The "degradation of the status" of the country's owners sparks bloody civil wars/ the fall of power and anger of the elites/ "sons of the soil" take up arms against demographic changes

Finally, based on the theories of cognitive psychology (including "loss aversion" by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky), humans react to the loss of what they consider to be their right, and show a more intense and radical reaction than trying to gain new gains. Thus, the most dangerous groups in the contemporary world are not poorer or marginalized groups, but groups that once dominated or considered themselves the main owners of the country.

Andisheh group: Vahid Islamzadeh book of Barbara F. Walter translated "How the Civil War Begins" and read the first and second chapters of the first chapter, the second chapter of the first chapter and the second chapter. Now the third chapter of this book is coming to your attention. Iran's sensitive situation requires Iranians to increase their knowledge about the scourge of internal disputes. At the core of Walter's book, the narrative of how civil wars begin and end is the story of the complex connection between identity, material power, and the collapse of power structures. The present text of the third chapter of the book "How Civil Wars Begin: And How to Prevent Them", examines the phenomenon of "downgrading" or the fall of the political and social status of ethnic and religious groups as the main driver and cause of civil wars. This part of the book, by presenting numerous historical and climatic examples, deals with the psycho-political analysis of the motives of groups that initiate civil wars. Contrary to popular belief that civil unrest is only a product of poverty, economic inequality, or serious ethnic differences, extensive research over the last three decades shows that the most powerful predictor of violence is the trajectory of a group's political status. When an ethnic or religious group that once considered itself the heir or the main ruler of a country, feels the fall, political rejection and loss of its traditional privileges, the possibility of turning to armed struggle increases greatly; A phenomenon that political scientists call "downgrading" or reversal of status.

The author begins his narrative with the story of Dato Udeto Matalam in the Mindanao region of the Philippines. Matalam was a respected Muslim leader who worked as a bridge between the Muslim minority and the central government for many years. But with the government's policies in encouraging the mass immigration of Catholics from the north, changing the ownership of land in favor of immigrants, and finally, Ferdinand Marcos came to power and removed the Muslim elite, the "Moro" Muslim community felt that it was losing its land and identity. After a personal and political insult to Matalam, he founded the Muslim Independence Movement; The spark that led to the formation of more radical groups such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the declaration of martial law by Marcos, and one of the longest and deadliest civil wars with over 100,000 deaths.

The book then deals with the concept of "Sons of the Soil"; Indigenous or historical groups who consider themselves the original owners of the land and consider demographic changes (combination of immigration and birth rate) as an existential threat to their language, culture and political dominance. Prominent examples of this phenomenon include: Abkhazia in Georgia: the indigenous minority started an armed uprising against cultural threats and the cancellation of ethnic privileges by the Georgian majority. West Papua in Indonesia: where the natives waged a guerilla war against the influx of immigrants from other islands. Assam in India: where the influx of millions of Bengali (mostly Muslim) immigrants from Bangladesh caused the natives of Assam to deeply fear becoming a linguistic and political minority. This sense of threat led to the formation of radical groups, the boycott of elections, and finally the "Nellie Massacre" disaster in 1983, during which about 4,000 Bengali immigrants were killed. Finally, referring to cognitive psychology theories (including "loss aversion" by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky), the author explains that humans react to the loss of what they consider to be their right and property, much more intense and radical than trying to gain new gains. Thus, the most dangerous groups in the contemporary world are not the poorer or marginalized groups, but the groups that once dominated or considered themselves the main owners of the country and now face the process of decline and degradation. Read this article below:

Dark consequences of losing position

Dato Udeto Matalam was loved by everyone in central Mindanao—a region in the southern Philippines with a mix of Muslim and Catholic residents. For Muslims, he was a World War II hero who fought against the Japanese; Religious and wise leadership, and fair arbitration in disputes between local people. For Catholics who had immigrated to the area from the north, he was known for his commitment to unity and peace between the two groups. No one expected him to help start one of the world's longest civil wars.

Matalam was born at the beginning of the 20th century in a small coastal town about two days by canoe from Cotabato City, the provincial capital on the coastline. As the son of the sultan of the region, according to the tradition of hereditary leadership in the Muslim community, Matalam reached the position of "datu" (tribal chief). At the time, the Philippines was still a colony of the United States, and Matalam, like others in his position, served both as a traditional leader for the local people and as a representative of the national government based in Manila. In 1914, he rose to the position of Assistant District Superintendent, overseeing Muslim activities in the agricultural community, and then became Inspector of Schools to ensure that Muslim children were enrolled in colonial schools. Matalam was part of the first generation of datus who accepted colonialism; In fact, he built his career path and status not by fighting against the colonial administrators, but by collaborating with them.

