Foreign Affairs Analysis: Lessons of the Iran War for America / Why didn't the air attacks on Tehran work?
The Iran war has severely damaged the international credibility of the American air power. Had the Trump administration known that seven months later it would still be engaged in an attrition and inconclusive war—a war that has wasted a huge portion of Washington's sophisticated munitions stockpile and brought staggering economic and geopolitical costs—it would be unlikely to launch Operation Epic Rage.
Faren Afrez wrote: The war with Iran has severely damaged the international credibility of the US air power. Had the Trump administration known that seven months later it would still be engaged in an attrition and inconclusive war—a war that has wasted a huge portion of Washington's sophisticated munitions stockpile and brought staggering economic and geopolitical costs—it would be unlikely to launch Operation Epic Rage.
According to "Select" report; This article continues: Along with Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine, where neither side has been able to gain air superiority, there is a serious risk that politicians and public opinion will lose confidence in advanced air capabilities as the main pillar of American and Western military superiority.
The first lesson of the war with Iran in 2026—as with numerous other wars, including Vietnam, post-2003 Iraq, and post-2006 Afghanistan—is that conventional military superiority, even when achieved with massive air power, is insufficient to achieve unrealistic political goals.
But the second lesson is that this failure is not caused by the weakness of American air capabilities. On the contrary, air power remains the most effective part of the United States' conventional forces and the country's most important source of deterrence and superiority in war against conventional military aggression by hostile states.
If the US goal of Operation Epic Rage was to defeat an Iranian invasion of a neighboring country, the air campaign almost certainly could have achieved that goal within weeks.
This hypothetical scenario is very important; Because it is related to the most important and unavoidable threats that America may have to face in the next few years.
In the event of Russia's invasion of one of the NATO member countries in Eastern Europe, or China's attempt to occupy Taiwan, the enemy will be forced to deploy large conventional ground forces to capture and then maintain the territory.
In both cases, the advanced airpower capabilities of the US and its allies will be absolutely necessary to quickly defeat these forces.
As it happened during Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, if NATO or American forces can quickly gain air superiority over the invaded territory and exploit it, they can make it impossible for Russia or China to continue military operations.
Therefore, to prevent much larger and more costly wars between Western powers and China or Russia, it is essential that both rivals are convinced that NATO forces in Europe and American-led forces in the Pacific Ocean can quickly establish air superiority and take advantage of it in the event of an attack by either of them.
In order to achieve this goal, the United States must choose investments and decisions related to the structure of its military forces correctly.
The immediate priorities, in particular, are:
* Replenishment and improvement of American air-launched ammunition reserves
* Rapid increase in the production of missile interceptors to defend air bases and naval operational units
* Accelerating the development of the next generation of fighter planes, bombers and supporting and enabling planes
Although establishing air superiority over an area where Russian or Chinese forces are resisting will be much more difficult than achieving air superiority over Iran, this mission is necessary for the United States and its allies; If they want to maintain conventional deterrence and avoid a major conflict between the great powers.
Air power cannot win all wars. But if it can be reliably achieved, it almost guarantees deterrence by denying the adversary the ability to achieve his goals against states that are thinking of seizing other people's territory.