Rubio and the Reproduction of Colonial Civilizing Justifications / Ali Mirsepasi: Iran Should Not Be Merely a Name for Mobilizing the Public During War, or a Tool to Justify Past Decisions
Professor of sociology and Middle East studies at New York University says: 'For me, the issue is caring for Iran: a real country, with people who have a right to a future. Iran should not be merely a name for mobilizing the public during war or a tool to justify past decisions. If we make Iran's prosperity, freedom, security and development the benchmark, our question goes beyond 'negotiate or not': what policy could make a lasting peace and a dignified life possible
According to Ambassador Arjan, the intensification of international confrontations with Iran, the simultaneity of diplomacy and war, and the role of historical and civilizational narratives in shaping political relations have raised important questions about Iran's place in the world today. In such a situation, examining the goals of foreign actors, the relationship between military pressure and political strategies and Iran's future prospects, requires looking beyond the daily developments and paying attention to the historical and intellectual contexts of these conflicts. In this context, we have had a conversation with Ali Mirspasi, professor of sociology and Middle East studies at New York University.
In the context of an academic critical of some policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mirspasi believes that even the assumption that Iran's regional or domestic policies are wrong cannot absolve the aggressor from responsibility in the war. He emphasizes that Marco Rubio's civilized speech in Athens is rooted in colonial and racial and civilizational supremacy views.
Referring to Marco Rubio's recent words about the history and civilization of the West, Mirspasi believes that historical narratives can play a role in the formulation of political conflicts today. Emphasizing the need to avoid reducing history to a narrative based on the superiority of one civilization over another, he examines the relationship between the civilizational discourse, the American pressure policy against Iran, and the prospect of reaching a lasting agreement.
This New York University professor also emphasizes that military and economic pressures, without a clear horizon for the end of hostilities, will not necessarily lead to a lasting peace. From his point of view, the evaluation of policies should not be limited to the balance of power and the survival of governments, but should also include the possibility of providing security, prosperity and a decent future for the people of Iran.
We should not make any criticism of the governance in Iran an enemy of Iran as a whole
*** Over the past year, along with increasing concerns about the possibility of Iran's disintegration, we have also witnessed the spread of anti-Iranian literature. From a historical and political point of view, is there any connection between the intensification of this literature and the possibility of Iran's disintegration? How do you analyze this trend and to what extent can it be considered a sign of confrontation with Iran as a historical and civilizational unit, beyond opposing the policies of the Islamic Republic?
A distinction must be made between criticizing a government, enmity with a country and humiliating its people and history. Opposition to the political system of the Islamic Republic does not necessarily mean anti-Iranism; Just as opposing the war against Iran does not mean approving all the policies of the ruling system in Iran. This distinction is necessary to maintain the possibility of public debate. If we consider any criticism as an enemy to Iran, we have exempted the government from answering. If we introduce every attack on Iran as a fight against the government, we have lost sight of the lives of the people and the existence of the country.
Literature that presents a society as inherently dangerous, backward, or incapable of governing itself can make intervention and violence against it seem more acceptable. In this sense, your concern is justified. However, from the existence of this literature, it cannot be directly concluded that there is a single plan agreed upon by the Western governments to divide Iran. Such a claim requires concrete evidence about policies, decisions and implementation facilities. At the same time, the destruction of infrastructure and the weakening of the country's governing institutions can increase the risk of social and territorial rupture, even if disintegration is not the declared goal of the war. One should be precise about the intentions and take the consequences seriously.
The policies of the Iranian government do not absolve the responsibility of the foreign invaders for their actions
Here, it is necessary to pay attention to an issue within the political structure of Iran. One of the stable tensions of the governance system in Iran is the relationship between being a government and being a movement. In an important part of official speech, the ruling political system in Iran is not only the government of a country; It presents itself as the bearer of a cross-border mission to confront domination and injustice. The issue is not that a country should not have moral ideals. The issue is how the government's responsibility to the citizens' lives takes precedence over ideological and regional commitments.
It is not possible to justify a policy with the criterion of cross-border missions, but when its costs are revealed, any critical question with reference to Iran and national unity is left aside. If Iran's interests are the criterion, it should also be the criterion when making a decision. Of course, the responsibility of the invading governments does not disappear by referring to Iran's policies. Examining the interrelationship of hostilities does not mean equalizing the power, responsibility or contribution of all parties in each event.
