Why Hasn't Saudi Arabia's Military Superiority Defeated Yemen's Ansar Allah?

Ansar Allah of Yemen, combining low-cost weapons, a resilient domestic base, and a divided enemy, has built an influence far beyond its conventional strength.

According to the report of Ambassador Arjan's international reporter, the Stimson American think tank has analyzed the escalation of conflicts between Yemen's Ansarullah and Saudi Arabia in an article that follows.

It should be noted that the publication of foreign articles does not mean the approval of its content by Ambassador Arjan.

The attacks on the King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh have brought the renewed war in Yemen to the economic and political heart of Saudi Arabia and further jeopardized the kingdom's development plans.

These incidents demonstrate the ability of the Houthis (Yemen's Ansarullah) to compromise Saudi infrastructure, without proving that every launch was successful or that Saudi air defenses collapsed.

After the attack on October 10, Saudi authorities announced that twelve people were killed and more than 300 were injured. The next day, another projectile hit a passenger terminal.

These incidents demonstrate the ability of the Houthis (Yemen's Ansarullah) to compromise Saudi infrastructure, without proving that every launch was successful or that Saudi air defenses collapsed.

The question is how a force with far fewer resources repeatedly imposes costs on a technologically superior government.

These attacks came after a new operation supported by Saudi Arabia. Escalation accelerated in July, when the Saudis attacked Sana'a airport to prevent an Iranian plane carrying Houthis attending the funeral of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran from landing.

After that, the Houthis attacked Saudi targets, including oil facilities, and captured the port of Mokha on the Red Sea coast near the Bab al-Mandab strait by the Houthis.

By October, Riyadh was backing an offensive to recapture Houthi gains along Yemen's west coast.

Attacks on Saudi airports are part of this coercive exchange, as this movement tries to make Saudi intervention costly and at the same time strengthen its territorial and negotiating position.

Why advanced air defense cannot prevent every attack

The Houthis can choose when and where to attack, while Saudi Arabia must protect airports, cities, energy facilities and military bases across a vast territory.

Protecting a kingdom requires more than advanced equipment and depends on early warning, coordination, and adequate missile defenses at threatened locations.

Different weapons require different responses; Low-altitude missiles leave little reaction time, and small drones are difficult to distinguish from other objects.

Systems designed to stop ballistic missiles may be less effective against these threats; Protecting the kingdom therefore requires more than advanced equipment and depends on early warning, coordination and adequate missile defenses at threatened locations.

Repeated attacks overwhelm this protection. Even when incoming weapons are destroyed, each interception uses ammunition that must be replaced. Shooting down cheap drones with expensive defensive missiles also makes long-term protection expensive.

Saudi Arabia has sought help as resources are strained, but available evidence does not indicate whether shortages played a role in the airport attacks. It would be premature to conclude that the defenses are out of action, overwhelmed, out of ammunition, or have equipment failure.

Damage can occur when a weapon passes through or debris falls after being intercepted. Saudi Arabia must consistently maintain protection, while the Houthis can gain political leverage from occasional attacks that cause damage and disruption.

The Houthis present their attacks as a response to Saudi military actions and restrictions imposed on Yemen. Their argument links Sana'a airport to Saudi airports through the main route called reciprocity.

The warning to airlines and passengers seeks to influence business behavior in addition to Saudi decision-making. This movement pursues coercion on the one hand by preventing further intervention, and on the other hand by pressuring Riyadh to change existing policies.

Airports magnify this pressure, as airlines, travelers and businesses independently market risk, extending disruption beyond physical harm.

The psychological goal is the promise of Saudi Arabia's stability. Economic diversification requires the trust of investors, tourists and international organizations.

The Financial Times reported that senior energy executives pulled out of a conference in Riyadh after the attack, suggesting the wider implications. Restraint risks appearing ineffective, and escalation invites retaliation.

By increasing the cost of confrontation for Saudi Arabia, the Houthis may hope to obtain more favorable conditions in these issues.

For the Houthi audience, reaching Riyadh represents strength, even if there is hardship within. These works do not prove that the movement has achieved its goals. Civilian casualties can solidify opposition to it, and retaliation does not eliminate the duty to protect civilians.

These attacks may also strengthen the position of the Houthis in the peace talks. The UN Roadmap, announced in December 2023, envisioned a nationwide ceasefire, payment of public sector salaries and further easing of restrictions on Sana'a airport and Hodeidah port. By raising the cost of confrontation for Saudi Arabia, the Houthis may hope to obtain more favorable terms in these issues.

Institutions and ideology keep the power of the Houthis stable

Ansarullah, the official name of the Houthis, emerged from the Zaidi revival movement in northern Yemen and fought six wars against the government between 2004 and 2010. These conflicts created experienced cadres, clan ties, and hardened leadership networks.

The capture of Sana'a in 2014 allowed the movement to absorb weapons and military forces, and to create overseers that link ministries, local councils, and tribal leaders to its leadership. Foreign weapons alone cannot explain this transformation from a movement to a territorial power capable of rebuilding forces and mobilizing state resources.

Taxes, customs, fuel-related revenue and compulsory contributions fund the system. Leader Abdelmalek al-Houthi's authority and old loyalties facilitate coordination, while recruitment is a combination of ideology, patronage, economic incentives, and coercion.

Poverty makes income and material support effective incentives, without implying political belief. Religious identity, resistance to foreign intervention, and solidarity with Palestine provide mobilizing narratives.

Foreign attacks can strengthen claims to defend Yemen and attract sympathy beyond the primary base, including among critics of the internal government. This power of mobilization does not prove global popular satisfaction.

Iran makes the ability possible, without determining any decision

Iran's help has expanded the military capabilities of the Houthis. US Defense Intelligence Agency releases identify Iranian links to missiles, drones and components intercepted at sea.

The report of UN experts in 2024 identified training and assistance including Iran's Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah and Iraqi specialists. Technical know-how helps the movement operate, maintain, and regenerate capabilities after equipment is lost.

However, local assembly depends on specialized components and expertise, but does not prove industrial independence or explain the command arrangements behind the recent attacks.

The Houthis retain their leadership, territorial ambitions, and bargaining priorities. Alignment does not imply Iranian leadership of every operation, although dependence on technical cooperation creates influence

Tehran, which is caught in its war with the US, gains influence over Saudi Arabia and sea routes without sending a conventional expeditionary force or fully providing for the Houthi government.

However, the Houthis retain their leadership, territorial ambitions, and bargaining priorities. Alignment does not imply Iranian leadership of every operation, although dependence on technical cooperation creates influence.