Consequences of a Failed Negotiation / Will the US Attack Iran Before the Congressional Elections?

Has the failure of Iran-US negotiations paved the way for a large-scale military attack before the elections, or is Trump forced to decide within a severely limited framework?

Ambassador Arjan - Rasool Safar Ahang - Iran-US indirect talks in New York, which were held with the mediation of Qatar and Pakistan, ended without any concrete results. What distinguishes this failure from previous failures is not just the inconclusiveness of the negotiations, but the political climate prevailing in Washington on the eve of the November 3rd mid-term elections. In an interview, Donald Trump clearly stated that "after the mid-term elections, he may intensify the bombing of Iran" and at the same time, the Pentagon announced the deployment of the third fleet and ten thousand additional military forces to the region. These developments raise the fundamental question of whether the failure of the negotiations has paved the way for a massive military attack before the elections, or whether Trump will have to make a decision after November 3, within a strictly limited framework.

The failure of the New York negotiations and the logic behind it

The New York negotiations, which were held on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly, included two rounds of indirect dialogue. One on September 22 and the other on September 28. Through Qatar, Iran offered to reopen the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for the lifting of the naval blockade, the cessation of attacks on all fronts, and the release of blocked assets. But Trump called this proposal "inadequate" and rejected it.

What distinguishes this failure from other diplomatic failures is the tone and manner of its ending. According to US officials, Secretary of State Marco Rubio effectively "ordered the Iranian delegation to leave" after the negotiations stalled. A move that one observer described as "a highly unusual diplomatic rebuke that reveals the deep mistrust between the two countries." These details show that the failure of New York was not a typical diplomatic failure, but a "political failure" with deep psychological and strategic consequences.

From a level of analysis, the failure of negotiations should be understood in the framework of "confrontation of narratives". Iran saw the negotiations as an opportunity to "establish its management role in the Strait of Hormuz" and "obtain security guarantees"; Guarantees that included the non-attack of the US and the cessation of Israeli actions in Lebanon. America, however, considered the negotiations merely a tool for "curbing Iran's nuclear program" and "restoring freedom of navigation". This difference in the "final game" has a deep root in the structure of the conflict: for Iran, the Strait of Hormuz is a "strategic asset" that can be negotiated in exchange for the lifting of sanctions; For America, this strait is an "international route" whose "freedom is non-negotiable".

Analysts of Iran issues also believe that "Iran has lost its trust in Washington after the violation of the Islamabad Memorandum by the United States" and now "the doors of negotiations are closed, but communication channels through Qatar and Pakistan remain open". This evaluation shows that even if "negotiation" in the official sense of the word has ended, "communication" continues in an informal way; But this communication is no longer a "serious negotiation", but merely an "exchange of information".

Legal and political limitations of pre-election attacks

From the point of view of American constitutional rights, any large-scale military attack on Iran requires the authorization of Congress. According to the Constitution, only Congress can "declare war"; And the War Powers Act of 1973 authorizes the president to take military action without congressional approval only in situations of "an attack on US soil or an imminent threat."

However, the House of Representatives rejected a plan that would have "required the president to obtain congressional authorization to attack Iran." This vote, on the one hand, shows the relative support of Congress for Trump's war powers, and on the other hand, it reveals the political atmosphere in Washington regarding the Iran war. But the important point is that even in the absence of an explicit legal restriction, the "political cost" of a massive pre-election attack is very heavy.

On the other hand, the American economy is in a worrying situation on the eve of mid-term elections. The published data shows that in February 2026, the US labor market lost 92,000 jobs and the unemployment rate reached 4.4%. At the same time, the price of gasoline in the United States reached the highest level during Trump's presidency, and the inflation rate put additional pressure on American households.

Public opinion polls show that the overwhelming majority of Americans oppose the continuation of the war, and this opposition has become one of the key factors in Trump's decline in popularity. In such a situation, a massive attack before the elections can lead to a further jump in the price of oil and intensify the inflationary pressure; Which will most likely end up at the expense of the Republicans. In an interview on October 1, Trump himself said, referring to the election, that "he wants to attack Iran after the election"; A phrase that shows that he is aware of the electoral consequences of the attack.

"Postpone until after the election" strategy and its limitations

In the weeks leading up to the election, the White House has pursued a strategy of "tactical pacification": reducing the level of conflict, avoiding escalation, and postponing major military decisions until after November 3rd. Multiple reports suggest that Trump's top advisers — including JD Vance and Marco Rubio — are trying to prevent the Iran war from becoming a "major election issue."

However, this strategy faces a fundamental contradiction: on the one hand, the White House wants the war to remain "quiet"; On the other hand, "calm" means stopping the pressure on Iran, and stopping the pressure can lead to the strengthening of Iran's position in the Strait of Hormuz and the increase in oil prices. In other words, electoral "pacification" can lead to economic "crisis intensification"; The crisis itself has become one of the main factors of public dissatisfaction.