Matalam was appointed governor of Cotabato after serving in World War II; The third largest administrative district in lush tropical Mindanao. But while he established himself as a powerful and efficient manager and did not shake the province's financial situation, the world was changing around him. In the past, foreigners did not interfere much in the affairs of the Moro people (the name of the natives of this region); Because the population of the region was small and the natives were known as tough and well-equipped warriors and did not surrender easily. In 1946, the Philippines became independent and Catholics increasingly migrated from the densely populated north to Mindanao. This process was encouraged by the central government because it wanted to develop the rich lands of Mindanao for the economic benefit of the entire nation. The government transferred legal ownership of the best agricultural land to Catholic settlers and gave them crop loans and other assistance not available to local residents. Many Muslims were forcibly evicted from the lands they had inhabited for generations. The number of Catholics who immigrated to Mindanao to take advantage of these benefits was so great that by 1960, in most parts of the region, Catholics significantly outnumbered native Muslims. Matalam went along with this trend and gained political and financial benefits from Manila's support. Meanwhile, a new generation of Datos emerged. Unlike Matalam and his contemporaries, these emerging leaders were born in the post-colonial era. They were university educated (usually in Manila) and most were professionals in the fields of law or education. Also, their spouses were more likely to be Catholic rather than Muslim. Their bond with Mindanao and its culture was not very strong.

Then in 1965, Ferdinand Marcos ran for the presidency. After winning a tense election in 1965, Marcos, a Catholic, began replacing officials who opposed him with those who were loyal to him. Matalam went from being a respected leader at the provincial level—a man at the center of power and influence who had a deep knowledge of the Muslim people and their culture—to a man with no power.

The decline of Matalam's political status became painfully apparent when, in the summer of 1967, an off-duty Justice Department agent shot Matalam's eldest son. It was a terrible blow, and it was made worse when his colleagues did not even come to him to express their sympathy and condolences. In a society where family and community ties meant all of life, Matalam found this to be a deep insult. In response to this incident, a few months later, on May 1, 1968, he founded the Muslim Independence Movement. He issued a statement calling on all the Muslim areas in the southern Philippines to secede and establish their own "Republic of Mindanao and Sulu".

The Moro people had a long history of demanding independence; In 1935, several decades after the United States claimed the Philippines, more than a hundred leading Datu's and local Muslim leaders sent a written declaration to Washington, insisting on final separation from the country. They feared losing their religion and culture among the much more Catholic population and wanted to be free to worship and live as they pleased. They wrote in that letter: "If our religion no longer exists, our lives will no longer exist." However, Matalam's statement triggered a spiral of fear-mongering reactions. All over the Philippines, the press ran headlines like "War on Cotabato is shaping up." Marcos sent troops to the region and some Catholic families, anticipating a Muslim uprising, decided to sell their properties and leave Mindanao.

Matalam withdrew from the Muslim independence movement relatively early and instead returned to his farm and retired. But the establishment of this movement had unintended effects, greatly inciting both Muslim and Catholic groups, and setting in motion a dangerous dynamic that led the country to war. By early 1969, the Muslim Independence Movement was training Muslim insurgents (probably financed by the Malaysian government), and by March 1970, sectarian violence had broken out. Catholic gangs began attacking Muslim farmers and setting fire to their homes, prompting the Muslims to retaliate. From that point on, the situation worsened; Muslims accused the government of encouraging Christian violence and formed their own armed groups. This was the classic "double security"; A situation in which people, fearing violence, arm themselves to defend themselves, but in the process, convince their enemy that they also want war.

But what really led to a full-scale conflict was Marcos' decision to declare martial law in September 1972. The president portrayed the order as necessary to prevent further violence between Catholics and Muslims, but in reality he was taking advantage of the unrest in the south to consolidate his power. Marcos ordered that all Filipinos must surrender any weapons within one month; including swords and knives that were culturally important for Muslim men. Anyone who tried to resist would be "destroyed".

The beginning of conflicts and the emergence of insurgencies in Mindanao

Just a few days before the end of the deadline for handing in weapons, hundreds of armed Muslims attacked the city of Marawi, in North Cotabato. About 500 to 1,000 Muslim rebels simultaneously attacked the Mindanao State University, the provincial headquarters of the Philippine National Police, and the Pantar Bridge—which connected Mindanao to the neighboring province. This was the first time the rebels fought under the name Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF); A more extreme militant group that broke away from the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM). The rebels failed to spark a popular uprising, but fled to the southern parts of the island where, after reorganizing, they continued to fight, but this time using guerrilla tactics. The group first attacked government forces and then expanded its targets to include civilians as well as Catholic bishops and foreigners, whom it kidnapped for ransom.