In my opinion, the defense of the integrity of Iran should be accompanied by the defense of equal citizenship, political participation and respect for cultural and linguistic diversity. Iran is not just a legacy of the past; It is the common house of the people who live in it now. Their sense of belonging cannot be preserved only by calling for patriotism in times of danger.
Rubio's statement is a genealogy for civilizational superiority and has a kinship with colonialism
*** It seems that in recent years, the scope of the confrontation between America and Iran has gone beyond the nuclear issue and has included issues such as missile power, regional influence and even Iran's historical and civilizational identity. According to the statements of some American officials, including Marco Rubio, about the history and civilization of Iran, to what extent can we talk about the formation of a kind of civilization confrontation discourse? Should this discourse be considered a part of America's political strategy or is it more a reflection of certain ideological and intellectual currents in this country? Do the governments and schools of thought of other western countries also agree with figures like Rubio in this field?
Rubio's speech in Athens is a remarkable example of the political use of history. He begins his narrative with the invasion of Athens by Xerxes' army, and then makes a continuous comparison to the West, from Greece and Rome to America. In another part, a group of currents puts Iran against the image it presents of a hero in the West. This formulation turns history into a source for moral and political demarcation today. However, a distinction must be made between this narrative structure and the explicit claim of enmity with all Iranians; One should not attribute anything more than what has been said to the speaker.
My criticism is towards the logic that emerges from such a narrative: as if freedom, rationality and creativity are the exclusive heritage of one world and the other world appears mainly as a threat. In this view, the history of relationships, learning and mutual transformations gives way to a genealogy for excellence. This way of telling history is related to some civilizational justifications of colonialism; Justifications that introduced domination as a civilization-building mission. This criticism does not mean denying the achievements of Western societies or equating all periods of their history.
We should not answer Western exceptionalism with Iranian exceptionalism
But the right answer is not to create a reverse narrative in which Iranians are always the bearers of virtue and the West is always the embodiment of violence. If we put Iranian exceptionalism against Western exceptionalism, we have reproduced the same idea of closed civilizations and unchanging essences. The problem is to recover the intertwined history of societies and the political responsibility of humans today, not to determine which people have been superior since the beginning of history.
At the same time, "the West" does not have a single voice. The speech of the US foreign minister naturally has political weight and cannot be considered merely a personal opinion; But we don't have a basis to turn it into a description of all American society or all European countries. A clear example of the difference in policies is the reaction of the European Union to the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA in 2018: Europe officially expressed its regret for this decision and insisted on maintaining the agreement. This example is about a specific section; I don't mean that Europe has always been independent or always supported Iran.
The role of political Islamism and anti-Western language should also be seen in this history. Some of these currents have built their identity in opposition to the West. After the 9/11 attacks, the scope for dangerous generalizations about Islam and Muslim communities also expanded. However, it should not be concluded from this context that the Islamic Republic of Iran, Al-Qaeda and all forms of Islamism are the same phenomenon, or that Iranian society can be defined by any of them. Hostile language on either side can serve to reinforce the other, without obscuring the real differences between the actors.
There is a gap between the ability to inflict damage and the ability to create a stable political order
*** In both of his presidential terms, Trump has followed the policy of pressuring Iran with the aim of reaching a comprehensive agreement. How can this approach be analyzed in the framework of America's historical and political view of Iran?
The policy of maximum pressure is based on the assumption that increasing costs will encourage the other party to accept wider demands. But there is a gap between the ability to cause damage and the ability to create a stable political order. Pressure may limit a government's resources, but at the same time, it reinforces the perception of encirclement, the fear of collapse, and the influence of forces opposed to reconciliation. Therefore, the failure of Trump's first administration to reach the desired agreement cannot be explained only by the lack of pressure or only by his unfamiliarity with Iran's history. It should be asked whether there was an acceptable proposal to withdraw from hostilities and whether the Iranian side also had sufficient authority and will to achieve it.
The range of American demands was not only nuclear. For example, the official maximum pressure document of the second Trump administration in February 2025, in addition to the nuclear issue, targets the missile program and the regional network of the Islamic Republic. This document shows that the dispute is also related to Iran's position in the regional order; But it alone does not prove that the ultimate and unchangeable goal of America is the destruction of Iran or even the change of government. We must distinguish between the declared goals, practical demands and our perception of hidden motives.