But a more important operational constraint is the state of US military stockpiles. Numerous reports show that the Iran war has severely depleted the US ammunition and equipment reserves. The report of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) shows that the cost of the war has reached 38 billion dollars by August 2026, and about 30 billion dollars will be added to it every month. It will take at least a few years to rebuild the stockpile of spent ammunition.

This means that the pre-election "tactical pause" is not merely a political choice, but an "operational necessity". The US military needs time to regain its ability to continue fighting in the coming months. In the absence of this "breather", any large-scale military escalation could lead to a faster depletion of reserves and a weakening of America's long-term deterrence.

Is an attack possible before the elections?

First scenario: limited and "controlled" attack

In this scenario, Trump may conduct "limited" and "symbolic" attacks on targets in Iran before the election to maintain his "deterrent power" but avoid an all-out war. These attacks can include attacks on military installations or missile sites, but with a "clear message" to Tehran that the goal is not "regime change" or "occupation".

The second scenario: postponement until after the elections

The most likely scenario is to postpone major military decisions until after November 3rd. In an interview on October 1, Trump himself raised this option and considered it "possible". In this scenario, the White House will focus on "crisis management" and "de-escalation" in the remaining weeks, and will decide after the election based on the outcome and composition of the new Congress.

The third scenario: Intensification before the elections (unlikely)

Considering the political and economic costs of a massive attack before the elections, this scenario seems to be the least likely option. Trump knows very well that the jump in oil prices and the escalation of inflation can lead to the defeat of the Republicans in the elections.

However, there are signs that the White House is preparing for a "controlled escalation" after the election. The dispatch of the third fleet and ten thousand additional troops to the region can be seen as "preparing the military infrastructure" for a wider operation. Also, Trump's comments about "increased bombing after the election" show that he has considered the escalation scenario in advance.

On the other hand, Iran is also preparing for different scenarios. The spokesman of the Iranian army has announced that the country has changed its military doctrine from "defensive" to "offensive" and "if necessary, it will carry out preemptive attacks". These statements show Iran's readiness for "reciprocal escalation" in case of an American attack.

Legal and strategic consequences of a possible attack

From the perspective of international law, any US military attack on Iran must be justified within the framework of "legitimate defense" (Article 51 of the United Nations Charter). Although America has claimed in the past that its attacks on Iran were a response to "imminent threats" or "Iranian attacks on American forces". However, it is difficult to prove the "imminence" of a threat in international forums.

Resolution 2817 of the Security Council, which was approved in March 2026, condemned Iran for "attacks on Persian Gulf countries" and "threats to close the Strait of Hormuz". However, this resolution did not authorize a military attack on Iran and simply called for a "stop to Iran's attacks". Therefore, any large-scale US attack on Iran will face a challenge of legitimacy from the point of view of international law.

But from a strategic point of view, attacking Iran before the elections can trap America in the "escalation trap". Using the "strait of Hormuz lever" and its "axis of resistance network", Iran can greatly increase the costs of the war for the United States and its allies. The simultaneous closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the threat of Bab al-Mandab by the Houthis can lead to a jump in oil prices to levels that the world economy cannot bear.

On the other hand, an attack on Iran can lead to the "strengthening of internal unity" in Iran. Experience has shown that foreign attacks often lead to "increasing national solidarity" and "strengthening the position of the leadership". By emphasizing "resistance" and "standing", Iran can unite public opinion against "foreign aggression"; Which leads to weakening the main goal of the attack (i.e. changing behavior or weakening the regime).

All in all, the failure of the New York talks has made the political and strategic environment more complicated on the eve of the US mid-term elections. Trump is in a position where, on the one hand, the pressure of public opinion and electoral economy leads him to "avoid escalation"; On the other hand, the pressure of "preserving deterrence" and "strategic legacy" encourages him to "intensify after the elections".

However, operational (depleted reserves, skyrocketing costs) and political (public discontent, congressional pressure) constraints make it clear that a full-scale attack before November 3rd is not only "unlikely" but could lead to "electoral self-inflicted" for the Republicans. Therefore, the most likely scenario is "postponing major decisions until after the elections"; A postponement that does not mean "peace" but "temporary calm before the storm".

After the election, regardless of the outcome, the White House will face a difficult choice. Either it should move towards a "real agreement" with Iran, an agreement that includes mutual security and economic guarantees, or it should go for a "military solution" with "military escalation". The solution that the experience of the past decades has shown, not only does not lead to "victory", but also leads to deeper "strategic traps". What is certain is that "choosing between war and peace" in the coming months will not only be a political decision, but a "historical test" for America and Iran.