, exhibitions, conferences and cultural programs that were published and held in Iran and abroad. One of the most important of them was the Iranology Congress, in which nearly 300 researchers participated. Besides that, hundreds of books were published and numerous projects were formed to introduce the history and culture of Iran to foreign audiences. The 2500-year celebrations were not just a series of multi-day ceremonies in Persepolis; Rather, it was the culmination of a wider cultural operation that had begun years before Mehr 1350.

Foreign Minister Ardeshir Zahedi later asked why the pounded kebab or broth was not served. In defense of this decision, Shah said, should they have served bread and horseradish?

provision; Two years of acceleration after a decade of delay

In 1349, the nature of procurement changed. The council became a consultative body and the "Supreme Executive Board" was formed under the supervision of Asadullah Alam, the minister of the court. This board met once a week in the court ministry and once every two weeks in Niavaran under the chairmanship of Farah Pahlavi. Dariush and Cyrus hotels in Fars were unfinished until the last months.

For the reception, the Supreme Council entrusted the construction of the "Tent City" to the Swiss company Jansen. Each tent included a living room, two bedrooms and two bathrooms; The place of the tents was in five radial streets named after the five continents of the world. The embassies were concerned about the comfort of their guests, and to answer this concern, equipped hairdressing salons and a questionnaire about the guests' food tastes were prepared. The food for the official banquet was provided by the Maxim Paris restaurant. Steele writes that the catering officials of the court and hotels said that holding such a banquet with Iranian chefs on that scale is not possible; However, this decision was interpreted as a "failure of public relations". Even Ardeshir Zahedi, the foreign minister, later asked why the pounded kebab or broth was not served. In defense of this decision, Shah said, should they have served bread and horseradish? On the second night, a light dinner was held with Iranian dishes and local artists.

The official program started on 20 Mehr 1350. There, the king spoke to the tomb of Cyrus and gave the message "Sleep peacefully as we are awake". The text of the speech was written by Shafa. On the occasion of the ceremony, the mosque columns of the 7th century (13th AD) around the tomb were removed; Steel considers this as a sign of the tendency of the official narrative to downplay the traces of the Islamic era.

On the 22nd of Mehr, the guests came to Persepolis and after the official dinner on the 22nd of Mehr, light, sound and fireworks were held in the ruins. Ioannis Gaznakis, a Greek composer, performed a new work at this event. The next day, a nearly two-hour parade was held with costumes of historical periods, from Achaemenid to Pahlavi; According to the military commission, its clothing design was the product of years of research.

This parade was one of the most lasting parts of the ceremony. Soldiers with reconstructed covers from different periods of Iran's history passed in front of the guests; From the Achaemenians, Ashkanians and Sassanians to the Safavids, Afshariya, Zandiya and Qajar and finally the Pahlavi period. This parade was actually a visual narration of history. The different pasts of Iran were placed next to each other in a single historical line, and the Pahlavi period was at the end of this path; It is as if the contemporary government is the natural continuation of this long history.

Then the guests went to Tehran and on 25-24 Mehr, the Shahyad Tower (Ariyamehr) and the 100,000-seat Ariyamehr Stadium were inaugurated.

Many governments accepted the invitation; According to Steele's report, 62 heads of state or their representatives came and 50 people stayed in Chadari city. Among them were Prince Philip and Princess Anne (representing the Queen of Great Britain), the King of Jordan, the President of India, Podgorny of the Soviet Union, Spiro Agnew, the Vice President of the United States, and Haile Selassie, the Emperor of Ethiopia.

Absentees also became controversial. Queen Elizabeth II, Nixon and Pompidou did not attend. Steele explains that the British attributed the rejection of the invitation to the "no participation in international events" rule, and the Queen wrote a respectful personal letter to the King. In France, Pompidou publicly refused the invitation. According to Steele, these rejections after the party did not mean the end of relations; Nixon visited Iran a year later, in 1972. He himself writes that the Shah's inability to attract these three people "damaged the image of his seriousness in the international arena to some extent".

On the other hand, the celebration was an excuse for diplomatic negotiations. Steele reports that the emirs of the seven sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf and the emir of Bahrain participated, and Iran established relations with Qatar on 24 Mehr. The presence of the Emir of Bahrain as the head of an independent government allowed the Shah to abandon Iran's territorial claims. The trip of a Chinese delegation also helped the relations between the two countries; Iran and China established official relations in 1971. In the economic field, European companies competed for contracts, and according to Steele, the competition over the Kerman copper mine was linked to the presence of the French president.

Abroad, about 52 committees of "Cyrus the Great" were formed under the chairmanship of the presidents of the countries; Shafa has reported the number of their members to be more than 1500 people. Steele counts about seventy committees by the time of the celebration and writes that Iran pressed for the election of the head of the British committee until finally Prince Philip accepted.

In the media coverage, the tent city overshadowed the scientific parts of the festival. But based on official statistics, 131 books, 143 exhibitions and 326 congresses and seminars were held or published in various countries on this occasion. The second international congress of Iranology was held from 21st to 23rd October at Pahlavi University of Shiraz; According to the official program, 275 researchers from 38 countries participated in it. Research works on ancient Iran "almost doubled" in the years after the festival, Steele writes.