Over the years, the group spawned several offshoots (with new groups emerging from it) that often clashed with an even more hard-line and radical group of Islamists, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Almost every president since Marcos has tried to end what has become one of the world's longest civil wars, offering varying degrees of autonomy to the region. But in most cases, the government did not live up to its promises, and various Moro groups continued to fight; Which led to the death of more than a hundred thousand people.

The concept of "relegation" and the sociological roots of the civil war

What explains the Muslim insurgency in Mindanao? Part of the answer lies in the fact that it was turning the Philippines into an "anocracy." When Marcos came to power in 1965, he inherited a political system that was almost democratic (with a political score of +5). Within four years, he had degraded the system to the point where it was completely in the anorexic (+2) zone, reaching the "collision point" or the brink of civil war. He did this by weakening individual and minority rights, expanding government power, reducing the rule of law, limiting the independence of the judiciary, and removing numerous checks on presidential power. In addition, the Philippines was severely "grouped and divided." Since the end of World War II, politics in the country has been dominated by local political dynasties (Catholics in the north and Muslims in the south) who compete with each other for support and concessions from the Manila government.

However, many disaffected ethnic groups live in fragmented anocracies, but most do not rebel. For example, Ethiopia has more than eighty different ethnic groups that believe in at least five main religions; But only a few of them have ever organized to confront the government. Indonesia is also one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world, with more than 360 tribal and ethno-linguistic groups, but only four—the Ambons, East Timorese, Acehnese, and Papuans—have ever taken up arms. So what is the special feature in some groups that makes them so determined to fight?

Over the past three decades, researchers have focused on finding answers by drawing on several massive datasets spanning nearly a century of civil wars. One of their first findings—perhaps unsurprisingly—was that groups that turn to violence generally feel left out of the political process. They have limited voting rights and almost no access to government posts; In fact, they tend to be excluded from political power. But the researchers found that the most powerful determinant of violence was a group's "trajectory change in political status." It is much more likely to fight over people who once held power and now see that power slipping away. Political scientists call this phenomenon "downgrading," and although the concept takes many forms, it is a reliable way to predict who will start violence in countries prone to civil war.

The Moro people in Mindanao gradually lost their power during the colonial period and then after the integration into the Philippines. They were once the rulers of their region; Their datus, sultans, and rajas made and enforced laws, determined how land was allocated, and decided which cultural customs were to be honored. Only after the Philippine government began encouraging the much larger Catholic population to immigrate to Mindanao—thus driving the native Muslims out of their homeland—did the violence begin. Matalam and many of his Muslim co-religionists were being "downgraded" and the evidence of this decline in prestige was all around them in the form of loss of land ownership, job opportunities and political power. They were losing their livelihood and culture to those they considered to be "trespassers" on their land.

Many modern civil conflicts follow this pattern. A study of Eastern European countries for much of the 20th century by Roger Patterson, a political scientist at MIT, found that the loss of political and cultural status fueled war in the region. Duke University political scientist Donald Horowitz, who has studied hundreds of ethnic groups in turbulent societies, came to the same conclusion. The ethnic groups that start the war are the ones who claim that the country "belongs to them or should belong to them". The concept of "demotion" explains why it was the Serbs—and not the Croats or Bosniaks—who started the civil war in Yugoslavia. Just like the Moro people in Mindanao, the Serbs saw themselves as the rightful heirs of their country. They used to rule themselves. When Yugoslavia was founded, they were the largest ethnic group and held most of the high-ranking positions in the Yugoslav military and administrative body. The Serbs started violence in Croatia and then Bosnia, knowing that they would lose considerable power if both regions were allowed to secede. The Sunnis also started a war in Iraq because they too had lost their power after the American invasion. The Moros, the Serbs, the Sunnis—all were "degraded" and turned to violence.

Psychological dimensions of "status degradation" and loss aversion of humans

"Degradation" is as much a political or demographic fact as it is a psychological one. Degraded groups can be rich or poor, Christian or Muslim, white or black. What is important is that the members of that group feel that they have lost the place they believe belongs to them, and as a result, they become bitter and resentful. Case after case we see that it is hatred and anger that drives a group to war. Fearon and Laitin, researchers at Stanford University, found that when the Sri Lankan Sinhalese tried to make Sinhala the official language of the government, this action "immediately caused a backlash among the Tommys; Because they felt that their language, culture and economic status were attacked." There is almost always some sense of injustice; The belief that anyone in power does not deserve this position and has no right to that lofty position. Demotion is actually a situation of "reversal of status", and not just a political failure. Dominant groups go from a situation in which, until a few moments ago, they decided what language to speak, what laws to enforce and what culture to honor, to a situation where they no longer have such power.

