Tigray War in Ethiopia: Where Do the UAE and Saudi Arabia Stand?

The Tigray conflict, UAE support for Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia's diplomatic role are under scrutiny.

ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia – As renewed fighting in Ethiopia's Tigray region threatens to destabilize the Horn of Africa, the United Arab Emirates' (UAE) public support for Ethiopia's federal government and Saudi Arabia's record in regional diplomacy are under scrutiny.

Both Gulf powers have strategic interests in the Horn of Africa, but their roles are different. The UAE has publicly supported the Ethiopian government, while Saudi Arabia has previously helped broker a rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea and has reportedly offered to mediate between the two countries in 2025.

Renewed fighting threatens Pretoria's November 2022 peace accord that ended fighting between Ethiopia's federal government and Tigrayan forces. As tensions with Eritrea increase the risks of a wider confrontation, the positions of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh are a window into the interests of foreign powers in the crisis.

United Arab Emirates: Clear alignment, unproven leverage

On September 25, the United Arab Emirates condemned the attacks by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and its allied armed groups against Ethiopian federal forces, the capture of Tigray airports and the escalation of tension in the neighboring Afar and Amhara regions.

Expressing solidarity with the government and people of Ethiopia, Sheikh Shakhbut bin Nahyan Al Nahyan, the minister of the government of the United Arab Emirates, emphasized the support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country and called for an end to hostilities, protection of civilians and adherence to this country. Pretoria Agreement

The statement clarified Abu Dhabi's public position: it supports the federal government of Ethiopia while calling for de-escalation and dialogue. It did not specify whether the UAE was providing military assistance or had secured commitments from the parties to end the war.

The UAE also has business interests throughout the Horn of Africa. Dubai Ports World (DP World) operates the port of Berbera in Somaliland, and a shipping lane due to be launched in 2025 will connect the port to Jebel Ali in the United Arab Emirates, providing an additional corridor for cargo serving inland destinations such as Ethiopia. Landlocked since Eritrea's independence in 1993, Ethiopia relies heavily on Djibouti for access to international trade.

These trade links help explain Abu Dhabi's interest in regional stability and its relationship with Addis Ababa. However, they do not prove that the UAE can influence the TPLF, persuade Eritrea to reduce or change Ethiopia's military calculations.

It is unclear to what extent Abu Dhabi can use its relationship with the federal government to encourage a political response to the conflict.

Saudi Arabia: diplomatic experience, uncertain engagement

Saudi Arabia has not yet announced its position on the latest clashes in Tigray.

According to an October 1 analysis by Critical Threats, the kingdom has not publicly commented on renewed fighting, although earlier this year it made diplomatic efforts to ease tensions between the Ethiopian federal government and the TPLF.

Saudi Arabia has already sought to mediate between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In November 2025, Chatham House reported that sources said Riyadh had offered to mediate between the two countries amid rising tensions over maritime access and regional security.

A June 2026 analysis by Germany's SWP think tank found that previous Saudi mediation efforts had failed, in part because the talks did not address Ethiopia's interests at the Eritrean port of Assab.

The wider regional alignment of the kingdom is also important. An August 2026 analysis by the Sofan Center described Saudi Arabia and Egypt as supporting Eritrea in opposition to Ethiopia's ambitions for access to the Red Sea.

This is an assessment of regional alignment, however, there is no evidence that Saudi Arabia is directly supporting Eritrea or the TPLF militarily in the current war.

Saudi Arabia has a vested interest in the security of the Red Sea, a vital corridor for international shipping and its oil exports. It is not yet clear whether Riyadh will play a more public diplomatic role as tensions escalate.

Egypt's rivalry with Ethiopia adds to regional tensions

Egypt's role in the crisis is shaped by its long-standing dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and its growing ties with Eritrea.

Cairo has also emphasized that the responsibility for the administration and security of the Red Sea rests with the neighboring countries of this waterway, a position shared by Asmara. This has added to regional tensions as Ethiopia seeks secure access to the sea.

In September, Ethiopian army chief Field Marshal Berhanu Jolla accused Egypt and Sudan of supporting armed groups fighting the federal government, including the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF).

His statement, reported by Al Jazeera on September 28, did not provide evidence to substantiate the charge. Nader Zaki, the spokesman of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, subsequently emphasized Cairo's commitment to the government's sovereignty and non-interference and rejected suggestions of deviating from these principles.

He did not directly address the specific claim of Egyptian support for the TPLF.

Egypt's relationship with Eritrea has nevertheless become an important part of the region's image. President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi met with Eritrean President Isayas Aforaki in Cairo on June 8, 2026.

According to the Egyptian presidency, these talks included bilateral cooperation, developments in the Horn of Africa and the security of the Red Sea.

The leaders of the two countries also emphasized the importance of coordination to maintain regional stability. The meeting emphasized closer cooperation between Cairo and Asmara, but it was not clear that either country was involved in renewed fighting in Tigray.

For Cairo, the conflict with Ethiopia extends beyond Tigray to the Nile and the balance of power in the Horn of Africa.

The country's relations with Eritrea and its differences with Addis Ababa are part of a wider regional context, but they are not evidence of Egypt's direct involvement in the renewed conflict. It is unclear whether these regional relations will affect the course of the war.

The dangers go beyond Tigray. Ethiopia's quest for maritime access has become a source of tension with Eritrea, whose Red Sea coastline includes the port of Assab. Addis Ababa argues that reliable access to the sea is a national priority, while Asmara denies any threat to its sovereignty.

Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of sending troops across the border and supporting armed groups. Eritrea has denied the accusations and has asked the UN Security Council to intervene. The charges remain disputed, but deteriorating relations have raised the risk of renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia.

A wider confrontation could put more civilians at risk, complicate humanitarian access, and disrupt trade and security in the region. It also tests whether foreign partners can encourage restraint without apparently endorsing each side's military goals.

The UAE's close relationship with Addis Ababa could provide a channel for diplomatic engagement, while Saudi Arabia's track record in regional diplomacy provides an opportunity to resume negotiations. However, the available public evidence does not prove that any country is currently leading an initiative to contain the crisis.

The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia should not be seen as pursuing opposing strategies simply because they publicly supported the Federal Government of Ethiopia while the other party's current position is less visible. Their interests and diplomatic approaches differ, but the evidence does not suggest that any of them had a decisive impact on the war.

Their contribution should be evaluated by whether they can help ensure concrete steps towards de-escalation, renewal of political dialogue and reduction of tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Public statements, business interests, and past diplomatic achievements may provide opportunities for engagement, but they are no substitute for progress on the ground.

The Pretoria accord remains a framework for a political settlement in Tigray, but renewed fighting underscores the difficulty of maintaining peace while underlying disputes persist. A viable settlement depends primarily on the parties themselves. External partners can help by encouraging restraint and supporting credible negotiations.

Currently, the UAE's public alignment with Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia's diplomatic record offer different potential channels for engagement. Whether any of the countries can transform these relations into a meaningful contribution to de-escalation remains unresolved.