The plaster version of the Cyrus cylinder also went to the United Nations in New York and Geneva, and the celebrations made "the first charter of human rights" one of its propaganda themes. The original cylinder was displayed in Iran for a while on loan from the British Museum. The British Foreign Office was worried that Iran would request a permanent extension.

The celebration was not only for foreign guests. Based on Steele's research, provincial committees were formed and exhibitions, cultural ceremonies, book publishing, parades and various programs were held in the cities of the country. Even some religious minorities participated in the programs related to the celebration and projects were formed in the fields of schools, hospitals, religious and cultural buildings for this occasion. This part of the story is very important; Because it shows that the cultural policy of the celebrations was not only limited to the display of power in Persepolis, the government was trying to spread a certain concept of "being Iranian" at the community level as well; A concept that emphasized ancient history, the institution of monarchy and the idea of ​​Iran as a long-lasting historical unit.

The lived experience of ordinary people: poverty, disgust and watching from behind the TV screen

One of the dimensions of the 2500-year celebrations is the direct and indirect experience of the common people of Iran in those days. Existing research, including field reports, memoirs, and later analysis, show that the reactions among different strata of society were not uniform, but overall, a deep gap was felt between the "official image of the celebration" and the "daily lived reality."

Rural poverty and field reports: James Beale, an American Iranologist, in his book The Eagle and the Lion and also in the reports before the celebration, describes that in 1971 (1350) he witnessed "deadly poverty" in the villages of Fars province and twice saw hungry children eating grass and bushes in the fields near the villages. These reports were in direct contrast with the images of banquets in Persepolis; where foreign guests enjoyed goose liver and caviar. According to some estimates, during that period, about 54% of Iran's population lived below the poverty line, and in the southern and rural areas, access to safe drinking water, health services, and schools was very limited. Steel also confirms in his research that "poverty was a reality in Iran and there were large wealth gaps between the urban middle class and poor rural communities".

Watching from behind the TV: For many Iranians, the celebrations were not a personal experience, but a media experience. The television broadcast of the ceremony reached millions of people, but instead of creating a sense of solidarity, this broadcast in many cases intensified the feeling of disgust. In the diaries and oral reports, it is stated that people in the slums and shantytowns, while gathering on the roofs or in the humble houses, watched the images of the feasts of Persepolis and murmurs of protest were formed in private circles. An Iranian youth says in his memoirs: "We, the people, did not know anything about it. We paid for it. It was in our name, but we couldn't get within a mile of it. really The road was closed by soldiers.

Tourism revenue, which was one of the stated goals, was reported to be less than 45 million dollars per year in the three years before 1971 and about 152 million dollars by 1976.

The debate on the cost is one of the most controversial parts. Estimates range from the official scientific figure of $16.8 million to $4 billion. James Beale calls the $200 million figure a "personal estimate," without stating the basis. In the report of the television documentary "The Shah's Great Party" by Hassan Amini (grandson of Ali Amin), Abolhassan Bani Sadr mentioned 650 million dollars from hearsay, and Abdolreza Ansari, the Deputy Chairman of the Shura, said 22 million dollars. However, Abbas Milani has considered both figures to be guesswork.

By studying the accounts of the Central Council, Steele shows that the cost of the Council was about 1.8 billion Rials (24 million dollars), of which 3 million were spent on coronation. The biggest rows included Shahyad Tower (about 5.9 million dollars) and Reception (about 3 million dollars). Darbar's share was about 17.9 million dollars; A figure very close to the science figure. However, Steele emphasizes that the actual cost is not exactly clear, as ministries and the private sector also had separate costs. He writes that the figures of hundreds of millions of dollars are not consistent with the available documents; A large part of the infrastructure cost was included in the fourth development plan and was spread over several years. Ariyamehr Stadium also cost about 22.7 million dollars and the program was funded by the organization. According to Steele, part of the costs were paid by the private sector, but the voluntary nature of these contributions is questionable.

One of the most important points of Steele's research is that all the expenses of celebrations should not be included in the category of consumption expenses. The construction or development of some infrastructures, road improvement, tourism facilities, facilities related to Persepolis, sound and light equipment, Ariyamehr Stadium, school building and other projects that were done in the same period could be used after the ceremony. Steele specifically explains about the Persepolis residence complex that after the ceremony, an attempt was made to turn this complex into a tourist center. Although the program ultimately did not meet with the expected success, it shows that the organizers had also thought about the long-term economic effects of the celebrations from the beginning. Also, the lighting equipment of Persepolis was used for tourism in the following years, and Ariamehr Stadium became important for subsequent sports events, including the 1353 Asian Games. Tourism revenue, which was one of the stated goals, was reported to be less than 45 million dollars per year in the three years before 1971 and about 152 million dollars by 1976. British Ambassador Peter Ramsbotham described the celebration as "putting Iran on the map".

The World Confederation of Iranian Students formulated a four-step plan to deal with the celebration. Also, a letter signed by Jean-Paul Sartre, Simon de Beauvoir and fourteen members of the British Parliament called for a boycott.