Humans hate to lose. Humans accept "no excuses" for losing money, races, jobs, respect, partners, etc. Psychologists such as "Daniel Kahneman" and "Amos Tversky" proved this issue in a series of experiments; They asked participants whether they would be willing to take a risk where the chance of winning $100 was equal to the chance of losing $100 (50% for each). They found that most people would not take that risk. What is the reason? Humans are "pests". Their motivation to try to recover lost assets is much higher than their motivation to make new profits. People may endure years of poverty, unemployment and discrimination; They may accept dilapidated schools, dilapidated hospitals and abandoned infrastructure, but there is one thing they will never tolerate: losing a place where they believe they belong. In the 21st century, the most dangerous groups are those that were once dominant and are now in decline.

Abkhazia and the "children of the soil" phenomenon

The people of Abkhazia in Georgia can trace their historical background in this region to the 6th century BC. They consider themselves natives of the Caucasus and have no homeland outside of Georgia. Their small piece of land in this area, located just south of Sochi, is stunningly beautiful; The mountains that rise from the emerald green waters of the Black Sea. Abkhazians have experienced periods of autonomy, but each period has been followed by longer periods of conquest and occupation. Their rulers have included the Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, neighboring Georgia, the Ottomans, and the Soviet Union. Despite these occupations, the Abkhazians have preserved their distinct culture; This is made possible in part by an unwritten code of ethnic beliefs called Apesvara (meaning "Abkhazianness") that is passed down from generation to generation.

The 20th century was about to mark the end of that culture. The first threat began when Joseph Stalin tried to completely erase the ethnic sovereignty of the Abkhazians by executing their elites, imposing elements of the Georgian script on their native language, and emigrating tens of thousands of Georgians to Abkhazia. In the late 1980s, a second threat became apparent as the Soviet Union began to disintegrate and Georgians pushed for independence. The Abkhazians, like the Moro people in the Philippines, feared that the Georgians would take away the "protected minority status" they had obtained after Stalin's death.

When that fear came true, they took up arms. In July 1992, a little over a year after Georgia became independent, the people of Abkhazia rebelled by declaring their independence in response to attacks on their culture and language. This action sparked clashes in which Abkhazian fighters, with Russian military support, attempted to "cleanse" the region of the ethnic Georgian presence. Thousands of Georgians and Abkhazians were killed and many more injured or driven from their homes. By the end of these conflicts, the Abkhazians, who once made up only 19% of the local population, now accounted for half of the region's population. The control of the region fell into their hands once again.

Groups like the Abkhazians are what experts call "sons of the soil"; Many "degraded" ethnic groups that turn to war fit into this pattern. They are indigenous to a region or have played a pivotal role in its history. These groups consider themselves the rightful heirs of their place of birth and believe that they deserve special benefits and privileges. They have been dominant either because of the majority of the population or because they were the first to settle in that land or conquer it. They consider themselves the "indigenous" people, and anyone else who has settled there, or whose mother tongue is not the main language of the area, is considered a "foreigner". In a study of civil wars from 1800 until now, it was found that the ethnic groups that fall under the category of "sons of the soil" rebelled at a rate of 60%; That is, almost twice the rate of groups that were not in this category (28%). These groups are dangerous because they are usually more capable of organizing a resistance movement, and their sense of oppression and resentment can be very intense and crushing. Both of these factors (the ability to organize and the intensity of resentment) are major drivers of who sparks civil wars.

The children of soil during their dominance, due to the pervasiveness of their privileges, do not easily notice these privileges; Because this situation seems completely natural to them. Their elders are the leaders of the country or region and make political decisions for the entire population. Their language is the "official"—and often the only—language of the state. It is their cultural customs and symbols that are passed, their holidays that are recognized, and their religious schools that receive special privileges. But when a new group enters the area in large numbers, the ground slips under their feet and the situation changes. Aliens bring their own cultures and languages ​​with them, and over time, can completely overwhelm the local population. For example, the Papuans had lived their entire lives in the rich forests of Western New Guinea and were completely self-sufficient politically and economically. All this changed when they were forced to join Indonesia and immigrants from Java, Sulawesi and Bali began to enter the region. In 1965, the indigenous Papuans formed the "Free Papua Movement" with the goal of achieving independence. In 1977, this group proclaimed the "Republic of West Papua" and drafted a constitution. And in 1977, the group began a low-intensity guerrilla war that first targeted the region's main copper mine (which was owned by foreigners) and then expanded to attack the Indonesian military and police, as well as non-natives living in West Papua. Since the beginning of this war, it is estimated that around 100,000 Papuans have been killed.