Negotiation and war are not opposites
Here, I would like to emphasize an issue that, in my opinion, is less clear in the general discussion of Iran: negotiation by itself is not the opposite of war. Negotiation can be a way to end the war, but it can also continue with the war and even to improve the situation in it. In the Vietnam War, the Paris talks began in 1968; However, the war continued for years, and the Paris Agreement of 1973 was not an immediate end to all conflicts. Therefore, just sitting at the table is not a sufficient reason to move towards peace.
The main question is what each side is willing to negotiate about, what commitment they accept and what specific achievement they receive in return. If in a part of the hard core of power in Iran, negotiation is only a means to reduce sanctions and avoid the risk of war, without the possibility of revising some policies, the result may only be a temporary break in the crisis. On the other hand, if America sees negotiation as another name for unilateral acceptance of its demands, the issue is no longer compromise; It is a demand for surrender.
Iran's mistrust of America is not just an ideological slogan but is rooted in reality
Of course, it is not correct to say that Iran has never been willing to negotiate or that the nuclear issue has never been on the table. The JCPOA shows the opposite of this claim. Iran accepted specific and monitorable commitments, and when the US withdrew from the deal, the EU cited successive IAEA reports on Iran's implementation of its commitments. Therefore, mistrust of Iran cannot be considered as an ideological slogan. America's withdrawal from the agreement raised serious questions about the durability of its commitments.
However, distrust alone cannot guide foreign policy. Agreement is often required between parties who do not trust each other. It should be seen how to stage the commitments, measure their implementation, make the lifting of sanctions visible in practice and increase the cost of violating the agreement. The Iranian side also cannot expect verbal reassurance to replace measurable behavior; Just as America's verbal promise is not enough for security and economic benefit.
Limited negotiation on the nuclear issue is not wrong in itself. Sometimes it is more realistic to deal with differences in stages than a comprehensive agreement. But if regional issues, mutual threats and the relationship between Iran and Israel remain outside the agreement, there must be a way to manage them. Iran is not going to give up its right to defend itself; The issue is that the security of all parties becomes the subject of dialogue and mutual commitment replaces the demand for unilateral power vacuum.
The government's duty is not limited to survival
What did the occurrence of the 12-day war and the recent war change in the calculations of the Trump administration regarding Iran? Should the move from economic and political pressure to the direct use of military power be seen as a sign of a change in America's strategy or an attempt to compensate for the failure of previous policies? What image does this development give of the logic of Washington's decision-making towards Iran?
Entering the war directly is an important change in the means of exercising power, but it cannot be concluded from that alone that a clearer political strategy has emerged. The 12-day war of June 2025 and the attacks launched on February 28, 2026 showed that the military threat was not merely a background to the negotiations. In February, talks between Iran and the US took place before the attacks. This experience shows the simultaneity of diplomacy and war preparation.
To evaluate these wars, we must ask what was the goal: destroying a military capacity, changing the government's behavior, imposing an agreement, or changing the political system? These goals are not the same, and the realization of one does not guarantee the realization of the other. An operation may be described as militarily successful, but it does not create sustainable security. Destroying facilities is not the same as destroying knowledge, motivation and sense of insecurity; And weakening the government does not necessarily create a safer and freer society.
Without sufficient evidence, I do not want to make a definitive judgment about the exact change in the inner calculations of the Trump administration. What can be said is that any strategy based on repeating the attack must answer where its political end is. If, after each operation, the reconstruction of the power of the other side is used as an excuse for the next operation, we are facing a mechanism to reproduce the war. Such a situation may create military superiority for a while, but it wears out normal life, investment and the possibility of planning for the future.
For Iran, the survival of the government after the war should not be the only measure of success. One should ask about the human cost, the damage to living facilities and the lost opportunities. Survival is necessary, but the government's duty is not limited to survival; It should provide the possibility of development of the country and a decent life for the people.
Getting out of the cycle of war requires measurable commitments
*** Do Trump's decisions to take military action against Iran follow a long-term and coherent strategy or are they more influenced by cross-sectional calculations, domestic considerations and efforts to achieve quick results? In the meantime, what role has Trump's personal and political relationship with Benjamin Netanyahu played in defining the goals and determining the course of confrontation with Iran?
The personal relationship of the leaders can affect the timing, mutual trust and choice of tools, but it is not enough to explain the war only through the relationship between Trump and Netanyahu. Security considerations, domestic politics, military institutions, regional allies and economic costs are also involved. Just as one should not assume a completely coherent plan for every decision, decisions should not be considered simply the result of two people's moods.