Sudan Cannot Afford to Miss the Chance for Dialogue

A new initiative faces serious questions over military influence, but its critics should not pass judgment prematurely.

After more than three years of fighting between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Sudan is in dire need of a political solution. The war has caused too much suffering, and a military solution alone cannot rebuild the state or reunify its fractured society. In such a situation, any effort aimed at encouraging Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue deserves serious attention instead of outright rejection.

In August, a self-appointed committee of 19 Sudanese public figures, chaired by Ahfad University President Kassem Badri, launched an initiative to pave the way for a national dialogue within Sudan. Its members had previously met with SAF chief General Abdul Fattah al-Barhan and demanded the lifting of legal restrictions on dissident politicians. Authorities subsequently issued a ruling that dropped some politically motivated charges against Sudanese returning for talks abroad and granted the participants temporary legal protection. These are limited but important confidence-building measures.

This initiative, however, has met with strong opposition. The Somoud civilian coalition, led by former prime minister Abdallah Hamdok, and Oshal, a coalition that includes the RSF, have opposed the proposed internal dialogue. They question its independence and warn that holding negotiations in military-controlled areas can legitimize al-Barhan's authority and strengthen the country's divisions. These concerns are legitimate and deserve serious consideration. But the committee says it does not seek to negotiate the future of Sudan or set the agenda for the national dialogue. Its role is to help create conditions for Sudanese political actors to interact directly with each other. The question is, can it fulfill this role without allowing one side of the conflict to dominate the process? It would be premature to dismiss the initiative before it has had a chance to prove its worth.

The country's political actors and civil society organizations are deeply divided, previous mediation efforts have failed, and the war continues to make inclusive political participation more difficult. The committee's initiative is an attempt to break the deadlock. Efforts to prepare for political dialogue should not be postponed until the end of the war. Securing a ceasefire and ensuring humanitarian access are immediate priorities, but preparations for political dialogue can continue alongside efforts to achieve them.

Committee members are not elected, and they do not represent any political constituency. However, the legitimacy of a committee cannot be judged solely by how it was created. It should also be judged on whether it can help bring a wider range of political actors into the national conversation.

Good intentions alone cannot resolve credit concerns. Political dialogue can only be successful if the participants believe that the process is fair and independent. The legitimacy required to facilitate a political opening is not necessarily the same as that required to negotiate a national settlement. But even a preliminary initiative must win the trust of those it seeks to bring together.

The meeting of the committee with al-Barhan was a practical necessity. As head of the army and head of the ruling council, he was in a position to respond to the committee's demands for legal protection. Communication with al-Barhan does not in itself mean confirmation of his authority. But if the initiative becomes too closely associated with the military, other political actors may see it as an extension of al-Barhan's political agenda rather than an independent facilitator. Therefore, the committee must show that its interaction goes beyond the military authorities and is ready to cooperate with the political forces that oppose them.

The initiative was launched in Khartoum, which is controlled by the military. This raises real concerns about whether a process that begins in territory controlled by one of the warring parties can win the trust of political forces across the country. National dialogue cannot be limited to a geographical or political area. Entire regions have experienced different realities of war, governance, displacement and insecurity. The committee must find ways to reach people living outside military-controlled areas, including Sudanese displaced by the war, and ensure that they can participate freely and without intimidation.

A decision by the Supreme Court to reject this initiative does not automatically invalidate the process. Their concerns deserve consideration, but total rejection at this early stage risks closing the opportunity for political participation. At the same time, their absence is important. Sudan's crisis is very deep and complex, which cannot be addressed by any political current. The committee cannot expect every stakeholder to immediately approve its initiative, but it must create conditions that convince actors of a willingness to participate. If it fails to do so, the initiative itself has failed.

The African Union Commission and the Arab League have also welcomed the initiative, providing an important measure of regional support. Their approval adds importance to efforts to revive Sudan-led political talks, although foreign support cannot replace the confidence of Sudan's own political forces.

Therefore, the committee's initiative should be judged without excessive optimism or automatic suspicion. The legal actions announced after the engagement with al-Barhan are an encouraging first step, but the real test lies ahead. Does it help to remove the legal and political obstacles facing the opposing actors in practice and not just on paper? Can it win the trust of those who rejected it? Can it ensure that Sudanese across the country's political and geographical divides have the opportunity to participate freely?

But what is clear is that the Sudanese crisis ultimately requires Sudanese actors with deeply different views of the country's future to sit together and engage politically with each other. No committee can do this on their behalf. No foreign actor can do it for them. At best, a preparatory initiative can help create the conditions under which such interaction becomes possible. The concerns raised by its critics should not be ignored, but they should not be grounds for dismissing the initiative before it has had a chance to be addressed. Those who have rejected it should reconsider their position if the committee shows that it can create an independent and inclusive process. If it succeeds, it has rendered an important national service.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Al Jazeera.