Assuming that negotiation means trust is a mistaken view; the experience of the JCPOA should have taught us not to close the path to negotiation

The risk of renewed conflict must be taken seriously. But there is a difference between "taking the risk seriously" and "treating war as certain."

The risk of renewed conflict should be taken seriously. But there is a difference between "taking the risk seriously" and "determining war".

According to Arjan's ambassador, Hamzeh Safavi told Khorasan newspaper: "If we assume from now on that war is inevitable, we have actually ruined part of the deterrence work ourselves." In the discussion of deterrence, two things are of fundamental importance. One is that the enemy knows that attacking us has a heavy cost. The other is that he is not sure of the success of his operation. We tend to emphasize the former and downplay the latter. While effective defense, dispersion of equipment, camouflage, protection of vital centers and the ability to rapidly regenerate, are exactly the things that upset the calculations of the other side.

He continued: When the enemy is not sure that he will achieve his goals with the attack, it is possible that he will basically give up on his decision. This doubt is a deterrent. With this account, Iran's response should be decisive, but decisive is different from maximum. If we think that the stronger we hit, the stronger the deterrence will be, we are wrong. We have seen many times that an operation was successful at the tactical level, but at the strategic level, it widened the war, increased the economic pressure, or made new enemies. The criterion should be placed elsewhere. The question is not how much damage we did. The question is whether the probability of the next attack decreased or not. If an action has a military achievement in the short term, but makes the country's security more fragile in the long term, it cannot be called a strategic success.

Safavi stated: Some people think that talking about diplomacy means trusting America. It is not so. It is possible to be pessimistic about the history of American commitments and be prepared for the worst scenario and not close the way of negotiation and mediation. These do not contradict each other. The experience of America withdrawing from JCPOA in 2018 showed why pessimism is necessary. But the same experience showed why the door of negotiation should not be completely closed. Incidentally, when there is no trust, the verification mechanism and communication channel become more important. We must maintain defense capability, raise the cost of aggression, prevent war from spiraling out of control, keep diplomacy active, and strengthen domestic resilience. The goal is not a military success or a symbolic achievement.

The goal is to make the next attack less likely. In addition, the cost of inaction should be taken as seriously as the cost of escalation. If we only manage against frequent attacks and don't respond appropriately, the enemy will conclude that the cost of the attack is low. So inaction has a cost. But the answer should be calculated, not emotional. Therefore, I believe that Iran should maintain the power of decisive and cost-effective response, but use it in an intelligent, phased manner and act according to the type of threat.

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