Two scenarios for the war in Yemen

What comes next is either the retreat of the Houthis or a war of attrition.

Iran-backed Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia have brought the war in Yemen to a new level. The targeting of civilian infrastructure, including airports, which has killed at least a dozen people and injured hundreds, has left no room for maintaining the "red line" that previously defined the limits of escalation.

This is a reckless gamble by the Houthis that does not benefit them. They know the retaliation will be severe, but they continue to attack Saudi Arabia to fulfill Iran's agenda of escalating tensions before the US midterm elections.

Depending on the motivation for escalation, the current situation has the possibility of turning into two scenarios: a major regional operation against the Houthis or a war of attrition.

First scenario: United Front against the Houthis

In response to the Houthi escalation, Saudi Arabia is trying to garner maximum international support while deepening its regional and international alliances. The goal is to create a united front that can counter what has become a regional threat.

Riyadh is certainly looking out for its Persian Gulf neighbors, who are themselves affected by the continued conflict in the region. There is a collective understanding that everyone is at serious risk, not just Saudi Arabia.

Therefore, the Persian Gulf countries - perhaps with the exception of Oman - will directly and indirectly support Riyadh in the war in Yemen.

Pakistan and Türkiye are also likely to join the front by signing a defense agreement with Saudi Arabia called the Mecca Treaty. This agreement is supposed to be approved by the Turkish Parliament in the next few days and will pave the way for Türkiye's military deployment in support of Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, indirect involvement by Turkey and Pakistan, along with logistical and intelligence support, appears to be underway.

US intervention is also possible, although unlikely until before the US midterm elections, as military conflict in the Middle East is unpopular with US voters.

A regional coalition could help support a counteroffensive by forces loyal to the internationally recognized government of Yemen. This could create the necessary pressure to reclaim the western coastal region, including areas beyond Bab al-Mandab and Dhubab.

Such gains could reduce pressure on Red Sea shipping and potentially shift the military balance in the government's favor. Opening additional fronts in other Yemeni cities and provinces could expand Houthi forces, disperse their resources, and increase the likelihood of further government advances.

The recapture of Sana'a could also be on the horizon. The main obstacle delaying the Yemeni government's recapture of the city is the internal divisions between different factions within the government itself, combined with negative foreign interference that exacerbates these divisions and weakens the collective effort to confront the Houthis.

The government's recent actions, especially the efforts to unify decision-making and stabilize the command of military operations, have brought significant improvements on the ground. However, achieving the ultimate goal of recapturing Sana'a requires sustained effort and focused determination.

If government forces make significant gains, it could force the Houthis to make concessions in exchange for an end to the conflict. They have already done this. Their goal is not to seek peace, but to have enough breathing space to reorganize and eventually return to war. Negotiators should keep this in mind when approaching negotiations with the Houthis.

Progress against the Houthis may slow if the Saudi-led coalition and the Yemeni government succumb to internal differences and disputes. This would allow Houthi fighters to maintain their positions while increasing pressure on the strategic city of Taiz and continuing operations against civilian targets in Saudi Arabia.

Such a development could complicate the conflict, increase civilian casualties and displacement, and prolong the war without a decisive military outcome.

This will have a significant economic impact on Saudi Arabia and complicate the implementation of its development goals, as it must prioritize defense spending.

The rest of the Gulf economies will also be negatively affected, as Saudi Arabia plays a pivotal role in the region. In addition, the loss of land to the Houthis will mean that it will continue to expand in the Strait of Hormuz and will disrupt the export of energy from this region.

In this scenario, there will be no "no winner, no loser" stalemate in Yemen, but Iran will emerge as the winner. A war of attrition along the coast of the Red Sea would provide Tehran with significant breathing room and allow Tehran to reduce pressure on its war effort.

This enables Iran to use the Houthi card as leverage in its ongoing negotiations with the international community and emboldens the country to raise its terms and demands during these negotiations.

This means that the only solution to the Yemeni crisis is a decisive military action led by the Yemeni government and supported by a regional coalition. For this to happen, the government must organize its internal affairs and its relations with its allies.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Al Jazeera.