language, education and tools of power; Aggravating factors

Native speakers of a country's official language have a huge economic advantage over citizens whose language is not accepted by the government. Francisco Franco, the dictator of Spain between 1939 and 1975, knew this very well. One of Franco's methods of consolidating power was to elevate the status of the "Castilian" language over other languages ​​and declare it the only official language of Spain. He then banned citizens from speaking Basque, Catalan, Galician or any other language in public. Babies were not allowed to take regional (local) names, and dialects were no longer allowed to be taught in schools or used in commercial transactions.

It was found that language has a very strong link with the identity of a nation and determines which group's culture will eventually dominate. One of the main fears of the ethnic Russians in the "Donbass" region of Ukraine was that the new nationalist government would make the Ukrainian language the only official language of the government and replace the Russian language. When you are not fluent in the official language, it will be very difficult to compete for high-paying jobs. Controlling access to education, especially higher education, is another way to favor one ethnic group over another. The same issue is true for access to national service (administrative) jobs; Jobs that are some of the most stable and profitable positions in a country. When people face the loss of such privileges, they can feel deeply oppressed and find the necessary motivation to resist.

Identity crisis and migration in Assam, India

In democratic systems, "sons of the soil" groups are often degraded through simple demographic factors; That is, a combination of immigration and differences in the birth rate. In the end, democratic elections are nothing but "counting heads"; And as "Donald Horowitz" has observed: "The numbers show who this country belongs to."

In Assam, a mountainous region in northeastern India known for its tea plantations, Assamese locals (who were mostly Hindu) saw ethnic Bengalis (who were mostly Muslim) immigrate to their region from neighboring Bangladesh beginning in 1901, and their numbers steadily increased over the course of the century. The first immigrants were brought by the British colonial government; Because Britain wanted to settle virgin and sparsely populated lands. Britain encouraged two groups of Bengalis to immigrate: low-skilled farmers who were mostly Muslims, and educated Hindu Bengalis who could help Britain run the government as civil servants. But the migration continued even after the independence of India in 1947 and caused the increasing dissatisfaction and concern of the people of Assam. Between 1971 and 1981, the region received 1.2 million immigrants, the highest rate of immigrant arrivals relative to population of any region in India.

Resistance, Nelly's massacre and the igniting of the fire of violence

The native people of Assam were getting more worried every moment. Their first concern was cultural. As the number of immigrants from Bangladesh increased, Bengali became increasingly the language of choice—whether at home, in business, or in government—and Bengali culture became a more prominent part of everyday life. The people of Assam did not want to become a "linguistic minority" in their motherland. The second concern was political. When the British left the region, the people of Assam took control of the regional government, knowing that they could only retain power if the majority of the population remained. The influx of immigrants threatened to make them a minority and end their dominance over the state. The third concern was economic. Assam's population was much smaller than that of neighboring Bangladesh, and much of its land was vacant and ready for new immigrants to settle. Migrant farmers quickly began to cultivate and take over these lands, while the more educated Hindu Bengalis obtained lucrative and desirable jobs in the bureaucracy. Over time, these immigrants enjoyed a higher standard of living than the natives of Assam.

The response of the people of Assam was in the form of organizing and creating an ethnic faction that tried to push the Bengalis and Muslims out of what they considered their "rightful space". In 1960, the political leaders of Assam made Assamese the official language of the state to make it more difficult for Bengali speakers to compete for government jobs. They also made it the language of instruction in government schools, thus putting another hurdle in the way of Bengalis. Finally, special privileges were given to the natives of Assam in the administrative recruitment of the government. But immigrants continued to arrive. And when the Assam Election Commissioner, ahead of the 1979 parliamentary elections, reported an unexpected increase in the number of new names on the electoral rolls (most of them Bengali), the natives of Assam suddenly saw their worst fears come true: by allowing these immigrants to enter the country and vote, the central government in Delhi—more than a thousand miles away—seemed to be encouraging a transformation (and a makeover). It was Assam.

For the first time in the history of this region, the proportion of Bengali population was increasing and the proportion of Assamese population was decreasing. Bengalis had long been the majority in the big cities of the region, and Bengali had become the dominant language there. In the words of "Myron Weiner", the late MIT professor and specialist in anti-immigration movements: "For the people of Assam, the cities of Assam had become centers of alien life and culture." But now this change was also evident in rural areas and did not leave any place untouched.