Restoring public trust is an essential condition for overcoming the crisis
Restoring public trust is an essential condition for overcoming the crisis. People should know the basis on which important decisions are made, what are the costs and consequences, and what is the plan to curb economic pressures, prevent the spread of poverty and maintain public services.
Jumohri-e-Islami newspaper wrote: The contradiction between diplomatic messages and practical actions, ambiguity in commitments and turning the negotiation into a matter of dignity within the country reduces the chance of a lasting agreement and paves the way for choosing more costly options.
According to Ambassador Arjan, Qadir Bastani added in a note: In nuclear policy, one should realistically look for a way to preserve Iran's legitimate rights to peaceful use of nuclear energy, and at the same time, reduce the risk of conflict and achieve mutual guarantees. Insisting on maintaining all the status quo, without weighing the costs, is not necessarily a sign of strength.
- In the issue of the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic review is also necessary. A strategy that is supposed to increase the country's power should ultimately lead to greater security and lower costs, rather than providing the basis for the formation of new threats.
- At the internal level, the decision-making mechanism must be modified.
- Restoring public trust is a basic condition for overcoming the crisis. People should know the basis on which important decisions are made, what are the costs and consequences, and what is the plan to curb economic pressures, prevent the spread of poverty and maintain public services.
You can read the full text of the note below.
How long has this question never left my mind, whether everything that has happened to the country and the system in the last year is just the result of the hostility of evil enemies, or should we look for part of it in our own calculation errors, costly decisions, and lost opportunities? Enmity of global arrogance with Iran is a clear reality. The use of force, military threats, and violations of international law cannot be justified by referring to internal errors. The responsibility of aggression lies with the aggressor, but condemning aggression does not exempt us from the responsibility of examining policies that have not ensured the security of the country.
The past, if read correctly, is a beacon of the future. 21 years ago, the Martyr Leader announced the 20-year vision document, which was compiled with the participation of the government and the Diagnosing Assembly, to determine the direction of Iran's movement in the horizon of 1404. The country's policies, programs, and decisions were supposed to be adjusted within its framework, and every government, regardless of its political orientation, should follow the same path, but it did not happen. Why did we deviate from the path that was drawn for the future of Iran? Which decisions, which calculation errors and which political considerations took us away from that vision?
The root of today's problems should be found in the accumulation of strategic errors. Two major strategic weaknesses diverted the system from the right path: ignoring the warnings of sympathizers and the dominance of political considerations over meritocracy. When criticism of decisions is considered a sign of opposition or weakness instead of an opportunity for correction, the decision-making system gradually loses the ability to recognize and correct its errors. In such an environment, seeking approval takes the place of expert criticism and flattery becomes a factor to stabilize wrong decisions and continue costly policies. Also, we could not establish a stable link between the ideals of the revolution and the requirements of efficient governance. As a result, we sometimes substituted intention and slogans for measuring results and asked less whether our policies have really led to the strengthening of security, independence and national interests or not.
In foreign policy, we emphasized on fairness rather than weighing the long-term consequences of decisions. However, in international relations, the legitimacy of a position alone does not prevent the formation of opposition coalitions or the increase of security threats. The art of diplomacy is to protect the country's rights, reduce the costs of conflict and prevent the conflict from turning into a crisis. When diplomacy became a prestige issue and the negotiator faced accusations and mistrust instead of full support, the possibility of avoiding confrontation was reduced.
If we look at the experience of the Saad Abad Declaration in the 1980s and the JCPOA in the 1990s, we find that mistrust of diplomacy, pessimism about negotiation, and unrealistic calculations about the consequences of confrontation have prevented diplomatic opportunities from becoming a sustainable mechanism to reduce tension and secure national interests. Negotiation curbs disputes when it is serious, purposeful and based on a realistic assessment of the interests and limitations of the parties. The inconsistency between diplomatic messages and practical actions, ambiguity in commitments and turning the negotiation into a domestic prestige issue reduces the chances of a lasting agreement and paves the way for choosing more costly options.
But what should be done? Naturally, the first principle should be the preservation of Iran, people's lives, territorial integrity and the possibility of continuing the normal life of the society, the ultimate criterion for evaluating policies. No sub-goal and no dignity consideration should take precedence over these priorities without evaluating the cost and benefits. Preservation of the country and preservation of the system, although they are linked to each other in many fields, should not be defined in such a way that every decision remains immune from criticism and revision. Preserving Iran and preventing the collapse of its vital capacities is a responsibility that goes beyond political rivalries and factional conflicts.
In nuclear policy, one should realistically look for a way to preserve Iran's legitimate rights to peaceful use of nuclear energy and at the same time, reduce the risk of conflict and achieve mutual guarantees. Insisting on maintaining all the status quo, without weighing the costs, is not necessarily a sign of strength. On the other hand, giving points is also rational when a clear and measurable achievement is obtained against it. The agreement should be balanced, verifiable and based on mutual obligations.
In the issue of Hormuz Strait, a strategic review is also necessary. The security of this waterway is important for Iran and the global economy, and any policy regarding it must be adopted with careful calculation of regional and international consequences. Using Iran's geographical position to strengthen its bargaining power is not the same as turning it into a factor for escalating tension and increasing economic and military risks. A strategy that is supposed to increase the country's power should ultimately lead to greater security and lower costs, rather than providing the basis for the formation of new threats.
At the internal level, the decision-making mechanism must be modified. The reminders of the sympathizers of the country about the economic, security and diplomatic consequences of important policies should be examined before making a decision, and opposing assessments should be possible without worrying about political confrontations, and accepting mistakes should become a part of the culture of accountability of officials.
Restoring public trust is an essential condition for overcoming the crisis. People should know the basis on which important decisions are made, what are the costs and consequences, and what is the plan to curb economic pressures, prevent the spread of poverty and maintain public services. Transparency according to security needs, accountability of officials and recognition of expert criticism are among the requirements of correcting the path. Admitting mistakes, honestly explaining limitations, and correcting costly decisions help rebuild trust. Revisiting the past should not be limited to political settlement or finding the culprits. The goal should be to identify the mechanisms that rendered warnings ineffective, perpetuated wrong decisions, and limited opportunities for correction.